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Were the years after 1815 a period of peace? To Julius von Wickede, the principal 
war correspondent of Die Gartenlaube and one of the most famous military writers 
of the 1850s and 1860s, the early nineteenth century had been characterized by a 
series of ‘struggles’ and ‘campaigns’ in South America, Greece, Poland, Spain, and 
Algeria, in which the subjects of his books had fought as adventurers, mercenaries, 
and professional soldiers.1 To many other observers of European affairs, like a ‘for-
mer Bavarian officer’ writing anonymously in the Allgemeine Zeitung in 1851, 
‘thirty-three years had elapsed and Europe had enjoyed a peace which, it appeared, 
would never end’.2 If this ‘golden peace’ had continued, contemporaries would 
again have been faced with the spectacle, as in the Holy Roman Empire, of having 
pictures of grenadiers painted onto their guard-houses, since real guards would no 
longer be needed, he went on.3 Yet peace had not proved durable, with wars involv-
ing European Great Powers breaking out in northern Italy, Hungary, and Schleswig-
Holstein in 1848, in the Crimea in 1853, and in Italy again in 1859.4 Together, 
such conflicts occupied a prominent place in eight of the sixteen years between 
1848 and 1863, after which the wars of German unification began. Although later 
widely understood to constitute an historical caesura, these wars, too, were seen by 
most contemporaries as the extension of a single era of international instability, in 
which the years of conflict outnumbered those of peace.
The escalation of each conflict seemed likely, reawakening fears of a European 
conflagration—which had never entirely disappeared—akin to those of the revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic periods.5 Britain had threatened to join the conflict in 
1 J. v. Wickede (ed.), Ein Soldaten-Leben. Erinnerungen aus den napoleonischen, südamerikanischen, 
griechischen, polnischen, spanischen und algerischen Feldzügen 2nd edn, (2 vols, Stuttgart, 1854), vol. 1, 
viii. Also, J. v. Wickede, ‘Kriegerleben in Algerien’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 18, 206–8, and vol. 19, 
219–21.
2 Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1851, 1500. See also Grenzboten, 1855, vol. 13, no. 4, 58: ‘This period of 
peace has been a long one and, in a certain sense, first ended with the Crimea expedition.’
3 Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1851, 1500.
4 The best work on the destabilization of the states’ system after 1848—especially given the impact 
of the Crimean War—remains P. W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War: The 
Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, NY, 1972). See also W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and 
the German Question, 1848–71 (New York, 1969); A. Doering-Manteuffel, Die deutsche Frage und das 
europäische Staatensystem 1815–1871, 2nd edn (Munich, 2001); F. R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy 
among the Great Powers, 1815–1918 (Oxford, 1990); J. Angelow, Vom Wiener Kongress zur Pariser 
Konferenz (Göttingen, 1991); and F. J. Müller, Britain and the German Question (Basingstoke, 2002).
5 Even Great Powers on the ‘right side’ were criticized in the German press: see, for example, 
Kladderadatsch’s depiction (1855, vol. 8, 196) of a French eagle and a British lion feeding on the 
 carcass of Sevastopol and throwing tidbits to Turkey and Sardinia.
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northern Germany in 1848–51; Russia had given military assistance to Austria in 
Hungary in 1849; and the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies had been 
poised to join France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire against Russia in 1853–6, 
which had appeared to offer ‘a chance of a war of all Europe against Russia’, as 
Marx and Engels eagerly put it.6 Prussia and other German states had anticipated 
participation in the war between Piedmont, France, and Austria in 1859. What 
was more, colonial, national, and civil wars outside Europe had become increas-
ingly difficult to ignore, with the American Civil War, in particular, appearing as 
an augury of the worst effects of modern warfare in general. Eventually, wrote 
Wickede from a more optimistic point of view, ‘the mythical idea of a perpetual 
peace’, which—he claimed—had ‘dominated so many minds’ before 1848, had 
disappeared forever, along with ‘that mad notion of the dispensability or even 
 burden of an army which is well-trained and ready for war, even in peacetime’.7 
The 1850s and 1860s seemed to prove, as historians and other commentators had 
continued to believe throughout the years after 1815, that war was inevitable.
Contemporaries’ impressions of such wars were, to a large extent, the product of 
press reportage, which was combined with an eclectic stock of pictures, personal 
accounts, and historical narratives of conflict.8 Given that revolutionary violence 
had been kept separate in onlookers’ minds from military combat, few Germans 
could claim to have had direct experience of warfare. At its height in 1850, 
Schleswig-Holstein’s army numbered 860 officers and 43,288 men, joined in 1848 
and 1849 by much smaller contingents of Prussian and confederal troops. As in 
1848–9, many German–Austrian combatants were to be found amongst the 
Habsburg monarchy’s 242,000 troops deployed in northern Italy in 1859 but their 
experiences, and the communities to which they were relayed, remained isolated to 
an extent from a wider German public sphere, as a consequence of the different 
internal and external priorities of the Austrian state and its German-speaking pol-
itical constituencies. ‘I can only lament that Austria manages to have so little effect 
in the press at this time,’ the publisher of the Allgemeine Zeitung Georg von Cotta 
had written to an Austrian official and occasional journalist in August 1857: ‘The 
A. Z. neglects it and, since Austrian newspapers are not read at all in Germany, it 
is only the Frankfurt Oberpostamtszeitung through which Austria speaks for itself, 
but this only has 2,000 subscribers and no influence at all on public opinion.’9 
In contrast to the experiences of their predecessors during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, which had often been first- or second-hand, Germans’ concep-
tions of warfare by the 1850s were closely connected to received ideas, mediated 
6 K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘Progress of the War’, New York Daily Tribune, 1 Jan. 1855, in K. Marx 
and F. Engels, Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 1985), vol. 13, 567.
7 J. v. Wickede, Die militärischen Kräfte Deutschlands und ihre Fortschritte in den neueren Zeit 
(Stuttgart, 1855), 1.
8 See N. Buschmann, ‘Auferstehung der Nation? Konfession und Nationalismus vor der 
Reichsgründung in der Debatte jüdischer, protestantischer und katholischer Kreise’, in H.-G. Haupt 
and D. Langewiesche (eds), Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte (Frankfurt, 2001), 
333–88.
9 G. Cotta to J. C. v. Zedlitz, 23 Aug. 1857, in E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 1798–1898 
(Munich, 1898), 290.
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images, and reported events. Thus, although reporters were anxious, in the words 
of one correspondent of the Allgemeine Zeitung after the battle for Eckernförde in 
April 1849, to establish the ‘sources of their portrayals’ (in this case, the ‘tales of a 
bombardier from Holstein and the testimony of captured Danes’ as well as the 
journalist’s own ‘eye- and ear-witness account’), they posted their articles alongside 
historical recollections and visual depictions of previous conflicts.10 This chapter 
investigates the extent to which such traditional representations of warfare were 
reinforced or contradicted by the varied reporting of modern military conflicts 
after 1815.
THE COvERAGE OF WAR IN THE PRESS
A transformation of the press and public sphere took place in the German lands 
during the mid-nineteenth century which had the potential to alter the way in 
which readers conceived of military conflicts.11 Much of the debate about a read-
ing public has concerned its extent and significance, not the expansion of the press, 
which was more or less constant: in 1826, there were 371 separate German lan-
guage newspapers, 688 in 1848, 845 in 1858, and 1,217 in 1867.12 The lifting of 
censorship and interest in politics during the revolution had led to a sudden mush-
rooming of titles—1,102 by 1850—but this figure remained as exceptional as the 
circumstances which had produced it. Although there was a quantitative leap in 
circulation after the adoption of rotary printing presses—making it possible to 
produce cheap copy for a mass market—from the 1870s onwards, the readership 
of the principal newspapers and periodicals had increased markedly before then.13 
In 1813, the Vossische Zeitung had had 4,000 subscribers for its three weekly 
 editions, the Leipziger Zeitung 5,000, and the Hamburgische Correspondenten 
10,000; by the 1850s and 1860s, the best-selling newspapers had subscriptions for 
daily issues of 10,000–15,000, with popular publications such as the Volkszeitung 
(Berlin) reaching 26,450.14 Illustrated periodicals such as the satirical Kladderadatsch 
had 24,550 subscribers (1854) and the family magazine Gartenlaube 42,000 
10 Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 Apr. 1849, 1616.
11 See N. Buschmann, ‘ “Moderne versimpelung” des Krieges. Kriegsberichterstattung und öffen-
tliche Kriegsdeutung an der Schwelle zum Zeitalter der Massenkommunikation’, in N. Buschmann 
and H. Carl (eds), Die Erfahrung des Krieges, 97–123; Ute Daniel, ‘Der Krimkrieg 1853–1856 und 
die Entstehungskontexte medialer Kriegsberichterstattung’, in Ute Daniel (ed.), Augenzeugen. 
Kriegsberichterstattung vom 18. zum 21. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2006), 40–67, on Britain; also, G. Maag, 
W. Pyta, and M. Windisch (eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg (Berlin, 2010).
12 A. Green, ‘Intervening in the Public Sphere: German Governments and the Press, 1815–1870’, 
Historical Journal, 44 (2001), 159.
13 K. Dussel, Deutsche Tagespresse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Münster, 2004); K. Koszyk, Deutsche 
Presse im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1966).
14 E. Widdeke, Geschichte der Haude- und Spenerschen Zeitung 1734 bis 1874 (Berlin, 1925), 104–5; 
O. Groth, Die Zeitung. Ein System der Zeitungskunde (Berlin, 1928), vol. 1, 245–7; H.-D. Fischer 
(ed.), Deutsche Publizisten des15. bis 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1971), H.-D. Fischer (ed.), Deutsche 
Zeitungen des 17. bis 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1972), H.-D. Fischer (ed.), Deutsche Zeitschriften des 
17. bis 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1973), H.-D. Fischer (ed.), Deutsche Presseverleger des 15. bis 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1975); K. Hagemann, ‘Teutsche Ehre’, 151, 154.
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(1856), rising to 100,000 in 1860 and 155,000–160,000 in 1863.15 The majority 
of publications appealed largely to middle-class readers, with the Deutsche Zeitung, 
for instance, drawing subscribers predominantly from the civil service (21.5 per 
cent), educated professions (35.8 per cent), and commerce (12 per cent) between 
1847 and 1850, yet they also extended beyond such circles.16 ‘News’ was not only 
discussed within the family, as newspapers were passed from one relative to another, 
but within reading societies, lending libraries, taverns, and coffee houses, extend-
ing a knowledge of domestic and foreign affairs to a calendar and almanac-reading 
public, which encompassed a significant part of the literate 80 per cent or so of 
men and 50 per cent or more of women of early nineteenth-century western 
German towns—even if it also excluded the lower orders from regular daily or 
weekly exposure to state or national politics.17 The proliferation of titles and 
expansion of circulation for each title meant, by the 1860s, that most educated 
Germans and Austrians regularly read a newspaper or periodical. In Prussia, it has 
been estimated that weekly newspaper sales in the mid-1850s amounted to one 
copy for every fifteen householders and one for every two or three voters.18 The 
actual number of readers of newspapers and periodicals was probably between 
three and five times this figure.19
The press in the German lands remained varied and central to political life, 
 despite censorship, aided by the patchwork of individual states with their twenty-
seven different sets of press laws.20 In some states such as Hanover, official activity 
was significant, with 54 per cent of Hanoverian papers controlled by the govern-
ment and a further 26 per cent occasionally influenced by it, according to one 
estimate.21 Even here, however, the chief of the Press Bureau Oskar Meding did 
not believe the liberal and other milieux of the larger cities to be susceptible to 
government influence.22 Elsewhere, the press was less restricted, despite common 
15 K. Belgum, Popularizing the Nation: Audience, Representation and the Production of Identity in 
Die Gartenlaube, 1853–1900 (Lincoln, NE, 1998), 200; E.-A. Kirschstein, Die Familienzeitschrift: 
Ihre Entwicklung und Bedeutung für die deutsche Presse (Berlin, 1937); D. Barth, Zeitschrift für Alle—
Blätter furs Volk. Das Familienblatt im 19. Jahrhundert (Münster, 1974).
16 U. v. Hirschhausen, Liberalismus und Nation. Die Deutsche Zeitung 1847–1850 (Düsseldorf, 
1998), 302.
17 From 1770–1820, 597 reading societies were founded, and 656 lending libraries in Prussia by 
1846. J. M. Brophy, ‘The Common Reader in the Rhineland’, Past and Present, 185 (2004), 119–58. 
See also R. Schenda, Volk ohne Buch (Munich, 1977); O. Dann, Lesegesellschaften und europäische 
Emanzipation (Munich, 1981); G. Jäger and J. Schönert (eds), Die Leihbibliothek als Institution des 
literarischen Lebens im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1980); M. Knoche, Volksliteratur und 
Volksschriftenvereine im Vormärz (Frankfurt a. M., 1986); R. Engelsing, ‘Zur politischen Bildung der 
deutschen Unterschichten 1789–1863’, in R. Engelsing, Zur Sozialgeschichte deutscher Mittel- und 
Unterschichten, 2nd edn (Göttingen, 1978); R. Pröve and N. Winnige (eds), Wissen ist Macht 
(Berlin, 2001).
18 K. Wappler, Regierung und Presse, 59.
19 R. Engelsing, Analphabetentum und Lektüre (Stuttgart, 1973).
20 W. Siemann, ‘Ideenschmuggel. Probleme der Meinungskontrolle und das Los deutscher 
Zensoren im. 19. Jahrhundert’, Historische Zeitschrift, 245 (1987), 71–106; S. Spiegel, Pressepolitik 
und Pressepolizei in Bayern unter der Regierung von König Maximilian II (Munich, 2001).
21 Abigail Green, ‘Intervening in the Public Sphere: German Governments and the Press, 
1815–1870’, Historical Journal, 44 (2001), 172–3, cites Alfred Hildebrandt’s figures from 1862.
22 J. F. M. O. Meding, Memoiren zur Zeitgeschichte (Leipzig, 1881–4), vol. 1, 66–7.
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practices such as the seizure of individual editions of newspapers, the withdrawal 
of licences to publish or sell, the lodging of sizeable deposits with the authorities, 
interference with postal subscriptions, collective liability for the contents of a pub-
lication on the part of authors, publishers, printers, and sellers, and the banning of 
‘foreign’ papers.23 Partly because it did not have a system of deposits and had 
retained jury trials for cases involving the press, which had been introduced in 
1848, Bavaria was notorious for seizing copies of newspapers, with Karl Brater, the 
Bavarian deputy and newspaper publisher, estimating that the power had been 
used on 2,520 occasions between 1850 and 1858, making it virtually a daily occur-
rence, yet it generally took place without further penalty or charge.24 The Bavarian 
Ministry of Justice itself seemed to doubt the efficacy of press controls, most not-
ably in a fifteen-page memorandum published in 1869, which looked back to the 
1850s and 1860s:
At different times, and namely at times of agitation, the demand resurfaced to again 
exercise influence over the press, which was usual in the old legal order. The permissi-
bility of confiscation gave a helping hand towards this end. There was at times the 
fullest and, it cannot be denied, also a barely permitted use of this method. With what 
success? Individual evil-intentioned voices in the press were silenced, and the admirers 
of the past were almost and temporarily satisfied, but only by summoning forth in this 
fashion, and giving actual credence to, new storms and, at the same time, by making 
the well-intentioned institution of confiscation, which was not incidentally intended 
to extend beyond the sphere of penal legislation, into the object of unanimous 
antipathy.25
The President of the Ministerrat Ludwig von der Pfordten confessed in 1857 that 
‘the judgement of charges against the press by juries does not safeguard effective 
repression of the excesses of the press’.26
With states like Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Sachsen-Weimar—where politics 
could be discussed openly—constituting ‘a happy oasis in the middle of the polit-
ical desert that covered the greater part of Germany’, in Karl Biedermann’s words, 
it proved difficult for any German government to stifle press opinion, especially in 
the sphere of foreign policy, which had traditionally been subject to fewer 
 controls.27 At the time of the constitutional crisis in Kurhessen, which provoked a 
stand-off between vienna and Berlin, precipitating the Olmütz Punctuation on 
29 November 1850, the press had demonstrated how unwieldy it was, in the words 
of the Allgemeine Zeitung: ‘What the Bavarian papers are silent about, the Swabian 
ones report on, and in Frankfurt, where the routes of the world and the telegraph 
lines converge and where one is so close to the site of Kurhessen, the press produces 
23 W. Siemann, Gesellschaft, 67–77.
24 L. Kuppelmayr, ‘Die Tageszeitungen in Bayern 1849–1972’, in M. Spindler (ed.), Handbuch der 
bayerischen Geschichte (Munich, 1975), vol. 4, 1147.
25 R. Kohnen, Pressepolitik des Deutschen Bundes. Methoden staatlicher Pressepolitik nach der 
Revolution von 1848 (Tübingen, 1995), 185.
26 Pfordten to Schrenck, 10 Oct. 1857, R. Kohnen, Pressepolitik, 121.
27 The forty-eighter Karl Biedermann, Mein Leben, vol. 2, 116, had gone there in 1855 to edit the 
Weimarer Zeitung.
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the most extensive and newest reports every day.’28 Even in Prussia, ‘public opin-
ion’ refused ‘blindly to trust’ in government policy, to the chagrin of Friedrich 
Wilhelm Iv, but instead wanted ‘to make itself independent’, in varnhagen von 
Ense’s opinion.29 When the king was attacked by the Vossische Zeitung for sacking 
Gustav von Bonin as War Minister in 1854, Karl Ludwig Friedrich von Hinckeldey, 
the Generalpolizeidirektor of Berlin, reportedly shrugged his shoulders and said that 
the courts usually acquitted journalists in such circumstances.30 The obverse of 
such press independence was the ability of editors to shape the political agenda and 
actively to call for war or to depict—or misrepresent—it as inevitable, which is 
what the National-Zeitung had done on 8 November 1850, in its eagerness to push 
a purportedly pro-German Prussia into a war against a reactionary Habsburg mon-
archy, when it had wrongly reported that the bellicosity of the Prussian public had 
prompted the government to mobilize troops.31 With 1,160,214 newspapers sold 
every week in Prussia by 1855, the Prussian state lacked the means to control the 
press.32 Throughout Germany, the expansion of the press and the legacies of 1848 
left a diverse public sphere in place: by the mid-1850s, it has been estimated that 
34.3 per cent of newspapers were ‘oppositional’, mainly liberal or democratic, 
4.4  per cent Catholic, 6.7 per cent neutral, 14.2 per cent conservative, and 
40.4  ‘governmental’, with a higher tally of official publications in rural regions 
(72.7 per cent in Silesia) and a lower one in urbanized ones (34.7 per cent in the 
Rhineland), where liberal organs such as the Kölnische Zeitung (12,250 copies in 
1854) and the Elberfelder Zeitung (3,200) were dominant.33
The bulk of newspapers’ coverage had been devoted traditionally to foreign 
affairs, with diplomatic and military conflicts occupying many column inches. In 
the Allgemeine Zeitung, the balance between international and national reports had 
been 87:13 in 1824 and 74:26 in 1842.34 The recollection of the Badenese jour-
nalist and revolutionary J. G. A. Wirth that he had gained his political education 
from the French press, the articles of which were reprinted in German newspapers, 
was not unusual.35 Even major publications like the Allgemeine Zeitung had not 
begun to print articles by their own editors until 1836, preferring to use pieces 
from other publications and occasional correspondents until that point.36 From 
eight o’clock in the morning, when the daily newspapers arrived at the office, the 
editor-in-chief Karl Joseph Stegmann had himself worked his way through 
Le Moniteur, Journal des débats, and The Times in order to see what would form the 
28 Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Nov. 1850, cited in N. Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, 46.
29 21 Mar. 1854, varnhagen von Ense, Tagebücher, vol. 11, 1.
30 10 May 1854, ibid., 63–4. Hinckeldey was, according to varnhagen, also acting to get his own 
back for unpunished attacks on him by the Kreuzzeitung, but he made the argument only because it 
was credible.
31 National-Zeitung, 8 Nov. 1850, cited in Buschmann, Einkreisung, 45.
32 K. Wappler, Regierung und Presse, 59.   33 Ibid., 60.
34 E. Blumenauer, Journalismus zwischen Pressefreiheit und Zensur. Die Augsburger Allgemeine 
Zeitung im Karlsbader System 1818–1848 (Cologne, 2000), 116.
35 Ibid., 124.
36 M. Breil, Die Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung und die Pressepolitik Bayerns. Ein Verlagsunternehmen 
zwischen 1815 und 1848 (Tübingen, 1996), 31–2.
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kernel of the publication’s news agenda and what could be used as articles.37 
By 1824, the journalists of the Augsburg publication were gutting forty-five news-
papers—most of which were foreign—in this fashion, extending the practice 
under Stegmann’s successor after 1835, Gustav Kolb, to include the merging and 
rewriting of pieces from other newspapers within single AZ articles.38 A network 
of contacts in Bavaria, the rest of Germany, and abroad was developed simultan-
eously, growing from fourteen correspondents in 1799 to 150 in the years between 
1807 and 1819, with the publishers Johann Friedrich and Georg von Cotta help-
ing to select them and arranging their fees.39 By 1845, the ‘directory of all corres-
pondents of the Allgemeine Zeitung’ registered 250 writers, some of whom 
submitted only occasional reports: twenty-three in Paris and thirteen in vienna, 
with a smaller number in other European capitals and single correspondents fur-
ther afield in China, the East Indies, Mexico, and Peru.40 Like the majority of 
other major newspapers and periodicals, most of which had networks of their own 
correspondents (albeit less extensive ones), the AZ also relied on Wolff’s 
Telegraphisches Bureau (WTB), which started to send news to Berlin publications 
at the end of 1849 and to those of other cities during the 1850s, drawing largely 
on articles from the foreign press.41 After using British cables during the Crimean 
and Franco-Austrian wars, WTB signed an agreement with Reuters (Britain) and 
Havas (France) to share information in August 1859.42
All these changes in the reporting of news ensured that foreign affairs remained 
central to the growth of the press during the 1850s and 1860s, accounting for 60 
per cent of lead articles in Prussia between 1854 and 1857.43 In part, a foreign 
focus was the corollary of censorship, with lead articles on domestic policy rising 
from 10–20 per cent in Prussia during the 1850s to 50 per cent in the first year of 
the ‘New Era’ in 1858 to 80 per cent in 1862, before dropping back to 20–30 per 
cent in 1864–6.44 In part, the focus was structural, as an article in the Gartenlaube, 
entitled ‘A Workshop of Contemporary History’, revealed in 1866, as it looked 
behind the façade of the offices of the Kölnische Zeitung—emblazoned in large gold 
letters—in ‘the great building at 76–78 Breitestraße’:
Journalism in our time has achieved so much in respect of the speed of dissemination 
of the most recent and latest news from all areas of the world that the astonishment 
of the layman seems to be justified, and the traveller who is not used, with only a 
Bädeker in his hand, to allow place after place to fly past will certainly not miss the 
opportunity of having a look at those institutions of a newspaper which create the 
pleasure of informing himself of everything important that happens in the world 
from day to day. . . .
37 Ibid., 34.   38 Ibid.   39 Ibid., 35–6.
40 J. Requate, Journalismus als Beruf (Göttingen, 1995), 279.
41 D. Basse, Wolff’s Telegraphisches Bureau 1849 bis 1933 (Munich, 1991), 17–18.
42 Ibid., 26.
43 J. Fröhlich, ‘Repression und Lenkung versus Pressefreiheit und Meinungsmarkt. Zur preussis-
chen Pressegeschichte in der Reichsgründungszeit’, in B. Sösemann (ed.), Kommunikation und Medien 
in Preußen vom 16. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2002), 374.
44 Ibid., 381.
0002891581.INDD   187 11/4/2016   10:41:24 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
188 The People’s Wars
Walking down a long corridor, covered with carpet, we find ourselves, in following 
the production of the newspaper systematically, initially in the editors’ office, less to 
examine the inner being of a newspaper’s editors . . . as to get to know its external activ-
ities. It is just eight o’clock in the morning but all the editors are fully occupied. The 
French and English post has already come in; the correspondence which has arrived is 
being edited; ruthlessly, the red pen, this sentence-killing, feared instrument of our 
gentlemen-colleagues, across individual sections which are marred by sweeping state-
ments, lack of clarity, an undesirable proclivity or other incurable, organic defect. 
Other letters meet with a still worse fate: they go straight into the grave of the waste-
paper basket. . . . With the speed of the wind, the editors let their pencils and quills fly 
across the paper in order to arrive at their own ideas, whether in the form of a lead 
article or as an introduction and notes to reports sent in from every region of the 
world.45
The established practices of the newspaper business ensured that various per-
spectives of German and foreign wars were presented to readers, with reports from 
publications’ own editors and correspondents placed alongside those of the foreign 
press. Such juxtaposition did not prevent newspapers adopting unambiguous pol-
itical and diplomatic positions, however, which became an object of official interest. 
Thus, although Kolb wanted to be ‘a disinterested observer’ in the manner of 
his predecessor, the Allgemeine Zeitung under his stewardship was known as a lib-
eral, pro-Austrian publication.46 The editor ‘reined himself and his paper in so that 
the many-sided content of each question was fully expressed,’ wrote the publicist 
Julius Fröbel of the editor’s apparently unrealizable ideal: ‘One had usually known 
for a long time on which side he stood, but he allowed opinions which diverged 
from his own to be printed without contradicting them.’47 Editors like Kolb were 
instrumental in determining the direction of editorial policy, prompting the press 
offices of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies to analyse and attempt to 
influence their decisions. Kolb was ‘always strongly courted by diplomats and 
statesmen’, as one contemporary recalled.48 At the end of 1851, Schwarzenberg 
himself had complained through an intermediary that the ‘A. Z.’, despite not 
belonging ‘to the detractors of Austria’, had ‘no political conviction’ and therefore 
‘no common sentiment’ in support of vienna, effectively sharing the principles 
of  men like Heinrich von Gagern, who were set on pursuing their plans for 
Germany even at the risk of ‘civil war’.49 During the Crimean War, the Habsburg 
Presseleitungskomitee, which had been founded in 1852, reported that Kolb was 
‘inclined toward Austria’, with the newspaper ‘elastic’ as a consequence of its 
‘almost impossible programme’ of being ‘impartial’ but also accessible ‘directly’ 
through its publisher Georg von Cotta, who—mindful of the ‘circumstance that 
the Allgemeine Zeitung has the greater part of its sales in the Austrian monarchy’—
had assured vienna ‘in a private letter’ that the publication would, ‘in the face of 
all eventualities in the oriental question and its ramifications in Germany, hold 
45 ‘Eine Werkstatt der Zeitgeschichte’, Gartenlaube, 1866, vol. 48, 752–3.
46 G. Kolb cited in E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 117.
47 Ibid., 119.   48 Ludwig Steub cited ibid., 124.
49 J. C. v. Zedlitz to G. Cotta, 19 Oct. 1851, ibid., 285–6.
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true to Austria’.50 Yet the editors of newspapers such as the AZ were not always to 
be swayed even by their owners: during the Franco-Austrian War in 1859, both 
Cotta’s and Kolb’s preferences were overridden by another of the five editors in 
Augsburg, Hermann Orges, ‘who lets himself be beaten to death for Austria’.51 
Looking back on the war and the crisis which preceded it, the publisher lamented 
the lack of ‘North German’ points of view in the newspaper’s columns.52 Editors 
of newspapers and periodicals were protected by self-contained, reputable organ-
izations—what the article on the ‘Werkstatte’ of the press in the Gartenlaube called 
an ‘institute’, divided spatially into the functions of editing, typesetting, printing, 
and distribution—and by a distinct ‘journalistic life’, with Kolb and others prefer-
ring to surround themselves ‘with their own kind’.53
It was obvious to many observers after 1848 that ‘newspapers in their entirety – 
the “press”’—were ‘one of the main organs of public opinion’.54 This state of affairs 
was new, as the journalist and later academic Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl had noted: 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, some journalists and many public figures 
had challenged the idea that newspapers and periodicals should ‘lead’ the public—
hence, the disputed nature of the term ‘Leitartikel ’—or that states should seek to 
form ‘a free governmental press’ and ‘a government party’.55 For C. P. Berly, the 
editor of the Oberpostamtszeitung (which was owned by the Thurn and Taxis family 
and was answerable to vienna), ‘the public articulation of an opinion’ was always 
‘a matter of daring’, which he sought to conceal through ‘the quotation of recog-
nised authorities’, preferably ‘from the literature of a distant time or a foreign 
land’.56 Riehl was sympathetic to Berly’s views, which already appeared antiquated 
by the 1850s, as the editor of the conservative Nassauische allgemeine Zeitung 
(1848–51) and later editor of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung (1851–4) was 
aware. Most journalists were less understanding, particularly those of the largest 
popular, liberal or unaligned publications like the Vossische Zeitung, Volkszeitung, 
Schlesische Zeitung, Magdeburger Zeitung, Hamburger Nachrichten, Weser-Zeitung, 
Kölnische Zeitung, Hannoversches Tageblatt, Frankfurter Journal, Schwäbischer 
Merkur, Stuttgarter Neues Tageblatt, Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, Nürnberger 
Correspondent, and Allgemeine Zeitung, which dominated Berlin, Silesia, and the 
urban centres of northern, western, central, and southern Germany, respectively. 
The editors and owners of these publications tended to be trenchantly liberal, like 
Riehl’s own immediate superior Gustav Kolb, who had been a member of a 
Burschenschaft at Tübingen and who had travelled to Piedmont and learned Italian 
as a 23 year old, returning to join a secret society and to be imprisoned by the 
50 The committee’s annual report for 1854 was presented to the Austrian government on 7 June 1855, 
K. Paupié, Handbuch der österreichischen Pressegeschichte, vol. 2, 24–5.
51 G. Kolb to G. Cotta, 18 June 1857, in W. Gebhardt, Die deutsche Politik der Augsburger 
Allgemeinen Zeitung (Diss., Dillingen-Donau, 1935), 14.
52 Ibid., 27.
53 ‘Eine Werkstatt der Zeitgeschichte’, Gartenlaube, 1866, vol. 48, 752–3; L. Steub on G. Kolb, 
E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 117.
54 W. H. Riehl, Kulturgeschichtliche Charakterköpfe, 3rd edn (Stuttgart, 1899), 90.
55 Ibid.   56 Ibid.
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 confederal Zentraluntersuchungskommission in the 1820s.57 Characters such as 
Kolb or his namesake Georg Friedrich Kolb, a forty-eighter from the Bavarian 
Palatinate who became the political editor of the Neue Frankfurter Zeitung in 1859, 
articulated their own, independent, sometimes idiosyncratic stance on war, willing 
to attack both allies and opponents, with Georg Friedrich Kolb opposing the anti-
Austrian policies of North German democrats—including vogt and Lassalle—in 
1859 but then proceeding—in a retrospective article in 1860—to advocate a 
‘struggle for unity, not against those abroad, but against the small and great states 
of Germany’, especially Austria.58
In general, liberal editors were belligerent in the name of a ‘German’ and ‘western’ 
cause. Karl Heinrich Brüggemann, the editor-in-chief of the Kölnische Zeitung, 
and Otto Elben, the editor and publisher of the Schwäbischer Merkur, were cases 
in point. The latter came from a well-known family of liberals in Stuttgart; the 
former had been imprisoned for eight years in Prussia during the 1830s, having 
been influenced by ‘the ramifications of the French Revolution’ in Germany  during 
his time as a student at Bonn, most notably the causes of ‘the freedom of the press 
and the political unity of the German fatherland’.59 During the revolution of 
1848–9, Brüggemann had demanded ‘measures for a timely war readiness on the 
part of Germany’ and had backed Prussia’s drawing of ‘the Reich’s sword for 
Schleswig-Holstein’, since ‘the opportunity was there’:
Europe’s inimical main powers had been lamed by fear of revolution and the desire 
burned in all hearts in Germany for Prussia to stand at the head of a national rebirth 
and to see an end brought to the growing anarchy of spirits through the violent jolt of 
a glorious decision.60
When Prussia failed to act on behalf of the revolutionary cause, the journalist had 
reminded the government via the columns of the newspaper that, ‘in times of 
danger, right lies with might, not with contracts’.61 ‘In Schleswig, Poland, at 
home, everywhere, one wants, above all, courage and decisive action’, he went on 
in April 1848:
The Volk . . . will be ready for every sacrifice as soon as you tell it what sacrifices you 
require of it! And it will be enriched by such sacrifices, for they procure for it the bul-
wark of all prosperity, the treasure of trust in itself, in the states which it bears and 
which it will be borne by!62
Because the ‘powers of the Reich’ were ‘rather theoretical and fictional’, he had 
advised—against those revolutionaries, including ‘much-respected Dahlmann’, 
who wanted ‘to mediatize or dissolve the armies of Prussia and Austria’—in favour 
of making the Prussian army ‘the actual point of crystallization of a future Reich 
57 E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 112–14.
58 ‘Rückblick’, Neue Frankfurter Zeitung, in K. Stoll, Die politische Stellung der Frankfurter Zeitung 
in den Jahren 1859 bis 1871 (Frankfurt 1932), 31.
59 K. H. Brüggemann, Meine Leitung der Kölnischen Zeitung und die Krisen der preußischen Politik 
von 1846–1855 (Leipzig, 1855), 6.
60 Ibid., 37.   61 Ibid., 38.   62 Ibid.
0002891581.INDD   190 11/4/2016   10:41:25 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
 War Reports 191
executive’.63 After the ‘failure of the Frankfurt Parliament’, the same wish for the 
Hohenzollern monarchy to countenance war for the sake of ‘Germany’, ‘as long as 
it has not improved its mastery of state fragmentation’, led Brüggemann to criticize 
Berlin’s ‘isolation’ during the Crimean War, warning it in a series of five articles in 
February 1855 that it faced a repeat of 1806, following its decision not to back 
vienna (as in 1805).64 Although the editor was dismissed, after Joseph DuMont—
the owner of the Kölnische Zeitung—was threatened with the withdrawal of the 
newspaper’s licence by the Prussian authorities, his replacement Heinrich Kruse 
continued to criticize Prussia for having missed ‘the most favourable opportunity’ 
of entering the war against Russia, which ‘unborn generations would have to 
regret’.65 The Rhineland would maintain its western outlook, as it had ‘twenty or 
thirty years ago, when we had no press at all’ and when the Kölnische Zeitung, ‘the 
most widely spread paper of the province, was merely a harmless collection of nov-
elties of the day’.66 Kruse’s point, in spelling out the implications of ‘editorial 
change’ on 1 April 1855, was that the press was now much more significant. 
He  went on to advance an equally independent line of argument during the 
Franco-Austrian war of 1859, hinting that the Habsburg monarchy was pursuing 
a war for its own ends, not those of ‘Europe’.67 ‘Germany’ should ‘remain vigilant 
and arm itself ’, ready to enter a ‘German war’, if one should break out.68 Elben 
followed a similar line, ‘not for Austria, not against Italy, but, if the German her-
editary enemy [France] interferes again, against it and for Germany!’69
What picture or pictures of war did the Schwäbischer Merkur, Kölnische Zeitung, 
and other publications propagate and how might readers have interpreted them? 
‘Public opinion’, which was discussed extensively in the mid-nineteenth century, 
was not to be equated with the press, as one article on ‘die öffentliche Meinung’ in 
the Catholic Historisch-politische Blätter reminded its readership in 1848: it was a 
‘great and profound misconception’ amongst private individuals and in govern-
ment to ‘hold public opinion to be a product of recent times’ or to be interchange-
able with the press.70 Instead, it referred to ‘the whole Volk’, describing the point 
at which ‘many individuals judge something in the same way at the same time’ so 
that ‘an agreement of judgement, a kind of general judgement (Gesammturtheil) 
results, either in individual or wider circles or even in whole lands, irrespective of 
the existing means of mental communication’.71 Such agreement did not imply 
that a single ‘public opinion’ obtained, invalidating unqualified injunctions for 
governments to enlist ‘public opinion on its side’, since ‘within the educated and 
reading world opinions on many issues are divided and not all are sufficiently rep-
resented by the press’, continued the Bavarian periodical.72 Beyond the educated 
world of readers, ‘the non-reading classes’ had their own views and prejudices, 
which were more difficult to gauge and to influence: ‘Each [the group of readers 
63 Ibid., 47.   64 Ibid., 73, 77.
65 K. Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen Zeitung, vol. 3, 193.
66 Ibid., 236.   67 Kölnische Zeitung, 1 May 1859, ibid., vol. 4, 96.
68 Ibid.   69 O. Elben, Geschichte des Schwäbischen Merkurs, 91.
70 ‘Die öffentliche Meinung’, Historisch-politische Blätter, 1848, vol. 2, 595.
71 Ibid.   72 Ibid., 596.
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and non-readers] is a world in itself; different ideas are in circulation in each; the 
exchange of ideas is mediated in different ways in each’, with word of mouth, 
rumour, and jokes being more central to one than the other.73 Nevertheless, the 
very occasion for the article in the Historisch-politische Blätter, which was more 
critical of what it called ‘the bad press’ and which was sympathetic to governments’ 
need to thwart or eliminate excesses, was a perceived transformation of the means 
of communication, opinion formation, and governance, in which ‘the most 
important means for the circulation of ideas, the easiest and most quickly effect-
ive’, was, ‘in truth, the press’.74 As such, it was ‘to be treated as a great power, which 
admittedly only has a direct effect on a small part of the population but which 
affects all classes indirectly’, the article went on: ‘What the reading public thinks, 
believes and desires metamorphoses over a certain period into the juices and life of 
the Volk and completes, like blood, its circulation of the entire organism.’75 
Governments had come to rely on the press as a forum for the articulation of pub-
lic opinion, which was needed to achieve public goods such as the provision of 
financial ‘credit’. Thus, they could no longer view ‘public opinion as an unjustified 
interference of the public in public affairs’, nor could they put themselves ‘in tow 
to public opinion’, either by setting up ‘an unworthy, dishonest system of spies and 
agents’ or by subjecting themselves to ‘the terrorism of those who claim, by crying 
the loudest, to represent the most powerful public opinion’.76 In practice, the gov-
ernments of most German states, in contrast to that in Austria, had availed them-
selves of limited, justified censorship to control the worst elements of the press at 
the same time as encouraging—via education and appeals to culture—the best 
elements, the article concluded. In an era of international crisis and war such as 
that between 1848 and 1871, it was expected that the best elements would prevail, 
with newspapers and periodicals informing subjects objectively and responsibly of 
the serious matters at hand.
There are many indications that readers took a close interest in military conflicts 
and looked to the press to relay the ‘facts’.77 Wars abroad led to increased sales for 
popular and liberal publications. In vienna, Die Presse had seen its subscriptions 
increase from 15,000 in 1850 to 30,000 in 1854–6 and 38,000 in 1859, before 
dropping to 25,000 by 1865.78 Although growing less dramatically, since the other 
German states were not implicated in hostilities, the circulation of newspapers 
such as the Allgemeine Zeitung, which had fallen from 11,155 to 7,064 between 
1848 and 1851, revived during the Crimean and Franco-Austrian wars.79 At the 
height of the conflicts in Schleswig-Holstein, Crimea, and northern Italy, news-
papers reported daily from ‘the scene of the war’, relying on telegraphs to pass on 
news as quickly as possible: at the start of the Crimean campaign, for example, it 
took five days for news to reach London (two days by steamship from Balaklava to 
varna, three by horse to Bucharest, where the nearest telegraph was), from where 
73 Ibid.   74 Ibid., 598, 601.   75 Ibid., 598.   76 Ibid., 597.
77 See, for example, the robust defence of the Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 Oct. 1853, of its reporting of 
the ‘facts’.
78 K. Paupié, Handbuch der österreichischen Pressegeschichte, vol. 1, 136.
79 E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 126.
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it was cabled directly by WTB to Berlin and the rest of Germany.80 By the end of 
1854, the French had linked varna to Bucharest by telegraph, reducing the deliv-
ery time to two days, followed by the laying of an underwater cable by the British 
from Balaklava to varna, so that news could reach London and the rest of Europe 
within hours. The speed of such communication created its own problems, with a 
time lag between short telegraphic bulletins and longer reports travelling by post, 
which arrived a week or two later from the Crimea and, even, Italy and a month or 
so later from the United States.81 Thus, the alleged defeat of Russia at Sevastopol 
on 2 October 1854—more than ten months before the event—was widely reported 
on the basis of telegraphs about an Allied victory at the Alma, which were not clari-
fied and corrected fully until William Howard Russell’s report reached The Times 
on 10 October.82 After the Austrian defeat at Solferino on 24 June 1859, there was 
an eleven-day delay, punctuated by Die Presse’s regular complaints that ‘detailed 
news about the great and bloody event of war are still missing’ (28 June), until 
reliable information arrived ‘from our own correspondent at military headquarters’ 
(4 July).83
It seems likely, however, that the speed and immediacy of the reportage helped 
to captivate readers, who weighed up for themselves the variety of sources—the 
War Ministry, commanders, officers, ordinary soldiers, civilians, foreign or war 
correspondents, other publications at home and abroad—that newspapers were 
anxious to evaluate and confirm.84 Journalists assumed that their readership would 
be familiar with the intricate details of a campaign—‘the general course of the 
 battle . . . will already be known to you from the newspapers’—even in the case of 
the American Civil War, which was covered less intensively.85 Occasionally, they 
pointed out ‘that no branch of literature’ was handled ‘as ruthlessly as daily news-
papers’, which were discarded like old household implements, and they voiced 
doubts that war correspondents, who were still relatively rare—Wickede being one 
of the best known in Germany—were guilty of sensationalizing or falsifying the 
events of a conflict in their desperation to produce interesting copy, but most of 
them were content to go on feeding a popular hunger for war reports.86
80 O. Figes, Crimea (London, 2010), 305. See also S. Kaufmann, Kommunikationstechnik und 
Kriegführung 1815–1945 (Munich, 1996).
81 Like other reporters, Marx commented on the need to combine the various sources, using ‘mails’ 
to substantiate and confirm telegraphs: K. Marx, ‘The War in the East’, The Zuid Africaan (Cape Town), 
6 Mar. 1854, written in London on 4 Jan. 1854, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 
1985), vol. 13, 18.
82 Ibid.   83 Die Presse, 28 June and 4 July 1859.
84 One correspondent of Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 May 1849, was typical of a general concern to 
confirm the veracity of his report, ‘writing down in pencil the oral description of the German officers 
and soldiers’.
85 ‘Orginalmittheilungen vom Kriegsschauplatze’, Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 30, 430. On readers’ 
familiarity with the American Civil War, see the Preußische Jahrbücher, 1862, vol. 10, 470.
86 ‘Berliner Bilder. Bürgerliche Kriegsbereitschaft’, Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 24, 345; Grenzboten, 
1850, vol. 9, no. 4, 681–5: there were war reporters in Schleswig-Holstein but their number was 
small. The first celebrated war reporters were associated with the Crimean War, particularly William 
Russell, who worked for The Times. The number of ‘war correspondents’ in the American Civil War 
was much greater, estimated at 500, yet the circumstances of a civil war were different, allowing 
American journalists and writers who usually worked in other fields to follow the fighting more easily: 
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Contemporaries’ appetites were stimulated by the novel, visual representation of 
conflicts in the press from the 1840s onwards. The Crimean War was the first 
major campaign to be caught on film, with about fifteen photographers from 
Britain (Roger Fenton, James Robertson), France (Jean-Baptiste-Henri Durand 
Brager, George Lefèvre Shaw, Jean-Charles Langlois), Italy (Felice Beato), and 
Russia taking several thousand images of officers, soldiers, camp life, and battle-
fields, yet few contemporaries in the German lands saw them at the time, since 
they could not be reproduced in the press and they were not published in German 
books.87 Ten years later, the American Civil War was much more extensively 
photographed, with up to 1 million images taken. Some were transposed by 
cohorts of illustrators—Harper’s Weekly and the Illustrated Weekly alone had eighty 
on their payroll—and others appeared in popular albums such as Timonthy 
O’Sullivan’s A Harvest of Death and Alexander Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book 
of the War.88 However, these images, too, made little impression on the mainstream 
German press. Photography—including, by the 1860s, images of the Crimean 
War—was one of several sources available to magazine illustrators, along with the 
various traditions of military painting, but its effect—particularly its gritty, 
unflinching realism—was limited until the mid-1860s.89
By comparison, the newly developing conventions of magazine illustration vis-
ible in the Leipzig Illustrirte Zeitung (founded in 1843) and Gartenlaube (1853), 
which focused on exotic landscapes, maps, scenes from daily life, portraiture, and 
anthropological typologies, were much more important, combined with longer-
standing examples of war albums by Albrecht Adam and Christian Wilhelm Faber 
du Faur, which had revealed the individual suffering and death of the Napoleonic 
campaigns.90 Der Weg zwischen Balaklava und dem englischen Lager, which appeared 
in the Gartenlaube in 1855, resembled paintings such as Adam’s Auf der Straße nach 
Moskau 8. September 1812 (1827) and Faber du Faur’s Die Brücke über die Kolotscha 
bei Borodino, den 17. September 1812 (1831–43) (see Figure 5.1).91 Französische 
Scharfschützen in ihren Feldschanzen, which was published in the same periodical 
at the end of 1854, showed French soldiers firing from entrenched positions as if 
G. Paul, Bilder des Krieges, 66. R. W. Desmond, The Information Process: World News Reporting to the 
Twentieth Century (Iowa City, 1978).
87 Ulrich Keller, ‘Schlachtenbilder, Bilderschlachten. Zur visuellen Kultur des Krimkriegs’, in 
G. Maag, W. Pyta, and M. Windisch (eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, 31–40, 
suggests that photographs were relevant in the construction of ‘panoramas’ in Paris (Langlois’s 
‘Sevastopol-Panorama’)—and there was also exhibitions—which seem to have affected magazine 
 illustration in France and Britain and, subsequently, in the German lands, too. J. Hannavy (ed.), The 
Camera Goes to War: Photographs from the Crimean War, 1854–56 (Edinburgh, 1974); U. Keller, The 
Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History of the Crimean War (Amsterdam, 2001); A. Rouillé, ‘Ein photog-
raphisches Gefecht auf der Krim’, in S. Germer and M. Zimmermann (eds), Bilder der Macht—Macht 
der Bilder. Zeitgeschichte in Darstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1997), 361–70.
88 G. Paul, Bilder des Krieges, 66–7; J. D. Horan (ed.), Timothy O’Sullivan, America’s Forgotten 
Photographer (New York, 1966).
89 S. Parth, Zwischen Bildbericht und Bildpropaganda, 242–52.
90 Ibid., 252–61. For the effects of illustrated and Familienzeitschriften on newspapers, see E.-A. 
Kirschstein, Die Familienzeitschrift, 131–45. See also Chapters 4 and 5.
91 Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 10, 137. S. Parth, Bildbericht, 258–9.
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they were completing a working day in a factory or workshop. It, too, had ante-
cedents—in addition to the mid-century realism of painters such as Adolph 
Menzel—in depictions of daily life during the Napoleonic Wars.92 Other illustra-
tions were closer to those of traditional military portraiture (Pelissier: Befehlshaber 
der französischen Armee im Orient, for instance, posed the commander in front of 
admiring officers and distant troops) or Romantic endeavour (Garibaldi’scher 
Volontair, Die Wiedereroberung einer Fahne in der Schlacht von Magenta).93 All such 
images, together with bird’s-eye-view maps showing the topography of battlefields 
(the siege of Sevastopol) and theatres of combat (the Black Sea), gave readers the 
impression that they were close to the war and the fighting. The images were juxta-
posed in the press with graphic correspondence and memoirs, which stood alongside 
the miscellany of nineteenth-century reportage. How significant such representa-
tions were—as a means of assessing their impact on subjects’ readiness to go to war—
is the subject of the following sections.
THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR  
SCHLESWIG -HOLSTEIN IN 1848–51
The military campaigns of Prussia and the Bund against Denmark involved small 
numbers of troops, but they had the potential to become a popular ‘German’ war 
on behalf of a beleaguered national population and territory against a traditional 
enemy. Jahn had termed the Low Countries and Denmark in their entirety a 
‘Nordreich’, anticipating their eventual inclusion in a greater German nation-
state.94 The so-called ‘Kiel circle’ of academics, which included Dahlmann and 
92 P. Paret, ‘Adolph Menzel from Different Perspectives’, in P. Paret, German Encounters with 
Modernism, 1840–1945 (Cambridge, 2001), 7–44; P. Paret, Art as History: Episodes in the Culture and 
Politics of Nineteenth-Century Germany (Princeton, NJ, 1988), 11–60, 77–130.
93 Pelissier, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 27, 345; Garibaldi’scher Volontair, Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 24, 
341; Die Wiedereroberung einer Fahne in der Schlacht von Magenta, Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 28, 405.
94 Cited in W. Carr, Schleswig-Holstein, 1815–1848: A Study in National Conflict (Manchester, 
1963), 9.
Figure 5.1 ‘Der Weg zwischen Balaklava und dem englischen Lager’
Source: Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 10, 137.
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Karl Theodor Welcker, had helped to establish the idea that Schleswig was a 
‘German’ land, connected by legal, linguistic, and institutional ties to Holstein and 
therefore—since the Duchy was a confederal territory—to the German Bund. 
In 1815, Dahlmann, who had been born in Wismar under Swedish rule in 1785 
but who was a professor at Kiel University between 1812 and 1828, remarked:
Even if the people of Schleswig have never been in the German Confederation, they 
belong to it through their brothers, the people of Holstein, to whom they have 
extended the hand of friendship over the centuries and with whom they are most 
intimately united in their constitution, their liberties and their rights . . . May they [the 
people of Schleswig and Holstein] grasp each other’s hand more firmly still.95
National claims and the call for an autonomous Schleswig-Holstein remained 
 limited in scope and resonance, however, until the late 1840s. Under the conditions 
of the ‘restoration’, conceded Welcker in the Kieler Blätter, ‘our national aspir-
ations will now have to become more or less provincial . . . so that in general the 
Germans will have to seek that which is good and true in the special circumstances 
of their own locality’.96 In the circumstances of the two duchies, with a handful of 
nationalists putting forward a case for the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark 
or the German Confederation by the 1840s, both liberals and conservatives con-
tinued to believe that some form of autonomy within the constitutional arrange-
ments of the Helstat, which itself had been granted by and fell under the prerogative 
of the Danish crown, permitted the maintenance of necessary historical, legal, and 
cultural linkages between the two territories. Even to a German nationalist like 
Droysen, who founded what became the Neue Kieler Blätter (originally bearing the 
historian’s preferred title of the Norddeutsche Blätter) and who taught students such 
as Karl Samwer, Lorenz Stein, and Theodor Mommsen at Kiel in the 1840s, a per-
sonal dynastic union with Denmark remained acceptable until 1848. Outside the 
duchies, the cause of Schleswig-Holstein became known to a wider German public 
from the mid-1840s onwards, with the song ‘Schleswig-Holstein meerumschlungen’ 
achieving popularity after the Würzburg festival of 1845, yet the complicated 
issues involved were barely understood until the eve of the revolution: the 
Allgemeine Zeitung was one of the first German publications to examine them in 
depth in a series of articles, to which so-called ‘Eider Danes’—who favoured 
extending Denmark’s border to the river Eider—also contributed, in 1845 and 
1846.97 Consequently, when the question became a pressing national one, after 
King Frederik vII of Denmark had announced his intention of annexing Schleswig 
on 21 March 1848, in order to appease Danish nationalists and forestall the full 
independence of the Duchy (along with Holstein), many German commentators 
could be found seeking answers and fashioning policies more or less from scratch.
Initially, there was broad support for the ‘national’ resistance of Schleswig and 
Holstein—or, at least, that of elites and other sections of the population of the 
95 Ibid., 55.   96 Kieler Blätter, vol. 2, cited ibid., 45.
97 Allgemeine Zeitung, 1845, nos 2828, 297, 359, 360; 1846, nos 12, 43, 59, 66, 95, 96, 121, 
Ibid., 239.
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main towns—against Danish aggression, after calling for assistance from the Bund 
and replacing the red, white, and blue flags of the duchies with the black, red, and 
gold ones of liberal ‘Germany’. With Frederik vII still a minor, ran the commen-
taries of the German press, it was not legitimate to try to banish doubts over his 
succession in Schleswig and Holstein by means of annexation.98 The estates of 
Schleswig-Holstein, meeting in Rendsburg on 18 March, had called for a separate 
constitution for the duchies and for Schleswig to join Holstein in the German 
Confederation. A provisional government had been set up by conservatives, 
national liberals, and radicals on 23 March in order to protect the rights of the 
duchies against the ‘unfree duke’, who had been constrained, as King of Denmark, 
by Danish nationalists.99 ‘With all our might and main we associate ourselves with 
the German struggle for unity and freedom,’ ran the provisional government’s 
proclamation, written by Droysen: ‘Let us show the German fatherland by our 
staunch demeanour and dignified bearing that the spirit of true patriotism fills the 
hearts of those who live in Schleswig-Holstein.’100 Prompted by his old student 
friend from Bonn Christian August, the Duke of Augustenburg, who was a con-
tender in the succession to the duchies, Friedrich Wilhelm Iv, issued a proclam-
ation on 24 March pledging Prussia’s support for the duchies against a Danish 
attack in accordance with the Confederation’s decision in September 1846. On 
12 April, the Bundesversammlung, which had previously recognized the provi-
sional government of Schleswig-Holstein, as had other German states, declared 
that the war between Denmark, the duchies, and Prussia, which had begun at the 
end of  March, was a Bundeskrieg, involving Germany as a whole, through the 
Confederation. Accordingly, the Tenth Federal Army Corps, with troops from 
Hanover, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Brunswick, and the Hansa cities, was deployed 
alongside the Prussian army. The Provisional Central Power and the National 
Assembly established by revolutionaries in Frankfurt formally endorsed the con-
flict as a ‘German’ or ‘Reich’ war. Deputies from both Schleswig and Holstein were 
elected in May to the Frankfurt National Assembly, despite the fact that the former 
territory lay outside the old Confederation. Dahlmann made their case to the 
newly gathered Frankfurt Parliament on 9 June, to applause from all sides of the 
chamber: ‘The balance of power in Europe may be upset, but if what is right does 
not occur in the matter of Schleswig, the German business itself will have been 
defeated’.101 Germans, he went on, would continue the fight ‘until the last drop of 
blood has streamed out of us’.102
After Prussia, under pressure from Britain and Russia, unilaterally ended the war 
with the truce of Malmö on 26 August 1848, in contravention of the Central 
Power’s conditions, the same deputies in the Frankfurt Parliament objected 
strongly, rejecting Berlin’s action by 238 votes to 221 in early September, even 
though General Friedrich von Wrangel, the Prussian commander of all German 
98 See, for instance the retrospective account of Grenzboten, 1849, vol. 8, 357.
99 W. Carr, Schleswig-Holstein, 279–90.   100 Cited ibid., 291.
101 v. valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution, vol. 2, 144.
102 Cited in B. E. vick, Defining Germany: The 1848 Parliamentarians and National Identity 
(Cambridge, MA, 2002), 181.
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troops in Schleswig-Holstein, had already begun a withdrawal. Those on the left 
such as Jakob venedey contended that the diplomacy of the Great Powers, doing 
deals separately with the German princes—in this case Friedrich Wilhelm Iv—
had been characteristic of the years after the ‘humiliating peace’ of Westphalia in 
1648: history had proved that—in order to avoid repeated humiliations, of which 
Malmö was the most recent instance—‘we need to create a new Reich, that we 
must create it even at the risk of entering into a war with the entire world in order 
to become a single, united Germany’.103 For his part, the radical Carl vogt criti-
cized Prussia for being ‘dragged along by Russia’ and recalled the successful defence 
of French revolutionaries against enemies on all sides during the 1790s.104 These 
calls for a renunciation of Berlin’s actions seemed to correspond to the Central 
Power’s expression of dissatisfaction on 3 September:
It is evident that Prussia, by concluding the present treaty, has overstepped its powers 
and that the Central Power, as the contracting party, as well as third powers can take 
on no responsibilities vis-à-vis Prussia before the approval of the Reich government is 
given. This can only be given by the Central Power as a result of a decision of the 
National Assembly.105
However, the resignation of the Reich ministry of Prince Karl von Leiningen after 
parliamentarians’ vote against the withdrawal of troops from Schleswig-Holstein 
and the subsequent failure of Dahlmann, who was against the truce, to form a gov-
ernment led to a volte-face in the National Assembly, with 258 deputies versus 237 
voting against a continuation of the war on 16 September. Despite the demonstra-
tion of at least 15,000 people on the Pfingstweide in Frankfurt, followed by the 
erection of barricades in the centre of the city, liberal deputies had already indi-
cated in the debates and votes of 5 and 16 September that they backed a ceasefire: 
the centre–right ‘Casino’ faction voted by eighty-nine to twelve in favour on the 
first occasion and by 103 to nine on the second; the constitutional–liberal 
‘Landsberg’ faction by thirty-four to five and thirty-nine to four; and the inde-
pendents by fifty-nine to forty and sixty-eight to thirty-five.106 To whistles from 
the left of the chamber, Arndt himself, who had been elected as the voice of 
Germany’s national struggle since 1813, argued for peace on the grounds that dep-
uties were so divided on the issue as to be unable to form a government and that 
the Danes, as a ‘fraternal tribe’ would respect the terms of the treaty.107 All such 
actions demonstrated that liberals—supported by the right, who voted for a 
‘Prussian’ ceasefire by 30 to 0 and 33 to 0—were not willing to prosecute the war 
in Schleswig-Holstein at the expense of the domestic purposes of the revolution.108 
Their stance was in keeping with a press response in Germany to the war in the 
103 F. Wigard (ed.), Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituierenden 
Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt a. M., 1848), vol. 3, 2048–9.
104 Ibid., 2094.
105 Cited in valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution, vol. 2, 150–1.
106 W. Ribhegge, Das Parlament als Nation. Die Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 1848–49 
(Düsseldorf, 1998), 85.
107 F. Wigard (ed.), Stenographischer Bericht, vol. 3, 2049–50.
108 W. Ribhegge, Das Parlament als Nation, 85.
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duchies which was supportive but muted, with newspaper coverage often eclipsed by 
a preoccupation with revolutionary events at home. This proclivity was reinforced 
during the second phase of the conflict between April and July 1849, after the truce 
had come to an end on 23 February, and during the third between July 1850 and 
April 1851. The Catholic Historisch-politische Blätter, which was published in 
Munich, did not devote a single article to the war during the entire period.109
Other newspapers and periodicals, including conservative ones, paid more 
attention to events in Schleswig-Holstein, but they tended to treat them like the 
strategic manoeuvres of a cabinet war. The fact that the contingents of troops from 
each state were small—with 64,000 men overall on the side of the Confederation 
in 1848, 82,000 in 1849, and only 28,000 defending Schleswig-Holstein at the 
start of 1850, according to one correspondent of the Grenzboten—encouraged this 
proclivity.110 For conservative publications, which had warned of the dangers of 
unbridled nationalism and a neglect of the realities of Great Power politics from 
the start, such reportage seemed natural. The unrealistic ‘German’ dreams of 
Frankfurt had come to nothing, gloated the Kreuzzeitung, since Prussia alone had 
been in a position to defend Schleswig-Holstein in March 1848, which it had done 
on behalf of the Bund, not the subsequently formed Provisional Central Power, 
National Assembly, or Reich.111 Because ‘the whole of Germany except Prussia’ had 
fallen into ‘defenceless impotence’ at the commencement of the conflict, it was 
now up to Friedrich Wilhelm Iv and his government to decide whether to agree a 
ceasefire in accordance with their evaluation of the policies of the other Great 
Powers.112 There was little mention in the conservative press of casualties and kill-
ing, nor in unaligned newspapers which were further from government circles such 
as the Königlich-privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung (known also as the Vossische Zeitung). 
Here, the correspondence of soldiers and ‘reliable’ local sources was relayed, as well 
as that of the government and army, but only passing references were made to 
blood-letting, which was usually linked to the attainment of military goals: thus, 
as ‘His Majesty’s troops’ achieved ‘possession of the whole fixed position before the 
town of Schleswig’, reported the newspaper on 26 April 1848, they met with a 
‘bloody encounter’, about which no further details were given.113 The style of 
much of the reporting was characteristic of a military dispatch:
One wanted on the 23rd only to advance against the Danish positions. However, dur-
ing the march, General Wrangel decided to carry out a decisive attack on Schleswig 
itself. Whilst the avant-garde itself now attacked Schleswig, where the Danes con-
tinued to hold the fort of Gottorp, the position of the Danes was at the same time 
outflanked on the western side, upon which they gave up Gottorp and retreated to 
109 On the general proclivities of the periodical, see K.-H. Lucas, Joseph Edmund Jörg. Konservative 
Publizistik zwischen Revolution und Reichsgründung 1852–1871 (Diss., Cologne, 1969). The same was 
true of the satirical magazine Kladderadatsch, which concentrated on domestic affairs and other aspects 
of foreign policy.
110 Grenzboten, 1850, vol. 9, no. 4, 683.
111 Neue Preussische Zeitung, 13 and 14 Sept. 1848.   112 Ibid.
113 Königlich-priviligirte Berlinische Zeitung, 26 Apr. 1848.
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Flensburg. The Prussian avant-garde took Königswill on the evening of the 23rd. The 
fighting lasted three hours and was very lively (lebhaft). The Danes fought bravely.114
Two days later, Wrangel’s own report was printed, passing on details of troop 
movements in a similar vein: ‘The pursuit of the Danes was continued on the 24th, 
and the avant-garde was composed of troops of the 10th [Federal] Corps (espe-
cially Hanoverians and Braunschweiger) in order to give them the opportunity to 
take part in the honour of fighting.’115 ‘The rear-guard consisted of Danish hussars 
and Jäger,’ the same article went on:
The Hanoverian hussars captured the enemy’s regimental commander, several officers 
and 80 men and took control of their banner; the Braunschw. Jäger forced the Danish 
defence opposite them, after their heroic counter-fire under Hauptmann von 
Schafenberg, to lay down their arms. The fighting stopped at this point. It was too late 
to reach Flensburg, especially since the troops of the 10th Corps had just put five miles 
behind them in unrelenting rain. Bivouacs were put up and the attack on Flensburg 
was set for the next day, the 25th.116
Local correspondence was interspersed with that of the military, giving a more 
immediate sense of the conflict but barely diverging from the official narrative:
The following report from the war front came to us from a reliable source in Rendsburg 
at 10 o’clock in the evening on 25 April—I am now entering Rendsburg and learn on 
registering my arrival with the Provisional Government [of Schleswig-Holstein] that 
the Prussians have already taken the city of Flensburg at 10 o’clock this morning. The 
Danes have been chased out completely and the route to their ships via Holnis cut off; 
if they have not got onto the water at Apenrade, they will be found by our troops and, 
hopefully, be completely destroyed. . . . . Apart from small individual contingents of 
troops from Holstein, the Prussians were again alone on the battlefield and have been 
gloriously victorious.117
The assumption that Prussia, and therefore ‘Germany’, would win this relatively 
small war with ease characterized much of the reportage in the conservative press 
during 1848.
Correspondents of liberal newspapers were less blasé about the aims and out-
come of the war in Schleswig, but they, too, frequently overlooked its bloodshed. 
In southern Germany (but not in Austria), liberals were, if one correspondent in 
the Allgemeine Zeitung were to be believed, more enthusiastic about the conflict 
precisely because they were less directly implicated in it and, therefore, had less 
to  lose.118 ‘The war with Denmark is comprehended here in the North from a 
114 Ibid.   115 Ibid., 28 Apr. 1848.   116 Ibid.   117 Ibid.
118 Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Sept. 1848, 3977. Die Presse (vienna), 12 Sept. 1848, by contrast, was 
scathing: ‘Nothing has been so overexploited theoretically and so hollowed out by democratic phrases 
as this Schleswig-Holstein business’. Since Schleswig had not, before March 1848, belonged to the 
Bund, ‘despite its historical union with Holstein’, the ‘one-sided incorporation’ of Schleswig in the 
Confederation by means of arms was, with some justification, seen by Denmark, Russia, and England 
as a ‘war of conquest’. The viennese newspaper treated the question of Schleswig-Holstein peripher-
ally and exclusively as a matter of high politics.
0002891581.INDD   200 11/4/2016   10:41:26 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
 War Reports 201
 completely different point of view than in the South as an unjust and, on the 
whole, senseless one,’ wrote one ‘traveller’ in ‘the German North’ on 6 September 
1848: ‘Many families have relations, often sons, on both sides, as in the case of 
people personally known to me. Thus, their interests are thoroughly divided and 
there is little trace of the enthusiasm which exists amongst us [in the South]’.119 
Like their counterparts elsewhere, South German liberals were critical of 
 conservatives—‘the party which now wants peace at any price’, as the Allgemeine 
Zeitung put it in August 1848—who were more concerned ‘not to bring the Danes 
to a point of desperation’ than to avoid driving the Schleswig-Holsteiner to despair 
and provoking an ‘unpredictable war’, instead of establishing peace.120 The conflict 
was at once a legal and a national one, ‘not at all just a war of nationalities, but also 
a war of defence on the side of a loyal, German Schleswig-Holstein for the male 
line of the house of Oldenburg’.121 It was a question not merely of money, render-
ing redundant the Hansa cities’ claim that they had already lost ‘many more mil-
lions than Schleswig is worth’, but a matter ‘of the honour, of the existence of 
Germany and the German princes’: ‘it is morally impossible that Schleswig-
Holstein again be brought under Danish jurisdiction’, for it would create such 
poor conditions that they would ‘become the cause of a new war’.122 ‘The Prussian, 
the Hanoverian fighters, the warriors of the Hansa cities and those from the Rhine 
were not fighting alone in Schleswig, not mainly for Schleswig, but for the defence 
of the left bank of the Rhine,’ declared the Allgemeine Zeitung on 18 August.123 
Although ‘it is true that we respected the enemy too little at the beginning of the 
German–Danish war’, the national war was worth waging, with ‘tens of thousands 
of good Germans ready [to give] their blood for a part of Germany’.124 It was 
 better to have ‘either peace, as will soon occur, or war in God’s name against any 
enemy’ rather than ‘this indeterminate, in-between stage, which has the evil conse-
quences of war for all of us, without being war, allowing the soldiers, who come 
ready to fight, to despair of their own strength’.125 Accordingly, the same news-
paper supported deputies’ rejection of the Malmö ceasefire on 5 September, citing 
Dahlmann’s speech approvingly, and it went on to back the National Assembly’s 
acceptance of a truce on 16 September, calling on the moderate conservative dep-
uty Georg von vincke as a witness that the truce’s terms exceeded Germany’s ori-
ginal war aims—the prevention of Danish annexation—and that the Provisional 
Central Power had no means to impose a more humiliating peace on its 
 opponent.126 It was ‘practical’ to end a war which, because of Prussia’s unilateral 
withdrawal and the machinations of the other Great Powers, had become ‘costly’ 
and ‘unnavigable’.127 Despite adopting a very different stance from that of conser-
vatives and portraying a national war undermined by neighbouring states, South 
119 Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Sept. 1848.   120 Ibid., 18 Aug. 1848, 3693.
121 Ibid., 3692.   122 Ibid.   123 Ibid.   124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 6 Sept. 1848, 3977.   126 Ibid., 8 and 25 Sept. 1848, 4002, 4257–8.
127 Ibid., 12, Sept. 1848. The issue also recorded that news of Prussia’s ceasefire landed ‘like a 
bomb’ in the Frankfurt Parliament.
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German liberals—like deputies and observers on the right—generally perceived 
the conflict in abstract political and diplomatic terms in 1848.128
As the conflict was reignited in April 1849, with confederal forces—including 
Prussians—under the command of the Prussian officer Eduard von Bonin, south-
ern German liberal publications like the Allgemeine Zeitung began to focus on the 
actual fighting rather than on political manoeuvring, not least because it now 
appeared possible that the war would be lost. Consequently, the outbreak of fight-
ing was marked by disbelief and foreboding:
The Danes have really started hostilities! News has just arrived, which I am sharing 
with you as fully certain, that the Danes, coming over from Alsen at 3, attacked out-
posts in the Sundewitt’schen, drew the entire Third Jäger Corps into battle and have 
bombarded it violently with artillery. The loss on our side from the rather tough fight-
ing amounts to 17 wounded and one dead.129
‘Our young troops’ could only withdraw from the fighting ‘with difficulty’, 
 preceded by ‘very many refugees, especially officials’.130 Large numbers of soldiers 
and guns—sixty pieces of artillery, Bavarians, Hanoverians, three battalions of 
Prussians, and 6,000 Saxons—had already been seen making their way north to 
the fighting front, reported witnesses in worried ignorance.131 Nonetheless, the 
Allgemeine Zeitung’s coverage focused on German victories at Eckernförde on 
5 April, where batteries built by Werner von Siemens incapacitated Danish war-
ships—with a loss of over 100 dead, sixty injured, and 1,000 taken prisoner—as 
they attempted to land troops and form a bridgehead, and at Kolding on 23 April, 
as Schleswig-Holstein’s troops attacked and took control of a town harbouring the 
famous Danish nationalist—‘the lunatic fanatic’—Orla Lehmann.132
On the first occasion, ‘the town of Eckernförde suffered a lot’, as ‘the thunder of 
the guns’ in the afternoon could be heard ‘in a radius miles wide, in Schleswig, 
Rendsburg and even Kiel’.133 On the second occasion, which was ‘one of the most 
violent and bloodiest instances of fighting’ with ‘the character of a battle’, Kolding’s 
population fled and buildings were set ablaze, as the Danes incurred a ‘very signifi-
cant loss’ of 800 dead, wounded, and taken prisoner, compared to 400 ‘on the 
German side’, including ‘many volunteers from the best families of the land’.134 
Such losses did not lead to a reconsideration of the war’s purpose, but were the 
result of ‘this shameful, unnatural hatred’ of Danes against ‘a kindred Volk’ of 
128 B.-C. Padtberg, Rheinischer Liberalismus in Köln während der politischen Reaktion in Preussen 
nach 1848/49 (Cologne, 1985); H. Brandt, Parlamentarismus in Württemberg 1815–1870 (Düsseldorf, 
1987); D. Langewiesche, Liberalismus und Demokratie in Württemberg von der Revolution bis zur 
Reichsgründung (Düsseldorf, 1974); L. Gall, Liberalismus als regierende Partei (Wiesbaden, 1968); S. 
Wolf, Konservatismus im liberalen Baden (Karlsruhe, 1990); M. Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland 
(Munich, 1991); T. Schieder, Die kleindeutsche Partei in Bayern in den Kämpfen um die nationale 
Einheit 1863–1871 (Munich, 1936); A. Neemann, Landtag und Politik in der Reaktionszeit (Düsseldorf, 
2000) and ‘Models of Political Participation in the Beust Era’, in J. Retallack (ed.), Saxony in German 
History (Ann Arbor, 2000), 119–34.
129 Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 Apr. 1849.   130 Ibid., 9 Apr. 1849.
131 Ibid.   132 Ibid., 11 Apr. 1849, 1542–3.
133 Ibid.   134 Ibid., 2 May 1849, 1877.
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Germans in Holstein and Schleswig. They were the consequence of the courage of 
‘our brave soldiers’, who faced the attacks of the Danes with their bayonets:
‘Forwards! Forwards!’ cried the fiery volunteers and they ran at an attacking pace 
against the Danes, who soon emerged everywhere from the smoke. The street battle 
lasted nearly an hour. Although very bitter at the cowardly murderers who, secure in 
the rear, shot down many German fighters from behind, they still spared their life.135
This and other reports helped to perpetuate a narrative of an heroic, romantic 
struggle—with ‘the setting of Kolding even more picturesque than that of 
Eckernförde’—against a familiar and similar enemy:
The brave Jäger…, the dragoons with their shining steel helmets, the handsome 
 martial figures of the Tann’schen Freiwilligen from the Ninth Battalion—they make 
good use today of the looted casks of wine, they sing and laugh and look so fresh, so 
good-natured, so ready for battle that the first day of fighting could have been a mere 
happy gymnastic exercise. In addition, it is finally nice weather again!136
The same narrative was maintained in the unsuccessful campaigns of 1850, as a 
purported 29,000 troops of Schleswig-Holstein faced 43,000 Danes (and an army 
of 60,000, according to the testimony of prisoners of war) at the battle of Idstedt 
(24–25 July), in ‘a quite terrible bloodbath’, leaving a rumoured 10,000 corpses on 
the battlefield and leading to the troops’ expulsion from Schleswig.137 Even then, 
the ‘mood of the army’ was said to be ‘outstanding’, with ‘no man . . . downhearted 
about the mishap near Idstedt’.138 Much was made of the ‘fact’ that the Danes, 
who had also fought heroically, had suffered ‘more than double the number of 
dead and wounded’ of the army of Schleswig-Holstein.139 It was sad ‘that Germany 
could not uphold the rights of the duchies in two successful wars’, not least because 
it had lacked sufficient ‘feeling for its honour and power’, wrote a correspondent of 
the Allgemeine Zeitung from the Baltic Sea on 31 July 1850, but Schleswig-Holstein 
would in future be able ‘to fight for its position vis-à-vis Denmark on its own’.140
North German liberals were frequently less sanguine about the prospects of war 
and more critical of Prussia, Frankfurt, and the Great Powers than their counter-
parts in the South. They were also closer to the fighting and, particularly in peri-
odicals, gave a more individual account of the wars. ‘The daily press has done its 
duty’, laying bare the conditions of the ceasefire, which was a cause of ‘shame’, and 
‘criticizing it from a party-political standpoint’, wrote one commentator in the 
Grenzboten in 1849.141 Neither Prussia nor the Bund had acted consistently, failing 
to exploit the circumstance that Denmark had provoked the war, in order to make 
the duchies ‘German’: ‘The war was waged by us to make a united Schleswig-
Holstein into German states.’142 Notwithstanding the ‘repeated question’ of 
135 Ibid. Also, ibid., 29 Apr. 1849, on the verification and denial of ‘excesses’.
136 Ibid. See also ibid., 17 Apr. 1849, which also described an idyllic, bucolic landscape in detail.
137 Ibid., 29 July 1850, 3348–9. Also, ibid., 11 Oct. 1850, 4530.
138 Ibid., 31 July 1850, 3381.   139 Ibid., 3 Aug. 1850, 3428.
140 Ibid., 31 July 1850, 3381.
141 ‘Schleswig-Holstein und Preußen’, Grenzboten, 1849, vol. 8, no. 3, 215–16.
142 Ibid., 216.
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 conservative newspapers in the Hohenzollern monarchy as to whether and how 
‘the war could have been conducted differently’, the Prussian government had 
‘rightly’ received ‘the bitter reproaches of the German press’ for refusing to oversee 
the construction of ‘our naval forces’, for electing not to hold out ‘until the end of 
the winter’ and for failing to provide ‘an energetic overarching command’, prefer-
ring to pursue ‘its own egotistical advantage and that of its citizens’ and to take up 
‘the struggle for a national interest . . . half-heartedly’.143 Most liberal publications 
agreed with the Grenzboten that the population of the duchies ‘only wants to be 
German’; ‘the majority, not only of a head count, but also of the educated, the 
majority of education, is in Schleswig-Holstein decisively German’.144 What was 
more, Denmark—it was widely held in such circles—had merely the ‘appearance 
of an independent state’ and would not be able to coexist with a strong, unified 
Germany:
How would one partition? According to sympathies and antipathies? That is not pos-
sible, for only a small part will want to become Danes. . . . Or according to language? 
The language which is spoken in the northern districts can be called Danish as little as 
it can be called German; it is a poor bastard.145
Whereas German Schleswiger were ‘chained to Holstein through the links of the 
law, all state institutions, the material interests of trade, and so on, Danish 
Schleswiger are connected to Denmark through none of these things’, went on the 
periodical.146 The Kölnische Zeitung concurred that ‘church, school, law and 
administration, in a word, the whole state, is German’, and that ‘the educated and 
propertied in the entire land are almost exclusively German’.147 Other liberal 
newspapers made similar claims.148 These ‘German’ populations had been let 
down and a broader national mission had been neglected by Prussia, the states of 
the Confederation, and the new Reich government in Frankfurt.
Much of the Grenzboten’s reportage focused on the war from the perspective of 
national volunteers, of which there were said to be about 4,000 by 1850.149 From 
the very beginning of the conflict, such soldiers were imagined to be ‘free fighters’ 
(Freischärler), living in the open and defending a cause which they believed in.150 
‘There might be no more enjoyable, carefree life than that of a mounted soldier 
(reisiger Landsknecht)!’ wrote one correspondent in 1848:
The whole of Germany had contributed to the completion of the colourful palette 
of volunteer corps (Freischaaren). . . . Here, there are bearded Jäger and mounted game-
keepers in green hats and with wonderful guns; there, there are black, red and gold 
students armed with rusting muskets and huge swords—and amongst them young 
lads for whom their father’s rod was perhaps too severe—former assistants of mer-
chants and fashionable barbers’ helpers who in the plenitude of their own power had 
advanced to become doctors of medicine—schoolteachers for whom a posting came 
143 Ibid., 220–1.   144 Ibid., 1848, 496. The article is dated 23 June.
145 Ibid., 1848, 217, 357.   146 Ibid., 355.   147 Kölnische Zeitung, 12 Apr. 1848.
148 For instance, National-Zeitung, 14 May 1848.
149 ‘vom Schleswig-holsteinschen Heere’, Grenzboten, 1850, vol. 9, no. 4, 682.
150 ‘Aus dem Freischaarenleben in Schleswig-Holstein’, ibid., 1848, vol. 7, no. 2, 430–5.
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along too late —. . . also quite a few simple folk from the land . . .— in short, all strata 
were thrown together in the most colourful mishmash. Nationalities here were prac-
tically submerged in a single German unity—but was it the sense of a German nation-
ality which had brought all these free fighters together in these northern duchies—who 
can say? Many, especially the educated, the intelligentsia, had certainly been led on by 
their enthusiasm for the thing, others by a thirst for action typical of youth, which 
great times powerfully awake; most, however, came for no other reason than to follow 
an inclination for adventure or because their reckoning with society had been brought 
to an end. Thus, the most heterogeneous elements were pushed together in tight 
 circles here so that quite often one feared fights breaking out between them. There was 
no shortage of frictions—but I must say, to the honour of the Schleswig-Holstein vol-
unteer corps, the good element was almost always the dominant one, and the  tendency 
towards roughness and excess, which threatened to develop in many, given any oppor-
tunity, was mostly snuffed out powerfully through the influence of the educated 
majority. The spirit which animated everybody was thus a satisfying one, on the 
whole, and I confess that I spent happy days in the midst of my comrades, days the 
memory of which will never pale in my heart.151
Following the legend of Freiwillige in 1813, the volunteers proved valuable, even 
though they lacked ‘discipline in the sense of the machine of the military of the 
line’, barely understanding how to ‘form a front and to distinguish right from left’ 
but knowing how to shoot, to use the bayonet, and shout ‘hurrah’.152 The relation-
ship between volunteers and regular soldiers was strained, with Prussian officers 
calling them ‘bandits’, but the different bands of fighters—the largest group being 
Berliners composed of revolutionaries ‘from the barricades’ and middle-class men 
in black coats and gloves—got on well together and were capable of decisive mili-
tary actions.153 At Eckernförde, the same correspondent saw ‘eighty Berliners, all 
of them men of the barricades from the days of March, as they called themselves in 
self-satisfaction, and armed with muskets from the royal arsenal, as they stormed 
the enemy with bayonets’, having discharged their guns at a distance of a thousand 
paces. The Danes ‘could have completely massacred the madly courageous small 
group, tired out from running’, but they were so ‘astonished and overcome’, once 
their first volley had been aimed too high and done no damage, that they ‘suddenly 
turned around . . . and began to run’.154 Descriptions of similar actions—with 
volunteers compared to the ‘adventurous figures’ of an ‘attack by robbers’ in ‘the 
weak light of the moon’ in one report—were common in liberal and other period-
icals during 1848–50.155
As the fortunes of the war changed in 1850, with the army of Schleswig-
Holstein, including its German volunteers, left to fight Denmark alone, reporters 
modified the tone but not the style or content of their accounts, shielding readers 
from the harsher realities of combat. Many days were ‘quite desperately boring’, 
made up of guard duty on the one-and-a-quarter-mile-wide strip along the border 
between Schleswig and Holstein, which ‘unfortunately is all that we have kept hold of ’, 
151 Ibid., 430–1.   152 Ibid., 431.   153 Ibid., 433–4.   154 Ibid., 431.
155 For instance, ibid., ‘Aroesund. Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzug in Schleswig-Holstein’, ibid., 
1849, vol. 8, no. 1, 422.
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and interspersed with ‘episodes’ of action which ‘help to fill the time’, as one article 
‘from an open-air camp in the field’ put it.156 The ‘situation of Schleswig-Holstein 
and therefore of its army have very few encouraging prospects’, noted the same 
article in 1850, even if the good morale of the troops had ‘not entirely 
disappeared’.157 The most that could be said was that ‘the decision to give the last 
worldly good and drop of blood in order to fight for an honourable peace’ had 
become ‘firmer and more unshakeable’ than ever, recorded another article in the 
Grenzboten a few weeks later: ‘If the humiliating circumstances of 1850 in Germany 
are written down in the eternal annals of history, Schleswig-Holstein’s page should 
remain untouched by dirt and shame.’158 The author was not able to provide 
‘happy news of victory, for the bloody days of Missunde and Friedrichsstadt 
remained without successes’, with the ‘two bloody fights’ together costing ‘us’ 
almost 700 soldiers, ‘dead, wounded or captured’.159 Each time, ‘we had to fight 
under the most unfavourable conditions, for our enemies were standing safely in 
front of our guns behind high walls, whereas their bullets smashed devastatingly 
into the ranks of our soldiers’.160 However, although they were not victors, they 
were ‘also not defeated’, still hoping for volunteers from the rest of Germany and 
for a successful winter campaign.161 Soldiers continued to fight for Schleswig-
Holstein because it was a just cause, despite the threat of Denmark and the 
Bundestag that they would be treated as ‘traitors’.162 Their dogged resistance, in an 
army which had been hailed as ‘the best that Germany possesses’ as late as 1849, 
was chronicled by reporters, who continued to lurk around the military headquar-
ters and encampments, as heroic acts of defiance.163 Accounts of combat, humor-
ous interludes (for instance, the taunting of a pompous, shabby actor who arrived 
to volunteer as an officer, since ‘in the realm of my art I have often been more than 
a lieutenant’), and descriptions of the harshness of the landscape and daily life 
(‘exhausted, frozen and soaked through to the last layer of clothing’, buffeted by 
the ‘cold northwest wind’ typical of the region) were regular elements of journal-
ists’ reports, yet they remained tied to the conventions of an adventure story.164
Those journalists who did describe killing and death, such as the Grenzboten 
correspondent Julius von Wickede, stayed within the traditions of the picar-
esque.165 A good example appeared in his collection of ‘pictures from a life of war’, 
published in 1853, which recounted the story of Liesch, a supplier of milk and 
other products to the army in Schleswig-Holstein, and Jochen, her fiancé and a 
156 ‘Aus Schleswig-Holstein’, ibid., 1850, vol. 9, no. 3, 433.   157 Ibid., 435.
158 ‘vom schleswig-holsteinschen Heere’, ibid., no. 4, 681.
159 Ibid.   160 Ibid.   161 Ibid., 681, 683–4.
162 ‘Das Tagewerk eines Adjutanten im schleswig-holsteinschen Heere’, ibid., no. 3, 921. Denmark 
had asked the Confederation, which had just been reinstated by Austria, to act against ‘insurgents’ in 
Schleswig-Holstein, to close the ‘revolutionary’ Landesversammlung, and depose the Statthalter 
Friedrich von Reventlow-Preetz in accordance with the terms of Russian-sponsored peace treaty with 
Prussia in July 1850. See M. Hewitson, Nationalism in Germany, 1848–1866, 68, for further details.
163 Grenzboten, 1849, vol. 8, no. 4, 455; ibid., 1850, vol. 9, no. 4, 685.
164 Ibid., 1850, vol. 9, no. 3, 922, 924–5, 928–9.
165 Wickede was the author of ‘Aus Schleswig-Holstein’, ibid., 1850, vol. 9, no. 3, 483–6, for 
instance.
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volunteer in the ‘well-known Bracklowsche Freikorps’.166 As soon as ‘the just war of 
independence for Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish yoke’ broke out in March 
1848, Jochen had gone to his master, the owner of a noble Gut in the territory, to 
ask for his permission to serve, which had been granted willingly, since ‘the whole 
nobility of Schleswig-Holstein were fully convinced of the justice of the struggle, 
to which [Jochen’s landlord] had devoted all his own sons’.167 A ‘quiet, sensible, 
morally virtuous man’, Jochen had soon become an outstanding soldier who was 
glad to leave behind life in the Freikorps with its ‘looser morals’ (in spite of ‘its very 
good elements’) for a regular corps of Jäger, with its ‘stricter discipline’ and ‘the care 
of the officers for their own’, which meant that Liesch was able to join him during 
the campaign.168 In this idyllic context, combat could seem like a game, with way-
ward Danish shots met with shouts of ‘missed’.169 As a bullet hit his cap, ‘Jochen 
made nothing of it’ and ‘showed the Danes, mockingly, that only his cap had been 
hit, not his head’; as the soldier next to him was shot dead, ‘our Jäger placed the 
“Käppis” of the hit man in such a way’ that ‘the Danes eagerly shot at this decep-
tion’, filling him with ‘delight’.170 Although Jochen ‘hated the Danes’ and looked 
on ‘with great joy’ as ‘they were hit by his bullets’, he insisted on treating them 
honourably as prisoners, refusing to allow a young Danish dragoon, who refused 
to give himself up despite being surrounded, to be killed by German soldiers.171 
Such cases, claimed Wickede, ‘occurred many times during the course of the 
war’.172 In 1850, Jochen was hit by a Danish bullet in the chest, wounding him ‘so 
seriously that he immediately sank to his knees’ but not prompting him to call for 
assistance, as he made his way to the rear.173 For her part, ‘Liesch did not dissolve 
into tears as she heard of the misfortune of her Jochen . . . but gave him immediate 
help’, forced to watch ‘the wounded man succumb, after terrible pains which he 
strove to confront as well as possible with manly fortitude’, becoming ‘a corpse 
after three weeks’.174 The pathos of the burial was that of a morality play, revealing 
the simple goodness and mixed fortunes of its German, peasant protagonists:
As the small group of pall-bearers, with the dully swirling tambourine at its head, car-
ried the three corpses to the cemetery of Rendsburg, a pale girl followed behind them. 
She threw the first handful of earth on the coffin, then she sank in silent prayer to her 
knees and stayed in this posture until the last soldiers had left the cemetery.175
Liesch did not go back to supplying the army and could be found in the crowd at 
Rendsburg, ‘a pale, stooped figure of a woman’ afflicted by illness, as imperial 
Austrian troops entered the town, playing a victory march.176 She died shortly 
afterwards and was buried ‘on the day that Rendsburg was given over fully to the 
Danes’.177 The melancholy of Schleswig-Holstein’s fate was embodied in the per-
son of Liesch and Jochen, but their own wounding, illness, suffering, and death 
were barely examined.
166 J. v. Wickede, Bilder aus dem Kriegsleben (Stuttgart, 1853), 140–1.
167 Ibid., 140.   168 Ibid., 141.   169 Ibid., 143.   170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., 144.   172 Ibid.   173 Ibid., 149.   174 Ibid., 150.
175 Ibid.   176 Ibid., 151.   177 Ibid.
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The depiction of the conditions of war in Schleswig-Holstein, which remained 
subordinated in all publications to reportage of the events of the revolution, did 
little to revise the heroic conceptualization of warfare which had occurred after 
1815. In the opinion of most journalists in and after 1850, a national war over the 
duchies was worth fighting, not least to make good the failings of Frankfurt and to 
make amends for the duplicity of the Great Powers, which—in Arndt’s words—
had proved to be the ‘devastators, the exploiters and the predators of Germany’.178 
The abandoned troops of Schleswig-Holstein ‘stand, fight and bleed not for them-
selves alone, but for all Germans, for Germany as a whole,’ wrote the nationalist 
proselytizer in the Kölnische Zeitung in August 1850: ‘Foreigners have had the 
audacity to do what they liked with it [Germany] and its future, at the same time 
as anticipating decisions and sealing its fate once and for all’.179 The victim status 
of both Schleswig-Holstein and the German nation could only be altered by 
‘actions’, agreed the Allgemeine Zeitung, despite its proximity to vienna and the 
campaign for a greater Germany.180 ‘Where is Germany?’ asked the Catholic, 
‘greater German’ Deutsches Volksblatt on 7 August: ‘Every shot which falls on 
Rendsburg’s walls brings this question, thunderously, to our ears.’181 Whereas the 
Berlin-based, liberal National-Zeitung argued that Prussia should back the entire 
German nation as it joined the uprising of Schleswig-Holstein, the Volksblatt saw 
the same actions as ‘the first foundation stone’, in ‘the far North’, of ‘the great idea 
of a central European Reich’.182 Yet both publications backed the uprising as a 
worthy national cause, to be prosecuted by means of war. Conservative newspapers 
in Prussia were more reluctant to back the insurrection in Schleswig-Holstein, 
given that at least some of their leaders and journalists still denied the diplomatic 
significance of a German ‘nation’ and that most of them advocated a rapproche-
ment with Austria—not war—at the time of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg 
monarchies’ stand-off at Olmütz, which was prompted by the question of inter-
vention in Holstein and, especially, Hesse-Kassel in late November 1850.183 
Nonetheless, even in conservative circles, there were those—like one correspond-
ent in the Evangelische Kirchenzeitung in July 1850—who continued to see the 
conflict in the duchies as a legitimate ‘war of defence’ on the part of one Volk (the 
Schleswig-Holsteiners) against another (the Danes).184 Other conservatives, in 
Prussia and in Austria, opposed the conflict on political and national grounds, not 
on military ones. Few, if any, onlookers contended that the costs of the war in 
Schleswig-Holstein had outweighed the potential benefits, partly because combat 
had been portrayed in such romantic, heroic colours. One lithograph appearing 
in the Gartenlaube in 1863, which displayed a ‘picture of a camp in 1850’ in an 
178 Kölnische Zeitung, no. 197, 17 Aug. 1850, cited in N. Buschmann, Einkreisung und 
Waffenbruderschaft, 244.
179 Ibid.   180 Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 286, 13 Oct. 1850, ibid., 245.
181 Deutsches Volksblatt, no. 185, 7 Aug. 1850, ibid.
182 Ibid., no. 168, 18 July 1850; National-Zeitung, no. 501, 28 Oct. 1850, ibid., 246.
183 M. Hewitson, Nationalism in Germany, 68–72, on the division of opinion, even within the 
conservative camp in Prussia.
184 Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, nos 54 and 56, 6 and 15 July 1850, in N. Buschmann, Einkreisung 
und Waffenbruderschaft, 249–50.
0002891581.INDD   208 11/4/2016   10:41:27 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
 War Reports 209
obvious attempt to foster support for the contemporary conflict with Denmark, 
envisaged well-fed, convivial soldiers from Schleswig-Holstein in smart but casually 
unbuttoned uniforms enjoying a bounteous midday meal in the bucolic yard of a 
native farm (see Figure  5.2).185 This image of the war had been maintained by 
 journalists, historians, and other writers throughout the 1850s and early 1860s.186
NEWS FROM ELSEWHERE: FROM GREECE (1821–9)  
TO THE CRIMEA (1853–6)
The romantic view of war disseminated by press coverage of the conflict in 
Schleswig-Holstein was reinforced by occasional reporting of wars overseas. Such a 
view, although qualified, predominated even during the Crimean War, which was 
185 ‘Schleswig-Holsteinsche Truppen beim Ausrathen des Mittagsfleisches’, Gartenlaube. Deutsche 
Blätter, 1863, 789. Special issues, carrying the title Deutsche Blätter, were published at the end of 1863.
186 For instance, A. v. Baudissin, ‘Erinnerungen aus dem Schleswig-Holsteinschen Kriege’, Gartenlaube, 
1861, vol. 36, 568–71, and 1862, vol. 4, 53–5. G. Waitz, Der neueste dänische Versuch in der Geschichte des 
Herzogthums Schleswig (Göttingen, 1852); G. Waitz, Das Recht des Herzogs Friedrichs von Schleswig-
Holstein (Göttingen, 1863); G. Waitz, Kurze schleswigholsteinische Landesgeschichte (Kiel, 1864); J. G. 
Droysen, Die Herzogthümer Schleswig-Holstein und das Königreich Dänemark, 2nd edn (Hamburg, 1850); 
J. G. Droysen, Kleine Schriften zur schleswig-holsteinischen Frage, 2nd edn (Berlin, 1863); W. Beseler, Zur 
schleswig-holsteinischen Sache im August 1856 (Braunschweig, 1856). See K.-O. Hagelstein, Eine an sich 
mittelmäßige Frage. Der deutsch-dänische Konflikt 1864 (Frankfurt, 2012), 9–270.
Figure 5.2 ‘Schleswig–Holsteinsche Truppen beim Ausrathen des Mittagsfleisches’
Source: Gartenlaube. Deutsche Blätter, 1863, 789.
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treated as an adventure as well as a conflict between the European Great Powers, 
with the potential to extend from the periphery of the continent to its centre. ‘No 
place in the wide world catches public attention at this moment more than the 
Crimea’, claimed the Grenzboten early in 1854, in large part because it was the site 
of a war between the Great Powers, carrying the risk of escalation and bringing to 
an end the long period of ‘peace’ between the powers since 1815.187 The war was, 
in the words of the Historisch-politische Blätter, a ‘European-Oriental conflict’.188 
Yet, despite contrary predictions in the German press, the fighting neither spread 
to Europe nor implicated the German states in military action.189 Throughout the 
course of the conflict, travel writing, which drew on a long-established tradition of 
Western Europeans’ voyages to the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, and the ‘Orient’, 
was interspersed with descriptions of sieges and battles, to a greater extent than 
during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, which initially had been treated by 
some correspondents and diarists as a foreign adventure but which ultimately had 
been subsumed within broader military reports of the Napoleonic Wars.190 One 
cartoon in the liberal satirical magazine Kladderadatsch entitled ‘The Newest Post 
and Travel Map of Europe, from the Kladderadatsch Geographical Institute’ 
(1854), envisaged a jumble of infantry columns, arms manufacturers, and stereo-
typical national characters moving in different directions in uncoordinated activ-
ity, as the Crimea—marked ‘Asia’—went up in smoke behind them.191 In this 
sense, the Crimean War was cast in the same light as colonial and other wars over-
seas in South America and China, which were presented to readers as distant, 
exotic, and exciting events.192
187 Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 4, 361; also, ibid., no. 4, 58. Also, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 11, 
126. Die Presse (vienna), 26 Sept. 1854, commented on the ‘extraordinary interest which the 
 expedition to the Crimea is currently enjoying’.
188 Historisch-politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 509.
189 On the possibility of escalation into a European war, see the Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Nov. 1853, 
5099, which still doubted that the war would develop into a ‘general’ one; and ibid., 13 and 24 Oct. 
1854, 4561–2, which talk of the war spreading to Germany and Europe. On the transition from the first 
position to the second, see ibid., 28 Mar. and 7 June 1854. Also, F. Engels, ‘The European War’, New 
York Daily Tribune, 2 Feb 1854, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 1985), vol. 13, 3–7.
190 See especially T. Kontje, German Orientalisms (Ann Arbor, MI, 2004); S. Mangold, Eine ‘welt-
bürgerliche Wissenschaft’. Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2004); S. L. 
Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire. Religion, Race and Scholarship (Cambridge, 
2009); v. G. Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East, 1800 to the Present (Oxford, 2009), 44–97; 
M. Keller (ed.), Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht, vol. 3 (Munich, 1992); W. Geier, Südosteuropea-
Wahrnehmungen. Reiseberichte, Studien und biographische Skizzen vom 16. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert 
(Wiesbaden, 2006), 116–88; A. Hammond, The Debated Lands: British and American Representations 
of the Balkans (Cardiff, 2007), 1–52; A. Hammond (ed.), Through another Europe (Oxford, 2009), 
1–19; M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, new edn (Oxford, 2009), 62–115; B. Jezernik, Wild 
Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers (London, 2004); W. Bracewell and A. Drace-
Francis (eds), Balkan Departures: Travel Writing from Southeastern Europe (New York, 2009), 1–24.
191 ‘Neueste Post- und Reisekarte von Europa, aus dem geographischen Institute des 
Kladderadatsch’, Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 236.
192 S. Zantop, Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–
1870 (Durham, NC, 1997); S. Zantop, ‘Domesticating the Other: European Colonial Fantasies, 
1770–1830’, G. Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in 
Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa (Chicago, 2007); G. Brinker-Gabler (ed.), The Question of the 
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There was a more or less unquestioned acceptance, including amongst liberals 
like the economist Friedrich List (who wanted to maintain the existence of ‘barbar-
ous nationalities’), that the ‘barbaric and half-civilized countries of Central and 
South America, Asia and Africa’ would be subjected to ‘pacification’ and ‘civilizing 
operations’ by European powers, especially Britain.193 ‘The Oriental question’, as 
List labelled it in Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (1841), encom-
passed not only the Ottoman Empire and Near East (and, therefore, the Crimea), 
but also India, China, and the eastern territories of the Russian Empire. ‘Sooner or 
later, Europe will see itself placed before the necessity of taking the whole of Asia 
into its care and subjected to its discipline,’ the economist declared:
In this whole chaos of lands and peoples, there is no single nationality which would be 
worthy or capable of continuation or rebirth. The complete dissolution of Asiatic 
nationalities thus seems inevitable and a renaissance of Asia only seems possible 
through an injection of European energy, through the gradual introduction of the 
Christian religion and European morals and order, by means of European immigra-
tion and paternalistic European governance.194
Consequently, wars overseas were usually believed to be legitimate and even  natural 
or beneficial. As the Allgemeine Zeitung’s coverage—in the form of reprinted 
reports from London newspapers—of Britain’s intervention in China in 1839–42 
and 1856–60 demonstrates, little attempt was made to discover the causes of the 
conflicts—they were not labelled ‘opium wars’ at the time—or to get nearer to the 
fighting.195 The reporting of revolutions in Naples (1820–1) and Portugal (1820–6), 
mutiny in Spain (1820–3), and wars of independence in Greece (1821–9) and 
Belgium (1830–9) was more regular and sympathetic, with the lionization of 
 foreign volunteers in Greece by philhellenic supporters, but it belonged to an era 
of restricted press activity, which was not comparable to that of the 1850s.196 Most 
articles on Greek independence in the 1820s were filed from Constantinople.197 
Like ‘the war of Russia against the Porte in 1828 and 1829, the Polish uprising in 
1830–31 and the Hungarian, Austrian–Sardinian and Danish–German wars’ of 
1848–51, which had not seen ‘two of the principal powers fight with each other’ 
and which had not therefore constituted ‘genuine interruptions’ of the peace, these 
early nineteenth-century conflicts were represented as sets of events in the Austrian 
Other(s) (Albany, NY, 1995), 269–83; M. Fiedler, Zwischen Abenteuer, Wissenschaft und Kolonialismus. 
Der deutsche Afrikadiskurs im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 2005), 81–174.
193 F. List, Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (Stuttgart, 1841). See also M. P. 
Fitzpatrick, Liberal Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism, 1848–1884 (New York, 
2008), 57–8.
194 F. List, Das nationale System, 213.
195 Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 and 18 Jan. 1840, 7 and 21 Aug., 4 Sept. 1841; ibid., 4 and 17 July 
1858, 18 Nov. 1860.
196 R. Quack-Eustathiades, Der deutsche Philhellenismus während des griechischen Freiheitskampfes 
1821–1827 (Munich, 1984), 90–124, 143–265; M. v. Rintelen, Zwischen Revolution und Restauration. 
Die Allgemeine Zeitung 1798–1823 (Frankfurt, 1994), 360–3.
197 Other articles were sent from the ‘Moldavian border’ (for example, one written on 10 Mar. 
1821, and posted to the Allgemeine Zeitung) or from the ‘Turkish border’ (written on 19 Mar. 1821, 
also appearing in the AZ).
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and German press which were secondary or subordinate to those of domestic 
 politics, especially those of the revolution, and to those of diplomacy and foreign 
affairs more generally.198
In contrast to earlier foreign conflicts, the Crimean War was followed closely 
by German newspapers and periodicals, many of which had correspondents on 
the spot.199 Partly because of the emergence of mass-circulation illustrated maga-
zines such as the Gartenlaube, which had 5,000 subscribers in its founding year of 
1853 and 42,000 by 1856, and partly because it involved Britain, France, and 
Russia, with Austria also mobilizing troops and forcing a Russian evacuation of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, the war between Turkey and Russia was reported in a 
new fashion.200 For the first time since the Napoleonic campaigns, details of 
which continued to emerge after 1815, graphic depictions of the suffering and 
killing of war were disseminated to a wide readership.201 By early 1855, towards 
the end of the winter-long siege of Sevastopol by British and French forces, can-
did descriptions were given of what the Gartenlaube called ‘the horrible things 
which come to light in every war and, above all when battles turn into ghastly 
scenes on the battlefield, which can shake even the most hardened heart’.202 
Although such scenes were counterbalanced by supposed improvements in sani-
tation and medical care, with the same article going on to describe the invention 
in the British army of a form of ambulance (a covered carriage carrying three 
lightly wounded men on a front pinion and two seriously wounded laid out 
inside), they were no less shocking, as one British-influenced report on the mili-
tary hospital at Scutari on the Bosphorus, ‘350 miles away from the Crimea’, 
showed, alongside a ‘portrait of Miss Florence Nightingale’: ‘86 English women 
and girls’, mostly ‘from the educated classes and good, propertied families’, had 
volunteered to look after ‘4,200 mutilated soldiers’ with ‘hideous wounds’, which 
were the result of ‘the bloody scenes of horror of the war’.203
198 Grenzboten, 1855, vol. 13, no. 4, 58.
199 Part of the press’s concern centred on the possibility of the war extending to Germany: see, 
for example, ‘Die neueste deutsche Phase der orientalischen Frage’, Historisch-politische Blätter, 1854, 
vol. 34, no. 2, 140–63.
200 For the circulation of Gartenlaube, see K. Belgum, Popularizing the Nation, 200.
201 Memoirs of the Napoleonic Wars continued to appear and were juxtaposed with accounts of 
contemporary wars: see, for instance, ‘Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1806’, Gartenlaube, 1856, vols. 44 
and 45, 597–9, 610–12. Nikolaus Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, 57, points to an 
article by Julius von Wickede on Algeria (‘Kriegserleben in Algerien’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 18) as 
evidence of the existence of ‘unleashed warfare’, but this was arguably more restricted in its descrip-
tions and was published at the same time as accounts of the Crimean War (including those by Wickede 
himself ).
202 ‘Die Pflege der verwundeten bei Sebastopol’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 51, 621.
203 ‘Hospital-Scenen vom Kriegsschauplatze. Mit Portrait der Miß Florence Nightingale’, ibid., 
1855, vol. 6, 74. Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 2, 297, also stressed the ‘humanity’ of at least some 
of the fighting. On British reporting of the war, which clearly influenced some of the German cover-
age (as in this case), see A. Lambert and S. Badsey (eds), The War Correspondents: The Crimean War 
(Strand, 1994); S. Markovits, The Crimean War in the British Imagination (Cambridge, 2009), 
12–62. On France, see L. Case, French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire 
(Philadelphia, 1954).
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In ‘Pictures from the Current War’, ‘various eye-witnesses’ recounted for the 
Gartenlaube how, in May 1855, they had gone back to Inkerman, the site of one 
of the war’s largest battles on 25 October 1854, to find ‘long, dense tufts of grass, 
weighed down with blossom’ indicating—‘high above the natural greenery of the 
plain’—‘the mass graves, in which the shot and cut-down from 25 October rest in 
their hundreds, each in a dug-out hollow’:
The smell of corpses mixed with the herb-like aroma of spring made an indescribably 
shocking impression, most sensibly on the horses. They snorted and whinnied with 
their manes erect amongst the grass and flowers, not biting a single stalk, and they 
could only be guided through the area with the greatest violence.204
The birds, too, were still. ‘Soon the monuments of that terrible, “glorious” October 
day piled up along our way,’ the same correspondent continued:
The skeleton of an English dragoon lay there between the stalks of grass, where he had 
fallen. Torn scraps of his red uniform played with gnawed-off bones. His buttons had 
all been cut off. He must have fallen right at the start of the battle, as the heavy cavalry 
came under the fire of Russian artillery close by ‘Canrobert’s hill’. Not far away lay, in 
friendship, a Russian skeleton, not completely without flesh. They could have got on 
together just as well in life, if the great stately wisdom of the creators and maintainers 
of the European balance of power had really settled on four points as men rather than 
on question marks as diplomats. The small round skull of the Russian had been picked 
bare and eviscerated by vultures, leaving only its red hair to flutter madly around his 
deep eye sockets.
Further on, another Russian skeleton seemed to have sprung to the heights out of 
its grave, between bullets and fragments of cartridges. Only its feet were covered. Its 
upper body loomed up and an arm was stuck in a position, as if threatening us. Now 
we had to force our horses with all our strength through labyrinths of half-decayed 
artillery and cavalry horses, beside and under which single, torn-off human limbs and 
bits of skull, bleached saddles, rusting bridles, buckles, scraps of clothes etc. were 
strewn. A terrible labyrinth of fights to the death now laid to rest in the contortions 
with which death had risen up in them in an act of deliverance. The rain had washed 
the top layers from countless graves so that the corpses stared upwards grimly and 
threateningly from the grass and flowers, as if to bring down the vengeance of heaven 
on their death, their burial and this conduct of the war.
Drums and whistles and our spurs drive us and our horses onwards in the full force 
of life through the opulence of death and the dawning spring, today still children of 
the latter, only perhaps to sink under its blooms tomorrow, dismembered and dead.205 
The representations of war which such eyewitnesses gave were intended, it appeared, 
both to fascinate and to shock. They were similar to those presented, usually in 
private correspondence, by combatants themselves.206
The same article went on to give a minutely detailed, contemporaneous account 
of fighting at Mamelon, Taganrog, and Malakhov hill, outside Sevastopol. At the 
204 ‘Bilder aus dem jetzigen Kriege’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 27, 356.   205 Ibid., 356–7.
206 O. Figes, Crimea, 230–410; J. Spilsbury, The Thin Red Line: An Eyewitness History of the Crimean 
War (London, 2005); C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimean: The German, Swiss and Italian Legions in 
British Service, 1854–56 (Montreal, 1977).
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first, on 22 and 23 May 1855, ‘about 5,000 French had blown up mines and taken 
trenches, with the loss of 1,700 men, and they had bayoneted hundreds upon hun-
dreds in the pursuit of fleeing Russians, since no pardon was asked for or granted’.207 
After ‘this disgustingly expensive victory, for which General Pelissier was ready to 
sacrifice 10,000 men’, the soldiers prepared to mount an assault on the ‘irregular, 
stony hill of the Mamelon’, from which ‘heavy cannon and thousands of smaller, 
gullets of fire, spat out death’ to threaten the Allies’ positions.208 The attack would 
be ‘one of the most audacious, bloody acts of war’ ever undertaken, the Gartenlaube 
asserted.209 ‘If you think of 12,000 men of the most varied units of the army in a 
wide, desolate, sullen ravine, menaced from the vantage point of the fearsome 
Mamelon’, which was surrounded by ‘desolate hills’ stretching away from it and by 
‘red-coated English, flashing officers, . . . shouts of triumph from all corners and 
distances, stormily returned in every accent by the incalculable, dense, closed ranks 
of the French’, ‘then you’ll be able to paint a pale picture of the scene for yourself ’, 
one of the eyewitnesses continued.210 Once ‘15,000 yellow Turks and brown 
Egyptians’ under Omar Pasha, the French and British general staffs, and ‘a couple 
of thousand of English below’ were added, one would have assembled ‘the main 
motifs of this attack’.211 When the actual—not the imagined—attack on the 
Mamelon took place in June 1855, the Russians were taken by surprise and unex-
pectedly fled, encouraging the French troops, ‘without any command’, to pursue 
them and leaving them without cover, exposed to Russian flanking fire, so that ‘the 
greater part of these most daring ones fell during the retreat’.212 Five to six hun-
dred of every thousand British soldiers, foolishly forced to retreat by their com-
mander Lord Raglan, were also ‘mowed down’ by the Russians, who had been 
allowed ‘to recover their strength’.213 ‘The fighting which now took place on and 
around the Mamelon was slaughter of the usual kind, which always occurs in war,’ 
the correspondent contended, ignoring the fact that descriptions of such slaughter 
were not at all commonplace.214 The sun came up the next morning on ‘many 
thousands of distorted, rigid faces of corpses’, with eighty to ninety having ‘fallen 
as victims of the modesty of their commanders’.215 The assault on Malakhov hill 
ten days later, on 18 June, was similarly written in ‘blood red’ ink in ‘this shudder-
ing history of war’, a ‘terrible counterpoint’ to the battle of Waterloo exactly forty 
years earlier.216 Like the bombardment of Taganrog on the Sea of Azov shortly 
afterwards, which turned a bustling town of 22,000 ‘Russians, Tartars, Armenians, 
Cossacks, Germans and some French’ into ‘piles of ash’, the actions caused the 
author to doubt the purposes of and consequences wrought by ‘the western bearers 
of civilization’.217
207 Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 27, 356, 357.   208 Ibid.   209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.   211 Ibid.   212 Ibid., 358.   213 Ibid.
214 Ibid. Another similar account can be found in ‘Nach der Schlacht an der Traktirbrücke’, ibid., 
vol. 36, 462: ‘Near the bridge of Traktir, not far from Sevastopol, another battle was fought and insati-
able earth again drank rivers of blood.’
215 Ibid., vol. 27, 358.   216 Ibid.   217 Ibid.
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Military technology—one of the products of ‘civilization’—also appeared, on 
some readings, to be one of the principal menaces facing civilized societies.218 
Although such technology encompassed steamships and railways (with the construc-
tion of a 7-mile-long stretch from Balaklava to Sevastopol in February–March 1855), 
it rested above all on what an article in the Gartenlaube described as ‘the massive use 
of the gun principle’.219 Contrary to commonly held expectations, wrote one expert 
in the Grenzboten, the transformation of strategic principles and military technolo-
gies had occurred after 1815 during peacetime. ‘It may appear surprising but it is 
nonetheless a fact that wars themselves are not always the periods in which the system 
of war has made the greatest advances,’ he noted in 1855: ‘More happened in many 
periods of peace than in the preceding period of fighting, largely because the experi-
ences gained in the latter could only be made useful during the succeeding era of 
calm.’220 Those epochs ‘dominated by a great reforming spirit’ like ‘the twenty-three 
war years that began with the toppling of the French monarchy’ were not exempt 
from the rule, with ‘far less’ happening ‘for the progress of the three branches of the 
military than during the later period of peace’, notwithstanding the prominence of 
the war-time leadership of the ‘military heroes of our century’.221 The innovations 
which marked the post-Napoleonic peace were ‘the renewal of artillery’ in the 1820s 
and 1830s and the ‘improved arms and manner of fighting of the infantry’ in the 
1830s and 1840s.222 Both involved the changed shape and material of projectiles—
bullets and shells—and the different means of firing them, which meant that they 
could be projected further and with more devastating effect.223
The latter innovation concerned the invention of the so-called ‘Minié ball’ 
(more accurately labelled a ‘Miniékugel’ or ‘bullet’ in German), which was a con-
ical, soft-lead bullet with grooves and a hollow base designed to spin the projectile 
and to provide a better seal for the expanding gas from the propulsive explosion, 
giving it an accurate range of 600 yards or more. The bullet also cleaned the barrel 
of the gun as it was fired, overcoming the difficulties of jamming and misfiring 
weapons, which had dogged infantrymen since the early modern period. ‘The 
main point of the Minié casing is obviously its great range’ and also ‘the safety of 
the shot’, which propelled the bullet at a speed of 2,000 yards per second, the 
Gartenlaube informed its readers amidst a flurry of technical details.224 The bullets 
could be pressed—rather than poured in a molten state—by a machine, which 
‘now works day and night and can, in a short space of time, deliver a huge pile of 
such bullets’.225 The efficacy and ease of use of the rifle ensured that it came to 
dominate infantry tactics, making sniping, skirmishing, entrenchments, and other 
forms of protection central parts of warfare, at the expense of cavalry charges and 
218 William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago, 1982), 224–41, 256–61, contends that trench warfare was developed in Crimea alongside 
the use of new kinds of artillery, which themselves were the product of industrialization.
219 ‘Die Feuerwaffen der Neuzeit’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 49, 602.
220 ‘Die vier Armeen in der Krim’, Grenzboten, 1855, vol. 14, no. 2, 58.
221 Ibid.   222 Ibid., 58–9.
223 See the image of ‘Die Lancaster-Kanone’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 49, 602.
224 ‘Die Feuerwaffen der Neuzeit’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 49, 602.   225 Ibid.
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hand-to-hand combat. Because they were manufactured from soft lead and pene-
trated bodies with great force, Minié bullets left terrible, often deadly wounds, far 
worse than traditional types of shot.
The same was true of the former set of technological innovations, which con-
cerned the introduction of lighter field artillery, high-calibre ‘bomb cannons’, and 
shrapnel shells. As a result of these changes, some commentators had claimed, 
from the mid-1830s onwards, that artillery had ‘increased its tactical decisiveness 
to such an extent that the other divisions of the army would no longer be able to 
counter it in closed formations’.226 Although such claims were exaggerated, 
 continued the Grenzboten’s correspondent, they indicated the centrality of guns 
and shells as definitive ‘fire-arms of modernity’, with the capacity to maim, kill, 
and destroy in a new way.227 Towards the end of the siege of Sevastopol in the sum-
mer of 1855, the Allies fired a daily 75,000 rounds at the small, fortified town, 
reducing it to rubble and causing 800 Russian casualties per day.228 Heavy artillery 
such as the Lancaster cannon, of which drawings were provided in the Gartenlaube, 
could fire conical, 25-pound missiles over 10,000 feet and create breaches in walls 
at a distance of 7,500 feet.229 It seemed to have the potential to alter the nature—
and combatants’ experiences—of modern warfare.
The manner in which such warfare was comprehended in the German lands 
during the 1850s and the ways in which German contemporaries believed it would 
be experienced in future depended on the press. Candid literary descriptions, as 
has been seen, could convey the shock of combatants’ and witnesses’ sensations 
and reactions with great immediacy. In illustrated magazines, paintings, and 
photographs, which—through the sanitized but harsh-toned images of Roger 
Fenton—became known to at least some members of the public in Britain and 
elsewhere, the conditions of combat and camp life appeared to become real for the 
first time.230 German illustrators and journalists were aware of such photographs, 
bringing them to the attention of readers.231 The stark contrasts of their engravings 
in periodicals, though softer than those of photographs, seemed to coincide with 
the harshness of the Crimean landscape, which consisted of treeless karst or pri-
meval mud.232 ‘The current site of war between Inkerman, Balaklava and Chersones 
226 Grenzboten, 1855, vol. 14, no. 2, 59.
227 ‘Die Feuerwaffen der Neuzeit’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 49, 599. These innovations forced the 
Grenzboten’s correspondent to revise his earlier evaluation of ‘Die vier Armeen in der Krim’, Grenzboten, 
1854, vol. 13, no. 4, 361–70, in which he had treated artillery as if it were no more important than 
the infantry or cavalry.
228 O. Figes, Crimea, 377.   229 Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 49, 602.
230 G. Paul, Bilder des Krieges, 61–5; H. and A. Gernsheim (eds), Roger Fenton, Photographer of the 
Crimean War (London, 1954); J. Hannavy (ed.), The Camera Goes to War: Photographs from the 
Crimean War, 1854–56; U. Keller, The Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History of the Crimean War; 
U. Keller, ‘Authentizität und Schaustellung. Der Krimkrieg als erster Medienkrieg’, in A. Holzer (ed.), 
Mit der Kamera bewaffnet. Krieg und Fotografie (Marburg, 2003), 21–38.
231 For example, ‘Der Weg zwischen Balaklava und dem englischen Lager’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 
10, 137.
232 See, for instance, ‘Französische Scharfschützen in ihren Feldschützen’ and ‘Angriff französischer 
Jäger vor Sevastopol’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 50, 614–15, and ‘Das Innere einer Parallele auf der 
französischen Linie’, ibid., 1855, vol. 15, 201.
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[a classical ruin] constitutes on its geological surface a terrible, fitting basis for the 
winter war and camp scenes’, recorded the Gartenlaube:
The earth here really looks like that imagined by geologists long before the first people, 
as a playground for amphibious enormities and mud monstrosities, ichthyosaurs, 
 plesiorsaurs and sundry other ancestors of crocodiles and alligators. An unremitting, 
tough mud, without trees or vegetation but with channels and puddles, from which 
desolate rocks and hills protrude in slovenly disorder. For an eye used to the signs of 
civilization—paths, fields, welcoming villages and towns, trees and pictures of vegeta-
tion of other kinds—there is nothing to behold. The wilderness, as it ruled on earth 
millennia before the first book of Moses, has returned, and the war between western 
civilization and eastern barbarism, dirty and ragged, hungry and dismembered, 
unwashed and unshaved, wades through this wilderness. Yet it doesn’t only wade 
through the mere ‘primeval soup’ from which the current geological crust of the earth 
is formed, the soup is richly sown with torn-off limbs of horses and people, half 
decayed and half dead fallen ones, wheels, bullets, . . . , straw, scraps of clothes, blood, 
bits of weapons, . . . , thousands of tiny puddles created by the hooves of horses, whose 
imprints remain set in the glutinous brew and were filled with water, blood and 
snow. . . . The sky stretches comfortlessly over the corpse-seeking carrion birds and 
rains, snows and bears down stormily on the dead, the dying, the ailing and the 
healthy. Here and there, weapons glint, cannons flash and bursts of fire natter, some-
times here, sometimes close by, sometimes further away. . . . Here, there is a cadaver-
coloured, tattered, wild-bearded fighter who is collapsing, dragging himself with 
difficulty to a rock in order to rest his head, at least, against something and to die. 
Other soldiers wind their way past him, throw him a pitying glance and let him lie 
there, since they can barely drag themselves along.233 
In such descriptions, there are both literary references—to Moses’ flight, to the 
return from Moscow in 1812, and perhaps to gothic novels—and visual ones, 
imagining ‘scenes’ and ‘pictures’, recalling images of dinosaurs in encyclopaedias 
and recreating the framing, spaces, and light effects of engravings and photographs 
(‘here’, ‘there’, ‘the sky stretches’, ‘weapons glint’).
Literature had been laid bare by photography and art, according to another 
correspondent of the Gartenlaube in a combined article and print representing 
‘The Road between Balaklava and the English Camp’.234 Contemporaries owed 
the fact of their ‘nakedness’ to ‘a welter of pictures, which are true to nature and 
to the situation, of the great tragedy in the Crimea, old Tauris, which does not 
look as gentle as the classical “Iphigenia in Tauris” of Goethe’.235 The depiction 
of the new road through Tauris showed ‘the bogs, valleys and hills, snow and 
rain, thousands of fallen horses, overturned wagons, buried supplies, frozen 
 soldiers etc.’, with figures toiling along a path to nowhere, reminiscent of 
the hopeless itinerary of returning French and German soldiers in 1812.236 In 
one article, the reported eyewitness is a British painter, with readers given a 
233 ‘Scenen aus dem englisch-französischen Winterlager’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 3, 34.
234 ‘Der Weg zwischen Balaklava und dem englischen Lager’, ibid., vol. 10, 137.
235 Ibid.   236 Ibid.
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‘depiction’ (Schilderung) of the battle of Chernaia (16 August 1855), as if via the 
medium of the artist’s gaze:
Dying and dead lay around in all directions and at all angles. Some died with their 
faces outwards, their hands grasping the air and thus reaching out until they fell flat. 
Others were dead and stiff with straight uplifted arms, as if they had been turned all 
of a sudden into stone in the middle of a struggle to the death. Many had in any case 
immediately fallen and lay with their faces flat on the earth. The wounds and dismem-
berment of others looked horrible. Two Frenchmen lay close to one another. Each 
robbed of an arm and shoulder blade by the same shot of a cannon. Elsewhere lay 
three Russians one behind the other, the first wholly without the front of his head, 
without a face, the second with a chest with a hole through it, and the third with its 
torso torn open: the result of a single shot.
Still, the dead were not by far the most horrible thing! No, the dead lay still, even if 
in the most unnatural positions. But the dying, the dying! That rasping last call for 
water in a completely incomprehensible language, but made clear enough by some via 
gesticulations, sticking their tongue out and pointing, and even trying to go through 
the operation of drinking symbolically during their last breath!237
The Gartenlaube deliberately gave its readers different views of battle. ‘The drama 
of the peninsula [Crimea] continuously calls forth, in bloody flux, new depic-
tions of scenes and situations, which are designed to give us the clearest possible 
picture of events there,’ remarked one journalist.238 Sometimes this striving to 
find a novel perspective of the action necessitated a bird’s-eye view, looking down 
on the fighting or bombardment below, but often it meant the relaying of sights 
seen by soldiers themselves amidst fighting or carnage. In the most extreme cases, 
words were favoured because there were fewer constraints placed on written 
accounts than on graphic representations of contemporary events, yet they were 
used increasingly to recreate a shocking visual spectacle.
Such reconstructed spectacles and descriptions were rare and had a limited 
effect. They do not appear to have prevented most observers from calling for or 
countenancing war. The majority of newspapers supported the Habsburg mon-
archy as it moved from the mobilization of a 130,000-strong army of observation 
in the border areas of Wallachia and Moldavia in the autumn of 1853 via the occu-
pation of the principalities after Russia’s withdrawal in August 1854 to more open 
threats of war.239 Of the thirty-two German newspapers surveyed by the Austrian 
Presseleitungskomitee in 1855, fourteen supported vienna’s stance in the Crimean 
War, as it faced the possibility of military hostilities, and ten opposed it.240 
237 ‘Die Schlacht an der Tschernaja’, ibid., vol. 39, 521.
238 ‘Der Kampf vor Sevastopol. Mit einer Abbildung des Kampfplatzes vom Fort Konstantin aus’, 
ibid., vol. 24, 317.
239 G. E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, 50–1. Such stances were aided by the positive 
reporting of the Austrian occupation, even by vienna’s liberal press: see Die Presse, 26 Sept. 1854, 
whose correspondent in Jassy in Moldavia talked of ‘the sympathies which the Austrian troops meet 
with here’, with the inhabitants of the city resolving to erect triumphal gate for ‘the glorification of 
the entry of the Austrian troops’.
240 K. Paupié, Handbuch der österreichischen Pressegeschichte 1848–1959 (vienna, 1960), vol. 2, 
23–53. Some newspapers were unaligned.
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Most  conservative publications, influenced by states which feared being drawn 
into war, were opposed to Austria’s stance, which had been made worse from min-
isters’ points of view by its rapprochement with the western powers.241 In Saxony, 
for instance, the Dresdner Journal was said to publish ‘articles . . . influenced by 
the royal Saxon minister Freiherr v. Beust himself ’, helping to ensure that it was 
‘decidedly friendly towards Russia’, ‘hateful towards the western powers’, and ‘mis-
trustful of Austria’, according to the committee.242 The official Leipziger Zeitung 
was held, ‘in the oriental question’, to be ‘fully in the direction of the Kreuzzeitung, 
i.e.  Russian, and, where this does not seem permissible, collecting everything 
which speaks against the western powers, with suspicions cast against the k. k. 
government’.243 It was joined by the Freimüthige Sachsenzeitung, which carried 
articles originating in Beust’s cabinet but which also rested on the ‘voluntary con-
tributors in the Saxon noble party’ (in effect, ‘the Saxon Kreuzzeitungspartei’), 
‘enthusiastic for Russia’ and ‘constantly warning, and even threatening, Austria’.244
For its part, the ‘Neue Preussische (Kreuz)Zeitung’, whose ‘great advantage vis-à-
vis all other German papers’ was that its ‘entire content’ was ‘permeated by a single 
tendency’, remained at once ‘ultra-Prussian up to the point of visible narrow-
mindedness’ and ‘decisively inimical to Austria’, piling up ‘for this purpose all hate-
ful memories of stock Prussians against Austria’ and ‘reminiscences of 1813 against 
France’ in order to underline its ‘ultra-Russian credentials’, in the words of the 
Austrian press committee report.245 The conservative mouthpiece ‘maintains links 
for its own ends extending into the king’s cabinet (secret counsellor Illaire, Niebuhr, 
General Gerlach), to the higher circles of the military (Field Marshal Graf Dohna, 
General v. d. Gröben, amongst others), with individual ministers (v. Westphal, 
Manteuffel II, brother of the Minister-President and an Under-Secretary of State), 
and finally with the envoys of foreign states, e.g. Baron Budberg’: ‘From Frankfurt, 
Herr v. Bismarck-Schönhausen furnishes it extra-legally with malicious rumours 
against Austria’.246 Although it had earlier published ‘vituperative anti-government 
articles, including those from smaller states’, it had now stopped opposing Berlin 
because its position on the Crimean War coincided with that of the Prussian 
state.247 Momentarily, the position of the reactionary camarilla tied to the 
Kreuzzeitung and that of the Prussian government and most of the states of the 
third Germany had converged. In the opinion of the Prussian-born Bavarian min-
isterial counsellor Wilhelm von Dönniges, expressed in a letter to King Max II on 
8 May 1854, ‘Prussia can count on having all the main states of the rest of Germany 
on its side, if it decides to represent German interests through its own mediation 
with Russia, above all.’248 This unity soon disappeared, however, with Prussia 
adopting a policy of armed neutrality, to the annoyance of St Petersburg, with the 
241 S. Meiboom, Studien zur deutschen Politik Bayerns in den Jahren 1851–59 (Munich, 1931), 
65–95.
242 K. Paupié, Handbuch, vol. 2, 30.   243 Ibid., 37.   244 Ibid., 47.
245 Ibid., 44–5. Also, D. Bussiek, ‘Mit Gott fuer König und Vaterland!’ Die Neue Preussische Zeitung 
(Kreuzzeitung) 1848–1892 (Münster, 2000).
246 K. Paupié, Handbuch, vol. 2, 45.   247 Ibid.
248 Dönniges to Max II, 8 May 1854, S. Meiboom, Studien zur deutschen Politik Bayerns, 76.
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Mittelstaaten avoiding committing themselves to either Russia or Austria and with 
the camarilla—or ‘Kreuzzeitung party’—advocating a ‘struggle of the Germans’ 
against ‘the Slav-Greek-and-Turkish’, which Austria was too ‘negative’ and lacked 
the courage to do.249
Much of the rest of the press in the German lands was critical of the pro-Russian 
posturing of the Kreuzzeitung and of the pusillanimity of Prussia and the other 
German states.250 To varnhagen von Ense, who was closely connected to Berlin 
‘society’, it was likely that ‘the Russian government is giving huge sums of money 
to the Kreuzzeitung people so that their scandal sheet eagerly takes Russia’s side’: 
‘Of this money, Wagener, Goedsche, Stahl and Gerlach received the greater 
part.’251 Like Prussian conservatives clustered around the Preußisches Wochenblatt, 
edited by the Frankfurt academic Moritz August von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
varnhagen wanted Prussia to support Britain and France—‘my sympathies are nat-
urally with the western powers in the current conflicts’—and, as it gravitated 
towards the ‘West’, Austria. Although he did not favour war, stating that ‘it is not 
my thing which is being fought for here’, he struggled not to ‘lose [this] from view 
in the tumult of daily opinion’, which generally pushed governments towards a 
conflict.252 In this context, the king himself, who ‘reads nothing but the 
Kreuzzeitung’, was ‘very agitated at the proclivity of public opinion, which doesn’t 
blindly trust in his policy but wants to become independent’: ‘The entire popula-
tion of Berlin is inflamed and full of indignation over the impudent tirades of 
Ludwig von Gerlach; everyone repeats the words of vincke and Bethmann-
Hollweg—even in the lowest classes these are known and approved of.’253 The 
principal ‘western’ group of the ‘Wochenblatt party’, including the editor Julius von 
Jasmund and the diplomats Guido von Usedom and Albert von Pourtalès, came to 
back the Habsburg monarchy’s mobilization of troops and threats of military 
249 Diary entry on 23 May 1854, L. v. Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, vol. 2, 154.
250 See, for instance, the Kölnische Zeitung in June 1854, which criticized the states of the 
Confederation for belonging to ‘Russia’s German Bund’; K. Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen 
Zeitung (Cologne, 1976), vol. 3, 192. Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 168, showed a young Prussian 
‘lad’ (Knabe) in military uniform being terrified and bullied by a giant Russian ghost; another article 
from 15 Oct. 1854, carrying the ironic title of ‘Good News’, Kladderadatsch, 189, commented that 
‘the people of Germany’ were ‘united’, represented at effectively at Frankfurt, and that ‘peace’ was 
imminent according to ‘a completely trustworthy Tartar’. Some publications such as the Historisch-
politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 607–31, examined the differences between ‘old’ and ‘young 
Russia’ and between ‘western civilization and a Russian Volkscharakter’ in a relatively nuanced way; 
also ‘Altrußland und die “heilige Allianz”’, Historisch-politische Blätter, 711–15. Jürgen Froehlich, 
‘Repression und Lenkung versus Pressefreiheit und meinungsmarkt. Zur preussischen 
Pressegeseschichte in der Reichsbruendungszeit 1848–71’, in B. Sösemann (ed.), Kommunikation 
und Medien in Preussen vom 16 bis zum 19 Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2002), 375, points out that most 
liberal publications in the German lands were happy to use Britain’s entry into the conflict as an 
opportunity to pit liberalism against reaction.
251 K. A. varnhagen von Ense, Tagebücher, vol. 10, 464. Hermann Goedsche, the author of Die 
Russen nach Constantinopel!, which had argued that the tsarist regime was warring against ‘communist 
revolution’, was especially targeted: H.-C. Kraus, ‘Wahrnehmung und Deutung des Krimkrieges 
in  Preußen. Zur innenpolitischen Rückwirkung eines internationalen Großkonflikts’, in G. Maag, 
W. Pyta, and M. Windisch (eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, 242.
252 Diary entry, 16 May 1854, K. A. varnhagen von Ense, Tagebücher, vol. 11, 71.
253 Respectively, diary entries on 24 and 21 Mar. 1854 and 10 Apr. 1854, ibid., 8, 1, 57.
0002891581.INDD   220 11/4/2016   10:41:31 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
 War Reports 221
intervention, having initially argued—before vienna had approached Paris and 
London—that, ‘if we must go to war, it would be more advantageous for us to have 
Austria as an enemy rather than as a friend’.254 Christian Carl Josias von Bunsen, 
Prussia’s ambassador in London and a close associate of the king’s brother and heir 
Prince Wilhelm, went so far as to advise Friedrich Wilhelm Iv in a memorandum 
of 1854 to back the maritime powers and expand Prussia at Austria’s expense.255 
The monarch agreed to his dismissal, believing—or professing to believe—that 
Bunsen had had a nervous breakdown, yet the diplomat’s stand revealed the extent 
to which the case for the war of the western powers was being made in Prussia and 
elsewhere.256 Although discounted in his memoirs by Bismarck as ‘childish uto-
pias’, such agitation involved figures as orthodox as Albrecht von Roon, the later 
War Minister under Bismarck, who was stationed at Cologne in the mid-1850s, 
and who was one of the military correspondents of the Wochenblatt’s publisher 
Friedrich Perthes.257
The majority of newspapers and periodicals in the Hohenzollern monarchy and 
other German lands supported the war, pushing their governments to join Austria 
and the western powers. To Otto Elben, the editor and owner of the Schwäbischer 
Merkur, it was ‘almost self-evident’ that most of the press was against Russia, given 
the part that it had played in propping up the Holy Alliance and Metternich’s order 
within the German Confederation.258 Despite the continuing anti-Habsburg lean-
ings of ‘democratic’ publications like the Beobachter (Stuttgart), Westfälische 
Zeitung (Paderborn), and National-Zeitung (Berlin), which nonetheless had been 
said, ‘from various sides’, to look on ‘Austria with a certain trust or even with secret 
hopes’ as a result of ‘the policy followed by the k. k. cabinet in the oriental affair’, 
as the Presseleitungskomitee in vienna put it, many
‘liberal’ papers of Germany—amongst which were the most significant and the most 
widely spread ones such as the Kölnische Zeitung, Bremen’s Weser-Zeitung, the Haude- 
und Spenersche Zeitung of Berlin etc.—have changed their tone, as a consequence of 
the decisive policy of the k. k. cabinet in the oriental conflict, or they express their 
inclination towards, or at least their applause for, Austria more or less openly.259
To Kladderadatsch, which recalled the words of Schiller’s Wallenstein, Austria ‘came 
late, but still [it] came!’.260 Of the largest publications in northern and central 
Germany, copies of which radiated out into their regional hinterlands, the Kölnische 
254 Preussisches Wochenblatt, 28 Jan. 1854, in R. Müller, Die Partei Bethmann-Hollweg und die ori-
entalische Krise 1853–1856 (Halle, 1926), 51.
255 Ibid., 55–6.
256 Hans-Christof Kraus, ‘Wahrnehmung und Deutung des Krimkrieges in Preußen’, in G. Maag, 
W. Pyta, and M. Windisch (eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, 238–9, suggests that 
the Wochenblatt party’s hold over the monarch was broken by March 1854. Because of the sympathy of 
the king’s brother and successor, this turn of events was not seen to be irreversible at the time.
257 O. v. Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke (Berlin, 1932), vol. 15, 80–1; M. Behnen, Das Preußische 
Wochenblatt 1851–1861. Nationalkonservative Publizistik gegen Ständestaat und Polizeistaat (Göttingen, 
1971), 77.
258 O. Elben, Geschichte des Schwäbischen Merkurs 1785–1885 (Stuttgart, 1885).
259 K. Paupié, Handbuch, vol. 2, 20.
260 ‘Neue Bilder zu alten Texten’, Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 168.
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Zeitung (whose circulation in 1855 was 12,000–15,000) was said regularly to take 
‘Austria’s side in the oriental question, especially against the Russian party in 
Prussia’; the Hamburger Nachrichten (11,000–12,000) was believed to follow ‘pub-
lic opinion in the oriental business’, backing the war of the western states, ‘though 
always with . . . reservations’; and the Frankfurter Journal (10,000), which was 
 subject to ‘Prussian influence’, worked ‘against the Bund and Austria sticking 
together’.261
In southern Germany, the ‘Catholic press’ had taken up ‘such an imposing and 
patriotic position in the oriental question that the consciousness of a generally 
affected occidental culture (abendländische Cultur), which had earlier been oscillat-
ing and unclear, had risen up and been clarified’.262 Although the states of the 
third Germany, meeting in the Bavarian town of Bamberg, had been ‘terrible’ in 
varnhagen’s opinion, shying away from war (according to the report of the Bavarian 
Foreign Minister and President of the Ministerrat Ludwig von der Pfordten on 26 
May 1854), newspapers such as the Augsburger Postzeitung, Mainzer Journal, 
Frankfurter Postzeitung, Casseler Zeitung, Hannoversche Zeitung, Leipziger Illustrirte 
Zeitung, Hamburger Correspondent, and Deutsches Volksblatt, which was published 
in Stuttgart, all backed Austria’s preparations for a military intervention.263 The 
Allgemeine Zeitung, the second largest southern German publication (after the 
Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, with its 15,000 subscribers), had proved so sup-
portive of the Habsburg monarchy that its publisher Georg von Cotta received a 
letter of gratitude from the Austrian government, expressing ‘the full acknowledge-
ment of the k. k. government for the patriotic and circumspect conduct of this 
important newspaper in its discussion of the position of Austria and Germany in 
respect of the oriental question’.264 The newspaper’s position, in its owner’s view in 
October 1854, merely mirrored that of ‘the public opinion of the nation’, which 
was ‘so little confused, so clearly energetic, that anyone who does not hold to the 
policy of Austria is depicted as being bribed by Russia’.265 The public’s appetite for 
war, it seemed to many observers in 1853–6, was undiminished, with many 
 journalists urging the German states to enter the conflict.
Arguably, the presence of a powerful and demonized enemy in the Crimean 
War, akin to the role played by Napoleonic France in 1813–15 or 1870, might 
have reinforced German observers’ anxieties about the changing nature of warfare 
by the 1850s. The shifting allegiances of governments and the press, however, mili-
tated against such demonization.266 For the Allgemeine Zeitung as for many other 
German newspapers, the war between Russia and Turkey, which broke out in 
1853, had appeared mainly to be about the defence of the rights of Christians in 
261 K. Paupié, Handbuch, vol. 2, 27–8, 31–2, 35–6.   262 Ibid., 19.
263 Ibid. On Pfordten’s report, see S. Meiboom, Studien zur deutschen Politik Bayerns, 77–8, noting 
that Hanover, Kurhessen, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt had argued that the Bund should join the 
western powers.
264 Weil to G. Cotta, 28 Dec. 1854, in E. Heyck, Die Allgemeine Zeitung, 289.
265 G. Cotta to G. Kolb, 21 Oct. 1854, ibid.
266 The Historisch-politische Blätter, 1858, vol. 2, 20, later talked of a revolution in the relations 
between European states during the Crimean War. Droysen likewise referred to a ‘revolution of the 
European states’ system’, in F. Gilbert (ed.), Droysen, 331.
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the Ottoman Empire, recalling—as the Grenzboten pointed out in an explicit com-
parison in 1853—the earlier conflict between the two powers in 1828–9, in which 
St Petersburg had enjoyed broad support.267 After Russian troops had occupied 
Moldavia and Wallachia in July 1853, the Allgemeine Zeitung had openly doubted 
the reassurances of the Journal de Constantinople that ‘the barbaric times of the old 
Turks are now over’, rendering anachronistic the treaties which continued to grant 
judicial competencies ‘over their subjects to the representatives of the foreign 
 powers’.268 The maintenance of such competencies was ‘a matter for which all 
Christian Great Powers have to have a concern’, the article went on, in part to prevent 
Russia from ‘exploiting’ it ‘for other reasons’ and in part to avert Turkish injustices 
and atrocities: ‘the introduction of laws and courts which treat all Turkish citizens 
equally impartially, whether believers or unbelievers, does not even appear to be in 
the realms of possibility as long as Islam is and remains the basis of the state’.269 
Despite the ‘objections and reproaches which were directed at the Allg. Ztg. 
because of the reception of our reports about the internal conditions of Turkey’ 
and ‘which gradually became weaker and finally quite silent’, noted the newspaper 
on 16 October 1853, it would continue to bring news of ‘abominations’ like the 
boiling and roasting of monks by ‘Turkish fanaticism’ and the cutting down of 
notables in ‘an open market’ by ‘armed hordes’.270 The correspondent declared:
Our aim in the publication of these facts—which, as long as the Allg. Ztg. is available 
to you, we shall carry on striving towards in order to clarify European opinion—is and 
will remain the same, even now that the Turkish question has gone from a state of 
peace, which was not a true peace, over to a state of war, which is allegedly not yet a 
war but which must soon become one . . . One should not forget, in all the political, 
financial and industrial considerations and calculations in whose bottomless depths 
this question is swirling around (to the shame of Europe), that the need of assistance 
of a defenceless Christianity in Turkey lies at the bottom of it, which will soon lead to 
horrors like those immeasurable outrages committed during the Greek uprising.271
Since ‘the Russian intention of protecting Christianity’ had widely been sus-
pected as a ruse to conceal the ‘expansion of the tsars’, it had been tempting to shut 
‘ones eyes and ears to the real fount of the actual evil and the source of all the dif-
ficulties and dangers of the situation’, viewing ‘the independence, greatness and 
267 See the Allgemeine Zeitung’s reports in support of Russia, dated 18 Oct. 1828 (from the 
Moldavian town of Jassy), 24 Oct. 1828 (in its Beilage, no. 303), 6 June 1829 (citing the Journal 
d’Odessa), and 16 June 1829 (from Jassy). The Grenzboten, 1853, vol. 13, no. 4, 241–50, 330–7, 
printed an extensive report on the earlier campaigns before concluding that Turkey was in a stronger 
position in 1853 than it had been in 1828–9. For another comparison, see the Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 
July 1853. The camarilla, in particular, stressed the Christian aspect of the campaign: H.-C. Kraus, 
‘Wahrnehmung und Deutung des Krimkrieges in Preußen’, in G. Maag, W. Pyta, and M. Windisch 
(eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, 241.
268 Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 July 1853.
269 Ibid. The article mentions the cutting off of Greeks’ ears and noses, as they were ‘mishandled 
and dismembered in a barbaric fashion, by Turks during instances of ‘disorder’, as the Journal de 
Constantinople had put it.
270 ‘Fortsetzung der Mittheilungen über die inneren Zustände der Türkei’, ibid., 16 Oct. 1853.
271 Ibid.
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worth of the Ottoman protégé as a European requirement’.272 For the Allgemeine 
Zeitung in October 1853, it was time for the German states and the European 
Great Powers ‘to join with Russia or take over from Russia’ the task of defending 
‘Christianity in Turkey against the fanaticism of the Muslims’.273 As Britain and 
France prepared to declare war on Russia, which they eventually did on 28 March 
1854, the Augsburg newspaper’s correspondent refused to ‘believe that an Anglo-
French army will fight for the Turks’, not least because ‘Russia’s victory, supported 
by the Hellenes, Serbs, Bosnians and Bulgarians, who are mostly Greek Christians 
and deadly enemies of the Ottomans, is almost absolutely certain, if it pursues no 
other aim than the freeing of the Christians from the yoke of the [Turkish] 
crescent’.274 Even if France and Britain did intervene, they would arrive too late 
and be overpowered by Russia on the ground.275 Yet as the Austrian government, 
too, began to alter its stance, with ‘the mood here in the city [of vienna] for Turkey 
and against Russia, in accordance with the opinion of the [viennese] Lloyd and 
most Austrian papers’, the Allgemeine Zeitung started to qualify its criticism of the 
Ottoman Empire and Islam, merely stating at the end of March that ‘one cannot 
exactly say that they [the Austrians] are mad about the Turks’.276 Although 
traces  of  the publication’s earlier position—with references to ‘fanaticism in 
Constantinople’—could be found later in 1854, its positive coverage of the 
Habsburg monarchy’s defence of Turkey, ‘against the greatest danger which men-
aced [it] from the Russian side on the land bridge in Europe’, had come to over-
shadow its earlier doubts by October.277 vienna’s actions against Russia and its 
‘independent position vis-à-vis the entanglements of the Orient’ demonstrated 
that ‘Austria feels a rejuvenating force in its limbs’, which was worthy of Germany’s 
support and cooperation, even if it entailed war.278
North German newspapers were less prone to the demonization of ‘Turks’ and 
‘Muslims’ than Austrian, Catholic, and other southern German publications—
looking back on a long history of conflict in the Balkans and Near East—and they 
were less likely to be swayed by vienna’s rapprochement with the western powers, 
with ‘well-meaning Christian-Germanic souls in the North’ viewing ‘Austria as a 
European China’ (in the words of the Allgemeine Zeitung in March 1854), but they 
272 Ibid. For more on the Turkish war effort, see C. Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853–1856 
(Leiden, 2010). For the Historisch-politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 530, the question hinged on 
‘the extent to which Russia will be allowed to make use of the Porte’s visible decay’. On the specious-
ness of the Russian claim to protect Christians, see Catholic and conservative commentators like 
Johann Wilhelm Braun in his Berliner Briefe über die Orientalische Frage (Bonn, 1854), for instance.
273 Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 Oct. 1853.   274 Ibid., 15 Mar. 1854.
275 Ibid. The same publication declared that Turkey was the ‘hereditary and imperial enemy’ of the 
‘West’, ibid., 16 Apr. 1854. Other southern German, Catholic publications such as the Historisch-
politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 527, assumed ‘that Russia would be forced by victories to wrest 
the dying Turkish empire from the western powers’, with ‘incalculable complications’ for the constel-
lations of the states’ system.
276 Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 Mar. 1854.
277 For instance, ‘Zur historischen Aufhellung der diplomatischen Schachzüge in der orientalis-
chen Frage’, ibid., 29 Apr., 7 June 1854. On the newspaper’s shift of position by October, see ibid., 24 
Oct. 1854.
278 Ibid., 28 Mar. 1854.
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remained similarly undecided about the identity and nature of potential enemies 
in the Crimean War.279 The Ottoman Empire was widely regarded at first as a 
threat to Christians and then, after the western states’ declaration of war and the 
Habsburg monarchy’s change of diplomatic course, as a foreign ally and a signifi-
cant military power. This impression was reinforced by the common practice—
especially during the ‘reaction’, when commentary on domestic politics was 
riskier—of reprinting articles in German publications from Austria, France, and 
Britain, where Turkey was treated favourably.280 As was the case in the Allgemeine 
Zeitung, the Ottoman Empire was still associated with ‘Asia’ or the ‘East’ and was 
subordinated to the machinations and shifting fortunes of European politics. Thus, 
for Heinrich Kruse, editor-in-chief of the Kölnische Zeitung from 1855 to 1872, it 
was necessary for the rest of Germany to follow the example of Austria—to which 
his predecessor Karl Heinrich Brüggemann had given ‘thundering congratulations’ 
in December 1854—in support of ‘the English and the French’ in a war to protect 
‘this communal culture (Bildung) of Europe against the push from Asia’.281 Given 
the alignment of powers, Turkey was no longer—by 1854—an eastern menace. 
Rather, it was treated in the same way as the other parties to the conflict or it was 
made an object of pity.
Like many correspondents, Marx and Engels oscillated between the two modes 
of representation. ‘Amidst all this confusion and uncertainty, one thing alone 
seems clear, and that is the extinction of the Moslem power as a distinct polity in 
Europe,’ they concluded in an article on the ‘European War’ in the New York Daily 
Tribune on 17 April 1854: ‘the emancipation of the Christians of Turkey, whether 
effected by peaceful concession or by violence, degrades Islamism from a political 
authority to a religious sect, and utterly uproots the old foundations of the 
Otttoman Empire.’282 A few months later, it seemed as though Turkey’s army was 
the principal force, despite being ‘very badly cared for’ and unable ‘to execute rapid 
movements which would remove it to a distance from its base’, with ‘nearly a hun-
dred thousand English and French soldiers’ merely ‘there to assist the Turks or 
make diversions in their favour’.283 Notwithstanding its mocking rather than 
revering tone, the content of the two exiled communists’ reportage was similar to 
279 Ibid.
280 J. Fröhlich, ‘Repression und Lenkung versus Pressefreiheit und Meinungsmarkt. Zur preussis-
chen Pressegeseschichte in der Reichsgründungszeit 1848–71’, in B. Sösemann (ed.), Kommunikation 
und Medien in Preussen vom 16 bis zum 19 Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2002), 374–5.
281 Cited in K. Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen Zeitung, vol. 3, 199.
282 K. Marx and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13, 179.
283 Marx and Engels, ‘That Bore of a War’, New York Daily Tribune, 17 Aug. 1854, ibid., 370. 
Marx made a similar point in ‘The War in the East’, The Zuid Africaan (Cape Town), 6 Mar. 1854, 
ibid., 21–2, written in London on 4 Jan. 1854, referring to the split nature of the Turkish army: ‘We 
know besides that the Turkish army of Anatolia, recruited as it is from the Asiatic provinces, the seat 
of old Moslem barbarism, and counting in its ranks a great number of irregulars, unreliable though 
generally brave soldiers of adventure, fancy warriors, and filibusters of Kurdistan—that the army of 
Anatolia , is nothing like the staid, disciplined and drilled army of Roumelia, where the commander 
knows how many and what men he has from day to day under his command, and where the thirst for 
independent adventure and private plunder is held under check by articles of war and courts 
martial.’
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that of articles in many liberal publications, as the main military evaluation of ‘The 
Four Armies in the Crimea’ in the Grenzboten made plain. Turkish soldiers were ‘in 
and for themselves incomparably superior’ to their Russian counterparts, capable 
of fitting into ‘any tactical formation’, the correspondent maintained, denying 
‘that, in saying this, I am letting myself be affected by considerations of partiality’.284 
Likewise, the Ottoman artilleryman, trained by Prussian officers, ‘aims better than 
the Russian’, as ‘has been said too often in recent times, so that it must seem redun-
dant to add anything else here’.285 In this type of report, Turkish troops were 
treated in a matter-of-fact way alongside Russian, French, and British ones.
At the same time, however, they were cast as ‘oriental’ objects of European fan-
tasy, transforming the Crimean War into a distant adventure comparable to a colo-
nial expedition.286 The Historisch-politische Blätter was not alone in lamenting the 
unwillingness of ‘our German Publizistik’ to acknowledge that ‘at least America 
belongs to the questions of European politics, not to mention Asia’.287 The affairs 
of Asia were widely believed to be distinct and distant from those of Europe, as the 
article’s own description of Russia’s and Britain’s global interests—which would 
constitute ‘the main act of the history of the second half of the nineteenth 
 century’—spelled out, with references to Turkish Armenia and Persia, ‘the steppes 
of the Tartar and Kyrgyz hordes of Central Asia’, ‘the tents of the Khans of Khiva, 
Bukhara and Kabul’, ‘the mountain passes of the Afghans’, ‘the northwest frontier 
of India’, and the ‘great military site of Bombay’.288 One early article in the 
Gartenlaube on ‘Turkish Soldiers’, which also conceded that regular troops—from 
a large total force of 338,260—were ‘well trained’ and ‘used to strict discipline’ and 
that officers were ‘very well-informed’ and artillery ‘excellent’, recorded that the 
soldiers were ‘funny, jovial chaps, and one can think of no better travelling 
companion’.289 ‘Each wears his Stambul fez like a humorous Bursche and the blue 
tassels never rest because of their liveliness,’ the article continued, before going on 
to describe the exotic uniform of the soldiers in fetishistic detail: ‘Tights are not in 
fashion, so a part of the foot always peeps out [of their shoes], but they are always 
well washed.’290 Such regular troops were portrayed, in words and etchings, beside 
turban-wearing, mounted Kurds, ‘some of whom serve in the Russian, some in the 
Asiatic-Turkish and some in their own robber armies’, or next to fearsome, muscu-
lar bashi-bazouks, who functioned as a form of Landsturm but ‘whole masses of 
284 ‘Die vier Armeen in der Krim’, Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 4, 365.   285 Ibid., 369.
286 Friedrich Engels, ‘The Attack on Sevastopol’, New York Daily Tribune, 14 Oct. 1854, in K. Marx 
and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13, 550, compared the campaigns in Bulgaria and Africa in deri-
sion, exposing the lack of preparedness and disorganization of the Allied armies compared to earlier 
colonial wars. See also M. Fuhrmann, Der Traum vom deutschen Osten. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im 
Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918 (Frankfurt, 2006), 39–47, 111–42, 281–328.
287 Historisch-politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 529. There were very occasional references to 
‘world powers’ such as the United States and Russia at the time of the Crimean War: see, for instance, 
‘Rundschauerlicher Traum’, Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 212.
288 Historisch-politische Blätter, 1854, vol. 33, no. 1, 529–30. Also, ‘Rußland in Asien, England als 
Nachbar’, ibid., 852–73; ‘Illustrirte-Zeitungs-Notizen’, ibid., 220, which showed native Americans 
wearing ill-fitting ‘European’ masks and clothes, roasting ‘Europa’ on a spit.
289 ‘Türkische Soldaten’, Gartenlaube, 1853, vol. 47, 520.   290 Ibid.
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whom deserted not exactly rarely’ and ‘roamed around . . . as robbers’.291 ‘Irregular 
Turkish Military’ were shown as medieval horsemen (see Figure 5.3).292 As they 
and their horses waded through a river in a long, arcing column, with the snow-
peaked mountains of Asia Minor behind them, the Kurds looked like figures from 
biblical story or Arabic legend.293 For their part, the bashi-bazouks were depicted 
as a single, organic, corporeal mass, similar to drawings of Africans, looking on 
menacingly and proudly from a mountain ridge.294
These anthropological studies of different tribal warriors were supplemented by 
travel tales of local folklore, topography, peoples, and women, from Georgians, 
who were ‘thin and of the purest proportions, with their chiselled faces and large, 
enthusiastically shining eyes’, via ‘the most beautiful girls’ in Wallachia, who 
 supposedly lived far from the ‘corruption’ of Bucharest, to Turkish women, who 
‘aroused our curiosity’ with their veils and their public silence but who were also 
shown in the ‘oriental’ fantasy of the Sultan’s harem.295 Readers were presented 
with ‘pictures’ of Belgrade, varna, Sevastopol, Odessa, Kars, Erzerum, and the 
Balkans and its mountain fastnesses.296 One article in Gartenlaube promised 
‘Turkish Reflections’, including ‘walks’, ‘the Balkans with its narrow passes’, ‘the 
Turk with the Christian coat’, ‘the trading of women’, ‘Turkish bachelorhood and 
family life’.297 It began by inviting ‘our readers to accompany us on some walks 
291 ‘Türkisches Militär’, ibid., 1855, vol. 46, 553; ‘Kurden- und Kosaken-Bilder’, ibid., 1855, vol. 
36, 471–2; ‘Die Baschi-Bazuks, der türkische Landsturm’, ibid., 1855, vol. 27, 360–2.
292 ‘Irreguläres türkisches Militär’, ibid., 1854, vol. 13, 142.
293 Ibid., 1855, vol. 36, 471.   294 Ibid., 1855, vol. 27, 361.
295 ‘Am Kaukasus’, ibid., 1854, vol. 41, 484; ‘Wallachische Schönheiten’, ibid., 1854, vol. 34, 404; 
‘Bilder aus varna’, 1854, vol. 28, 341; ‘Blicke in einen türkischen Harem’, ibid., 1854, vol. 25, 293.
296 ‘Belgrad’, ibid., 1854, vol. 3, 29; ‘Bilder aus varna’, ibid., 1854, vol. 28, 327; ‘Belagerungsplan 
von Sevastopol’, ibid., 1854, vol. 50, 609; ‘Mamelon, Malakoff und Taganrog’, ibid., 1855, vol. 27, 
357–8; ‘Odessa’, ibid., 1855, vol. 43, 575; ‘Aus den letzten Tagen von Kars’, ibid., 1856, vol. 2, 27–8; 
‘Erzerum’, ibid., 1856, vol. 4, 54–5.
297 ‘Türkische Spiegelbilder: Spaziergänge; der Balkan mit seinen Engpässen; der Türke mit dem 
christlichen Frack; türkisches Junggesellentum und Familienleben; der Türke mit Sprungriemen; 
Handel mit Mädchen; der Sonntag der Frauen in Constantinopel’, ibid., 1853, vol. 46, 500–3.
Figure 5.3 ‘Irreguläres türkisches Militär’
Source: Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 13, 142.
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into the interior of Turkish mores and morals; that is, into those circles on which 
the “oriental question” largely hinges’.298 Another article offered a short history 
and geographical exploration of ‘The Crimean Peninsula’, which ‘even without 
war, without the English, French and Russians in soldiers’ uniforms, is interesting 
enough’, as the old ‘seat of the Tartar Empire of the Mongols’, who ‘once used to 
dominate the whole of Asia’, and as the site of classical ruins and Christian sects.299 
Sticking out into the Black Sea, the peninsula was as large as Saxony, Hanover, 
Württemberg, and Baden combined, with three-quarters of the territory covered 
by steppe and one-quarter, on the south coast, an ‘attractive mountain land’ called 
‘the Russian Switzerland’, noted a guide to ‘Rambling in the Crimea’ in late 
1854.300 The juxtaposition of and alternation between these types of exotic travel-
ogue and war reports within periodicals and, to a lesser extent, newspapers turned 
an alien land and culture into a source of fascination and attraction rather than of 
fear, it appeared.301 Even gruesome accounts of military killing and hardship such 
as ‘Scenes from the Anglo-French Winter Camp in the Crimea’, which was pub-
lished in the Gartenlaube in early 1855, often couched their depictions of corpses—
on the battlefield of Inkerman in this case—and ‘the dirt, terror, hospitals, graves, 
dead, dying [and] the stink’ of camps (Balaklava) within the conceit of ‘a short 
hike’, a trip along a ‘road’, or a voyage.302
By contrast to Turkey, Russia was regularly perceived to be a familiar European 
power rather than an exotic extra-European one.303 Until 1848, it had been the 
guarantor of the Holy Alliance, joining Austrian forces to defeat Hungarian ‘revo-
lutionaries’ in 1849. Many newspapers reprinted articles from the Russian press, 
casting the campaign from St Petersburg’s point of view and referring to the for-
tunes of ‘our’ Russian soldiers. On the left, Engels was unambiguous in viewing 
the tsarist regime as ‘our enemy’, which had to be looked at ‘straight in the face to 
see what sort of an opponent he may turn out to be’, but he also acknowledged 
that ‘the composition and organisation of the Russian army is known well enough 
to military men all over Europe’, with ‘a good deal of valuable matter in our west-
ern literatures which requires nothing but sifting and combining’, in spite of the 
existence of ‘the most contradictory opinions as to [its] real military strength and 
capabilities’, ‘overrated by some, underrated by others’.304 ‘The actual difficulty is 
merely to know how far this organisation’, which was based on an imitation of that 
introduced in France by Napoleon I, ‘has been really carried out, how much of this 
298 Ibid., 500.
299 ‘Die Halbinsel Krimm’, ibid., 1855, vol. 37, 436; ‘Karaiten von Theodosia auf der Krim’, ibid., 
vol. 16, 216.
300 ‘Wanderungen in der Krim’, ibid., 1855, vol. 44, 529.
301 For such juxtaposition in other periodicals, see ‘Sevastopol’, Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 4, 
281–8.
302 ‘Scenen aus dem englisch-französischen Winterlager’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 3, 34–5; ‘Der 
Weg zwischen Balaklava und dem englischen Lager’, ibid., vol. 10, 137.
303 For German representations of Russia, see v. G. Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East, 
44–97; M. Keller (ed.), Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht, vol. 3. For more on Russian percep-
tions and experiences of the war, see—in addition to Figes’s work—J. S. Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War 
(Durham, NC, 1979).
304 F. Engels, ‘The Russian Army’, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13, 173–5.
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army exists not merely on paper but can be brought forward against a foreign foe’, 
the journalist and industrialist went on.305 In principle, at least, Russian forces 
were large, with 750,000 troops according to Marx and Engels in 1855 (historians 
now estimate 1.2 million in total), of which only one-third were stationed in the 
Crimea and two-thirds were ‘deployed to menace Austria’.306 As for many of his 
contemporaries, war was reduced for Engels to the status of a European strategic 
game, reminiscent of 1812:
And there are people who believe that Nicholas will sue for peace if Sevastopol be 
taken! Why, Russia has not played one-third of her trumps yet, and the momentary 
loss of Sevastopol and of the fleet is hardly felt at all by the giant to whom Sevastopol 
and he felt were but a plaything. Russia knows full well that her decisive action does 
not lie along the sea shores or within reach of disembarking troops; but on the con-
trary, on the broad interior of the Continent, where massive armies can be brought to 
act concentrated on one spot, without frittering away their forces in a fruitless coast 
defence against evanescent enemies. Russia may lose the Crimea, the Caucasus, 
Finland, St Petersburg and all such appendages; but as long as her body, with Moscow 
for its heart, and fortified Poland for its sword-arm, is untouched, she need not give in 
an iota.
The grand actions of 1854 are, we dare say, but the petty preludes of the battles of 
nations which will mark the annals of 1855. It is not until the great Russian army of 
the west, and the Austrian army come into play, no matter whether against each other 
or with each other, that we shall see real war on a large scale, something like the grand 
wars of Napoleon. And, perhaps, these battles may be the preludes merely of other 
battles far more fierce, far more decisive—the battles of the European peoples against 
the now victorious and secure European despots.307
In theory, ‘the continental force launched against Russia’ was stronger in 1854 
than in 1812, with Britain on France’s and Austria’s side, not Russia’s.308 Russia in 
the latter instance had helped to defend German states. In both instances, it was 
treated by Marx and Engels as a regular Great Power.
Because of its size, with a land mass of 343,240 square miles compared to the 
314,662 square miles of Britain, France, Turkey, and their empires, Russia consti-
tuted, for liberal and unaligned publications, a unique site of conflict, with more 
or less conventional military forces.309 This positive assessment of the tsarist 
regime’s forces became more, not less, pronounced as the war continued, partly 
because of Russian resistance during the siege of Sevastopol, where 65,000 soldiers 
of the tsar had been killed or wounded by the end of July 1855, before the Allies’ 
305 Ibid., 174.
306 K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘Progress of the War’, New York Daily Tribune, 1 Jan. 1855, ibid., 563; 
O. Figes, Crimea, 334.
307 F. Engels, ‘The Military Power of Russia’, New York Daily Tribune, 31 Oct 1854, ibid., 153. 
Many publications considered the Crimean War a ‘game’ between the Great Powers: see, for instance, 
Historisch-politische Blätter, 1855, vol. 35, no. 1, 1030–43.
308 K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘Progress of the War’, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13, 
566.
309 ‘Die kriegführende Mächte’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 15, 200.
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final assault on the city.310 Occasionally, the press pointed to the existence of a 
‘racial conflict’ between ‘Slavs’ and ‘Germans’, with Austrians fearing ‘the national 
character of this Great Power [Russia]’, not merely its military forces, in the words 
of the Allgemeine Zeitung on 7 December 1854, yet the general tenor of newspaper 
reportage was less stereotypical and more admiring.311 At the start of the winter of 
1854–5, in November, the same publication had underlined the resilience of the 
Russian troops, against whom ‘the Allies cannot boast of any significant progress 
until now’: ‘They [the Allies] have underestimated the strength of the defenders 
and the difficulty of the undertaking’, with the ‘courage and morale’ of the 
 30,000–35,000 occupiers of Sevastopol ‘unbroken’ and its defences strong.312 As 
the Gartenlaube informed its readers, the military fortifications of the port had 
been designed by a British civil engineer, just as the most opulent of the Crimean 
palaces of the Russian nobility had been built by a British architect, standing in 
stark contrast to the wooden huts and freezing living conditions of the British and 
French armies on the peninsula and begging the question of the two sides’ relative 
‘civilization’ and ‘humanity’.313 Initially, in November 1854, the Grenzboten had, 
its military expert conceded, underestimated the strength of the Russian army, 
emphasizing the ‘parade-ground’ discipline of its peasant soldiers at the same time 
as their ‘slowness and unwieldiness’ in manoeuvres, as they dissolved in disarray 
under the fire of British artillery.314 The ‘supplement’ provided by the same 
 correspondent in the spring of 1855 revised these earlier judgements, praising the 
tsarist regime for introducing a fundamental reform of the artillery in the 1840s, 
which had proved effective in the Crimea, in spite of the fact that it lay ‘in the 
nature of the Russian Empire’ to lag behind the institutions of ‘western Europe’.315 
Its infantry had not been reformed, turning the siege of Sevastopol into ‘a school 
for its army in general’, but it nonetheless remained wedded to the military tradi-
tions of the European states, having learned from the battles of ‘Eylau, Borodino 
and Leipzig’ during the Napoleonic Wars.316 Unlike in the campaigns of 1812–15, 
‘Cossacks’ were the subject of few reports and, when they did feature, they were 
often portrayed in an exotic, unmenacing fashion.317 In such articles, the forces, 
tactics, and armaments of Russia were compared straightforwardly to those of the 
other Great Powers.
310 O. Figes, Crimea, 376–7.
311 Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Dec. 1854. Racial stereotypes remained one element of press reportage, 
of course, more evident in cartoons than in newspaper reports: see, for instance, ‘Der versteckte 
Freund und einzige Bundesgenosse Rußlands von 1812’, Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 180, or 
‘Illustrirte Zeitungs-Nachrichten’, ibid., 196, which showed a row of characters with stereotypical 
‘Asiatic’ features—with narrow eyes, pig-like or bulbous noses, and long beards—above a caption from 
the Journal de Constantinople, referring to the ‘difficult task’ of ‘distinguishing between officers and 
rank-and-file soldiers amongst the captured Russians’.
312 Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Nov. 1854.
313 ‘Fürst Woronzow’s Krim-Palast und die Holz-Paläste der Alliirten’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 7, 
96–7.
314 ‘Die vier Armeen in der Krim’, Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 2, 364.
315 Ibid., 1855, vol. 13, no. 4, 58–63.
316 ‘Die vier Armeen in der Krim’, ibid., 1855, vol. 14, no. 2, 143.
317 ‘Kurden- und Kosaken-Bilder’, Gartenlaube, 1855, vol. 37, 493–4.
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To German and Austrian newspaper readers, the Crimean War combined the 
familiarity of a European crisis with a cast of well-known actors, which had the 
potential to spread to central and western theatres of war, on the one hand, and an 
unknown, exotic location, where adventurous or visibly modern forms of combat 
were being tested and were being covered by the press in a novel way, on the  other.318 
In some respects, the exploitation of new technologies of warfare marked out the 
Crimean campaign from previous wars. More destructive, accurate, and longer-
range bullets and shells increased the need for skirmishers and protected posi-
tions  and reduced the role of infantry formations, hand-to-hand fighting, and 
cavalry charges, as well as producing more deadly, gruesome wounds and more 
efficacious medical means of treating such wounds.319 Steamships criss-crossed the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea, the routes and ports of which were displayed on 
countless maps, making a ‘European’ war—rather than a colonial one, using troops 
already stationed abroad (in the American War of Independence or the Napoleonic 
Wars, for instance)—possible for the first time.320
From varna on the Black Sea Coast of European Turkey, where the British and 
French armies had massed troops in the summer of 1854, to the port of Balaklava 
was a journey of just two days, giving the town the atmosphere of a staging post, 
wrote Julius von Wickede, who was in transit with the Chasseurs d’Afrique from 
Algeria.321 On 7 September, 400 Allied ships led by HMS Agamemnon, the Royal 
Navy’s first screw-propelled steamship, set out from the port of varna bound for the 
Crimea ‘like a vast industrial city on the waters’, according to a French observer.322 
‘In the struggle, which threatens to unfold between the European western powers 
(Westmächte) and the Empire of Russia at this time, the art of war appears on the 
battle scene for the first time with means of violence which have never been seen in 
previous struggles,’ one correspondent had written in the Gartenlaube, beneath a 
detailed cross-section of ‘The Propeller-Driven Warship Wellington’, early in 1854:
We mean the powerful steam-propelled war fleets, and especially the huge propeller-
driven steamers which now plough through the seas and which scarcely allow a means 
318 One of the main series of articles in the Allgemeine Zeitung (22 and 29 April, 3 May 1854) was 
entitled, ‘On the Historical Clarification of the Diplomatic Chess Moves in the Oriental Question’, 
suggesting that the conflict was the result of long-established European rivalries; another (ibid., 21 
Oct. 1854) carried the headline ‘Prussia’s Role in the European War’. ‘Ein Schachspiel aus dem 19. 
Jahrhundert’, Kladderadatsch, 1854, vol. 7, 200, imagined a chessboard with the different powers on 
it. For an interesting discussion of the intersection of diplomatic and military considerations in respect 
of Britain, see H. Strachan, ‘Soldiers, Strategy and Sebastopol’, Historical Journal, 29 (1978), 303–23. 
Also, W. Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853–1856 (Oxford, 1999).
319 On the strategic shifts, see ‘Die vier Armmen in der Krim’, Grenzboten, 1854, vol. 13, no. 4, 
361–70, and 1855, vol. 14, no. 2, 56–63, 143–52.
320 For typical maps, see Die Presse, 26 Sept. 1854, or ‘Uebersicht des Kriegsschauplatzes’, 
Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 51, 600–1. The Allgemeine Zeitung’s military correspondent cautioned on 24 
Oct. 1854 only that ‘It must now have become clear to a wider public through the course [of the 
embarkation] that it is impossible, even under the most favourable conditions, to ship across armies 
which are completely ready for war.’ By implication, armies could be transported which were largely 
ready for war.
321 J. v. Wickede, ‘Bilder aus varna’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 28, 327–9, 340–2.
322 Cited in O. Figes, Crimea, 200.
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of resistance to be imagined, given the speed and strength of their attack. The elemen-
tal dangers of the sea are more or less vanquished by these steam colossuses.323
Yet the destructive potential of such new machines of war was not unleashed, 
with the Russian fleet remaining in the harbour of Sevastopol where it was des-
troyed during the siege. Likewise, although the changes wrought by artillery and 
munitions were recognized, with corresponding use of trenches and protected 
positions, their full effects were rarely disclosed to a reading public. The nature and 
extent of shrapnel and bullet wounds were made public infrequently, despite being 
described more regularly than in the past, following the example of journalists such 
as William Howard Russell in The Times.324 The use of trenches and artillery was 
generally incorporated into analyses of siege warfare, with Sevastopol understood 
to have been ‘built for offensive defence’ and as a form of ‘reinforced battlefield’, 
which could be compared to that used by the French defenders of Danzig in 
1813.325 Thus, the Grenzboten, notwithstanding its fear that trench warfare had 
filled ‘Sevastopol’s wide field of the dead with new corpses’, contrasted the Allies’ 
bombardment of and half-hearted attacks on Sevastopol unfavourably with the 
French assault on Tarragona in 1811.326 The human cost of the conflict, with a 
dozen murderous struggles in 1855 replacing the Napoleonic idea of ‘a single, con-
centrated, genuine assault’, was roughly the same as that of its predecessors, it was 
implied.327
The true cost of the Crimean War was only revealed occasionally and partially to 
a German or an Austrian public. Kladderadatsch portrayed the consequences of 
artillery bombardments and senseless killing, most visible in the chaotic debris and 
figures of death in ‘What the Franco-English Commission Found as It Drew Up an 
Inventory of Materials at Sevastopol’ (1855), yet it more frequently depicted the 
events in the Crimea as a diplomatic game or a more or less harmless fight between 
statesmen, national characters, children, or, in one instance, deep-sea divers, who 
were shown picking up cannon balls from the seabed in order to ‘bring this usable 
munition via Balaklava back to the batteries’.328 Another cartoon  imagined a giant 
cannon, typical of the siege of Sevastopol, as a ‘hearing-aid for those who don’t want 
to hear’.329 Few lithographs showed dead or wounded soldiers and those which did, 
such as the drawing of ‘French Sharpshooters in Their Field Entrenchments’ in 
Gartenlaube in 1854, often covered or obscured the bodies.330 Most pictures 
323 ‘Der Kriegsschraubendampfer Wellington’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 11, 118.
324 See especially A. Lambert and S. Badsey (eds), The War Correspondents: The Crimean War; S. 
Markovits, The Crimean War in the British Imagination; F. Becker, ‘Der “vorgeschobene Posten” als 
“verlorener Posten”? William Howard Russell und die britische Berichterstattung vom Krimkrieg’, in 
G. Maag, W. Pyta, and M. Windisch (eds), Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, 221–34.
325 ‘Die Expedition gegen Sebastopol’, Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 Oct. 1854.
326 ‘Die Belagerung von Sebastopol’, Grenzboten, 1855, vol. 14, no. 2, 401–10.
327 Ibid., 402.
328 ‘Was die Französisch-Englische Commission vorfand, als sie das Inventarium des Materials von 
Sebastopol aufnahm’, Kladderadatsch, 1855, vol. 8, 180; ‘Zur orientalischen Frage’, ibid., 1854, vol. 7, 
228; ‘Ein schlauer Junge!’, ibid., 1854, vol. 7, 216.
329 ‘Ende December’, ibid., 1854, vol. 7, 240.
330 ‘Französische Scharfschützen in ihren Feld schanzen’, Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 51, 614–15.
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 displayed the topography and cultural sites of the various expeditions and the 
bloodless operations of small groups of soldiers. Three-dimensional maps and aerial 
views of cities gave readers the impression that they were reconnoitring the scene of 
a future battle, revealing—in ‘Sevastopol’ (1854) and ‘Siege Plan of Sevastopol’ 
(1854), for instance—the hills, cliffs, escarpments, encampments, army formations, 
and fortifications surrounding the enclosed harbour in overstated relief in order to 
suggest the romance of the setting and the entrapment of the Russian fleet (see 
Figure 5.4).331 In ‘The Crimea from a Bird’s Eye view’ (1855), the peninsula pro-
truded outwards towards the viewer, hinting at the vast plains of Russia behind, 
while in ‘Pressed Overview Map of the Russian–Turkish War Setting’ (1855), the 
region was portrayed as an organic, rocky integument on which humans would 
struggle to leave a mark.332 Other lithographs—such as ‘Balaklava (the old 
Chersonesus)’ (1854)—presented landscapes in the Romantic tradition.333 They 
were juxtaposed with anthropological images of local peoples and heroic, some-
times mythical ones of soldiers, visible in ‘The French Garde-Cuirassiers’ (1855), in 
which they were likened to bearded Germanic gods, and in ‘Chasseurs d’Afrique at 
an Outpost’ (1855), where a winding, muscular column of French cavalry made its 
way along a narrow path around an outcrop of rock.334 The fascination and adven-
ture of combat overshadowed suffering in these representations. The realities of 
modern warfare involving ‘Germans’ in Europe, as Austria went to war with France 
331 Ibid., vol. 30, 354, and vol. 50, 609.   332 Ibid., 1855, vol. 15, 200, and vol. 39, 518.
333 Ibid., vol. 44, 531.   334 Ibid., 1855, vol. 41, 543; ibid., 1856, vol. 1, 5.
Figure 5.4 ‘Sevastopol’
Source: Gartenlaube, 1854, vol. 30, 354.
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and Piedmont in northern Italy in 1859, and ‘Germans’ abroad, as German-
speaking correspondents wrote about their experiences of the American Civil War 
in the early 1860s, tested such heroic mythology more fully.
MODERN WARFARE: THE FRANCO -AUSTRIAN 
WAR (1859)
Technological, strategic, tactical, and moral changes in the waging of wars during 
the mid-nineteenth century were likely to have more of an impact in those con-
flicts involving ‘German’ soldiers. To a limited extent, an ‘internal’ view of the 
American Civil War was provided by correspondents from the German-speaking 
communities of the northern states (with references to ‘our’ troops), helping to 
ensure that admirers of the South such as Heinrich Marquardsen—a lawyer in 
Erlangen writing for the Kölnische Zeitung—were outnumbered by supporters of 
the North such as the Cologne newspaper’s regular reporter in New York, Friedrich 
Kapp.335 This form of identification and dissemination occurred more frequently 
during the Habsburg monarchy’s war in northern Italy against France and 
Piedmont-Sardinia in 1859, when even newspapers traditionally sceptical of 
Austria and sympathetic to Prussia like the semi-official Badische Landeszeitung 
noted ‘the patriotic spirit’ permeating ‘the whole of Germany’.336 Other pro-Prussian 
publications such as the National-Zeitung (Berlin) and Grenzboten (Leipzig) 
pointed to the ‘agitated mood that today grips the German people’, as vienna 
strove to secure ‘a significant role for our great nation in this European drama’.337 
Southern German newspapers such as the Catholic, pro-Austrian Freiburger 
Zeitung tended to be considerably more positive, declaring as early as January, as 
the opposing powers jostled for position and threatened the use of force, that 
‘There are no longer democrats and ultramontanes, backward-looking men and a 
revolutionary party, but only Germans who are ready to mount a common defence 
when danger and disadvantage threaten the whole fatherland.’338 In common with 
many observers in 1859, Guido von Usedom, the Prussian delegate at the Bundestag 
335 On Kapp and Marquardsen, see Karl Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen Zeitung, vol. 4, 
247–8. Examples of reports from German–American commentary included Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 
Aug. 1862, which referred to ‘our sad Civil War’; ‘Amerikanische Zustände’, Gartenlaube, 1861, vol. 
39, 574–6, 621–3, by Otto Ruppius, who had ‘just returned from America to his Heimat’, as a foot-
note to the article explained; ‘Briefliche Mittheilungen aus Nordamerika’, Grenzboten, 1865, vol. 24, 
no. 1, 477–80. On different aspects of this question, see W. Hochbruck (ed.), Achtundvierziger/Forty-
Eighters. Die deutschen Revolutionen von 1848/49, die Vereinigten Staaten und der amerikanische 
Bürgerkrieg (Münster, 2000); J. Nagler, Frémont contra Lincoln. Die deutsch-amerikanische Opposition 
in der Republikanischen Partei während des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges (Frankfurt, 1984).
336 Badische Landeszeitung, 17 Feb. 1859, cited in F. Fischer, Die öffentliche Meinung in Baden 
während der italienischen Krise 1859 und in dern anschliessenden Diskussion um die Bundesreform bis 
1861 (Berlin, 1979), 52–3.
337 National-Zeitung, 27 May 1859; Grenzboten, 1859, vol. 18, 277. See the attempts of even the 
conservative Neue Preußische Zeitung, 13 Mar. and 15 Apr. 1859, to present itself as the champion of 
national affairs, which were linked to the international position of the Habsburg monarchy.
338 Freiburger Zeitung, 23 Jan. 1859, in F. Fischer, Die öffentliche Meinung in Baden, 52–3.
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in Frankfurt, was convinced that ‘the whole of South Germany is mad about 
Austria’ and ‘identifies Austria with Germany’, appearing to push their reluctant 
governments towards war.339 Such support seemed to encourage both commenta-
tors and readers to empathize with German–Austrian combatants.
As was to be expected, empathy was most pronounced in the Austrian press, 
which remained influential amongst the political elites of the German lands and 
whose articles were reprinted in German newspapers. The Habsburg Foreign 
Minister Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein was so confident of the proxim-
ity of German and Austrian public opinion in 1859 that he predicted that ‘all 
Germany’ would ‘gather round a hard-pressed Austria’, even if it were defeated.340 
At various points, the ‘Franco-Sardinian’ campaign was portrayed, not merely as 
a war against the Habsburg monarchy, but ‘an attack on Germany’.341 As the 
prospects of the war worsened, Austrian journalists became more convinced than 
ever that ‘the ramifications of the event for Germany appear to be profound and 
powerful’.342 The representation of events by the press in Austria was favourable 
to the Habsburg regime and army, designed in part to garner support in the 
German states and to push German governments to mobilize the troops of the 
Bund.343 After the battle of Magenta on 4 June, which issued in a decisive victory 
for France and Sardinia, the main liberal viennese newspaper Die Presse cast 
around for positive news. ‘French reports about the battle of Magenta already 
sound more modest,’ began one article on 11 June: ‘They all agree that the fight-
ing has demanded terrible sacrifices from the French.’344 The figures provided by 
one newspaper (L’Indépendance)—3,000 French dead, 9,000 wounded, and 1,000 
captured, which proved to be three to five times too high and which masked 
Austrian losses twice as great as those of the French and Piedmontese—were 
seized on as proof that the enemy’s victory had been costly and precarious, assured 
only by MacMahon’s arrival at the last minute, preventing an Austrian flanking 
manoeuvre.345 The suffering on both sides, even though it was ‘not yet possible 
from official reports and other details to date to give a clear picture’, had evidently 
been ‘terribly murderous’.346 By the end of ‘the first act of this bloody drama of 
war’, commented another lead article on 12 June, ‘events have taken a different 
339 G. v. Usedom to T. v. Bernhardi, 28 Apr. 1859, in T. v. Bernhardi, Aus dem Leben Theodor von 
Bernhardis (Leipzig, 1893), vol. 3, 194.
340 J. K. Mayr (ed.), Das Tagebuch des Polizeiministers Kempen von 1848 bis 1859 (vienna, 1931), 
510. See also K. F. Buol, 5 Feb. and 2 May 1859, in J. Müller, Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation, 
279, 286.
341 Die Presse, 27 June 1859. See also Bohemia (Prague), 13 Jan. and 3 May 1859, and the conser-
vative Oesterreichischer Volksfreund, 13 Jan. 1859, which called on the support of ‘the entirety of the 
German nation’. For an historical justification of the Habsburg monarchy’s ‘German’ role in Italy and 
elsewhere, see the historian Ottokar Lorenz’s Österreichs Politik in Italien und die wahren Garantien 
seiner Macht und Einheit (vienna, 1859).
342 Die Presse, 28 June 1859. The liberal Telegraf (Graz), 28 Sept. 1859, cited in N. Buschmann, 
Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, 155–6, commented after the event that southern Germans, in 
particular, had treated Austrian soldiers, including Galician, Czech, and Illyrian ones, ‘not as foreign-
ers or as good neighbours, but as brothers’.
343 The Oesterreichischer Volksfreund, 15 July 1859, talked of ‘the beautiful and great vocation’ of 
spilling blood for the monarchy even after Solferino and the armistice of villafranca on 12 July.
344 Die Presse, 11 June 1859.   345 Ibid.   346 Ibid.
0002891581.INDD   235 11/4/2016   10:41:34 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
236 The People’s Wars
course from that which we expected, and there has never been a more serious 
moment for our oft-tested land’, but ‘our army’ had nonetheless done ‘everything 
that daring and a lion’s courage could do on their own’, despite leaving ‘a great, 
rich province [Lombardy] to the Franco-Sardinian army, which must now be 
reconquered with the sword’.347
When news of Austria’s decisive defeat at the battle of Solferino on 24 June 
began to filter through to vienna by the end of the month, after days without tele-
grams or official information, the death toll of the war became impossible to 
ignore. ‘The losses are enormous and verona is spilling over with wounded’, 
recorded one ‘very laconic piece of correspondence’ on 30 June: ‘Those troops who 
were active defended Solferino house by house from 10 o’clock in the morning 
until 8 o’clock in the evening, using bayonets and the butts of their guns, since 
their munition had run out, and at least three times as large a number of the enemy 
opposed them.’348 On the evening of the same day, Die Presse finally received and 
printed the fuller report of its own correspondent, which provided more details of 
the battle and revealed how artillery had been used to devastating effect in hilly 
terrain, where ‘each step forwards’ had to be ‘bought with rivers of blood’, resulting 
in ‘over 20,000 men killed and wounded’ on Austria’s side.349 Napoleon III’s com-
munication to his own army, in which he congratulated his soldiers for repelling 
‘the efforts of 150,000 men’, was printed in the viennese newspaper without 
 further comment.350 By the next day, it had become apparent that the French and 
Piedmontese had won a ‘victory’, although ‘only with important losses, which 
were also great on our side’.351 On 4 July, the newspaper’s correspondent con-
tinued to ignore the consequences of the Habsburg forces’ defeat, passing on ‘the 
decision of the army leadership . . . to give up the Mincio line’ and to adopt a 
defensive  position near verona’, but the same publication had begun to publish 
long lists of dead and wounded Austrian officers (by name) and soldiers (by num-
ber only), which made the extent of the defeat obvious for the first time.352 The 
entire second army was, ‘as a result of the sick, dead, wounded and missing, 
unfortunately about half as strong as before’.353 The empathy, anxiety, and pathos, 
as well as the ignorance, deceptions, and obfuscations, of such reportage could 
easily be detected by readers.
Given the effects of artillery and sharpshooters during the Crimean War, the 
conditions facing combatants in 1859 were foreseeable, even if the ‘new factors’ of 
warfare—including the telegraph and ‘steam on water and land’—were ‘still partly 
unknown and scarcely studied in theory’, in the words of the official Oesterreichische 
Zeitung on 21 June 1859.354 Modern combat tore ‘the manly, youthful strength of 
the peoples from the arms of their loved ones and from useful work’ and pushed 
347 Ibid., 12 June 1859.   348 Ibid., 30 June 1859.
349 Ibid., Abendblatt, 30 June 1859.   350 Ibid.
351 Ibid., 1 July 1859.   352 Ibid., 4 July 1859.   353 Ibid.
354 Cited in Die Presse, 29 June 1859. Engels criticized the war for not proceeding, initially, with 
the speed expected of ‘modern’ warfare: ‘The War: No Progress’, New York Daily Tribune, 27 May 
1859, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, vol. 13, 339. The original from the Tribune is cited here, not 
the translation into German.
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conscripts, ‘with drums and whistles, into the chemically and scientifically studied 
sphere of war, which spread the instruments of murder afar’, leaving thousands 
dead and ‘peace’ to be concluded by generals over the bodies of ‘cripples and the 
dismembered’, lamented the democratic Beobachter (Stuttgart) in May 1859: 
‘A modern war like this stands before us.’355 In the ensuing conflict in northern Italy, 
the consequences of such warfare were occasionally revealed to a mass readership. 
Thus, one instalment of the Gartenlaube’s ‘Original Communications from the 
War Front’ gave an account, in the words of its sub-title, of ‘the smell of Montebello’ 
and of a ‘visit to the battlefield of Palestro’ with French forces:
If we see a corpse, especially someone murdered, in civilian life amongst peaceful 
people, and the murderer in front of a court, . . . no one can very easily guard against a 
shudder of horror. It is always somewhat shocking. A dead body! Yet hundreds of 
 dismembered and dead bodies around us daily—that is something quite different. 
One gets used to the horrors of war and takes the hundreds and thousands of those 
who have been smashed to pieces, even if one sees them at all, as something inevitable, 
which is self-evident. Even the terrible, tortured, mass death of the wounded appear 
for those around as for those suffering and dying to become a form of business which 
one must view and oversee in the coldest blood possible. In Alessandria, I saw long 
caravans of the wounded and those who died in transit coming from the battle of 
Montebello, with enough material for the most distressing and cruellest scenes for an 
entire century of novels, yet those who were lightly wounded sang, smoked and 
laughed like people who were bringing funny goods to an annual fair. They turned and 
wrestled and jabbered heart-wrenchingly on their stretchers; others lay completely still 
and fixed and were dead; but the lightly wounded next to them, who could still make 
their way, limped and laughed and smoked and sang at their side, and made humor-
ous, well-meaning comments about those who had become completely still. A zouave 
with one smashed leg and one intact one played the formal joker in their midst.
I wasn’t able to enter Montebello itself. I was driven far away by a bitterly repellent, 
unconquerable force: by the smell of the fallen, who had been buried in their hun-
dreds in hastily dug, rectangular pits, densely piled on top of one another and had 
only been loosely covered by a thin layer of soil—so thin that, as man explained to me 
on the road, the rain overnight had uncovered heads with fluttering hair and protrud-
ing arms and legs, so that grim, frozen faces stared at the sky with white, dead eyes.356
Such ‘slaughter’ was presented by the correspondent of the Gartenlaube as proof of 
the horrors of modern warfare, with ‘the scenes of street fighting and “house 
wars” . . . sometimes as disgusting and bloody, as fanatical and ruthless as the cruel-
lest instances of revolutionary fighting’.357 To the satirical journal Kladderadatsch, 
the battles of Magenta and Solferino were feathers in the cap of the grim reaper, 
the ally of all ‘liberators and civilizers’, who—‘to the relief of all’—was ‘now resting 
from his exertions’.358
355 Beobachter, 19 May 1859, cited in Buschmann, Einkreisung und Waffenbruderschaft, 79.
356 Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 30, 430.   357 Ibid., 430.
358 ‘Zum Friedens-Abschluß’, Kladderadatsch, vol. 12, no. 33, 17 July 1859, 132, depicted the 
symbol of death in one panel, topped by a greedy, corpulent, comic Napoleon III, whose eyes were 
‘bigger than his belly’, and a vainglorious ‘new Italian freedom’, half bound to France (Lombardy) and 
half to Austria (venice), and dressed half in the military garb of one and half of the other.
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The battle of Solferino became famous because it gave rise to the signature of the 
first Geneva Convention in 1864 and the founding of the International Committee 
for Relief to the Wounded in 1863 (becoming the International Committee of 
the Red Cross in 1876), after the publication in 1862 of Jean Henri Dunant’s 
Un Souvenir de Solférino, which exposed the conditions experienced by wounded 
soldiers. Like German coverage of the American Civil War, which eventually saw 
2.64 million men in arms and up to one-fifth of combatants killed, press reportage 
of the war between France, Sardinia, and Austria included few exposés of the effects 
of modern combat.359 Military conflict continued to be represented—and, as far 
as historians can judge, to be understood—as an heroic adventure. There were vari-
ous reasons why the Habsburg monarchy’s war in northern Italy in 1859 did not 
lead to the abandonment of this conception of military conflict in the German 
lands. One concerned the unexpectedly short duration of the conflict. Most jour-
nalists had foreseen a longer war, which had the potential to become a protracted 
European conflagration, as the Gartenlaube noted:
The peoples of Europe have become something like a single people, through work and 
trade, railways and telegraphs, and thousands of daily contacts of material and ideal acts 
of communication. They are a single societal body which suffers as a whole, if it is 
 disturbed, wounded or infected in one of its parts. This is why we all feel, despite the 
fact that the war has been ‘localized’ in an exemplary way until now, the misery of it. 
Now, every war more or less takes on the form and the curse of a civil war. Now, the 
philistine can no longer praise himself for holding forth on Sundays and holidays about 
war and calls for war when, far away in Turkey, the peoples are fighting with each other. 
The most distant and most localized war concerns his life and his pocket.360
The rapid ending of what one journalist of the Grenzboten predicted, at the out-
break of hostilities, would become ‘at least a European war’ and perhaps ‘a new 
thirty years’ war’ took most commentators by surprise.361 On 7 June, after defeat 
on the 4th at Magenta, which was still being referred to six days later as an ‘alleged 
defeat’, the Kreuzzeitung could be found reiterating the assurance of the Kölnische 
Zeitung’s correspondent in vienna on 1 June that Austrian reinforcements were on 
their way to Italy.362 Following the abandonment of Milan a fortnight earlier, the 
conservative publication prophesied on 21 June, via the reprinting of an article 
from the Militär-Zeitung (vienna), that the Habsburg forces would soon return.363 
359 The death toll comes from Mark Grimsley, ‘In Not So Dubious Battle: The Motivations of 
Civil War Soldiers’, Journal of Military History, 62 (1998), 176, but the figure is contested; for exam-
ple, by Mark Neely, Jr, The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction (Cambridge, MA, 2007). Much of 
the literature on the American Civil War has stressed, and sought to explain, the willingness of 
 soldiers to fight, given the conditions and killing rate of modern warfare: G. F. Linderman, Embattled 
Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York, 1987); Michael Barton, 
Goodmen: The Character of Civil War Soldiers (University Park, PA, 1981); E. J. Hess, The Union 
Soldier in Battle (Lawrence, KA, 1997); J. M. McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861–1865 (Baton 
Rouge, LA, 1994); and J. M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War 
(Oxford, 1997); E. Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare 
(Bloomington, IN, 1988).
360 Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 24, 341.   361 Grenzboten, 1859, vol. 18, no. 2, 471.
362 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 7 June 1859. On Magenta, see ibid., 10 June 1859.
363 Ibid., 21 June 1859.
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On 24 June, the day of the battle of Solferino, the newspaper merely declared that 
the ‘first act’ of the war was over, with Austria’s early defeats the consequence of 
bad luck and poor information.364 The Habsburg army still seemed stronger than 
those of its enemies. After the gravity of the monarchy’s defeat at Solferino had 
become clear and the armistice of villafranca had been agreed on 12 July, the Neue 
Preußische Zeitung’s main question was whether ‘this pause was the beginning of 
peace or . . . the calm before a greater storm’.365 The conservative mouthpiece found 
it difficult, like many German newspapers and periodicals, to accept that the war 
was over.366 ‘The whole of Europe was transported into a state of almost incompar-
able wonderment by the news that the peace of villafranca had been signed’, stated 
the principal correspondent of the conflict in the national–liberal Preußische 
Jahrbücher at the end of the war, before going on to provide hasty explanations of 
it; lack of finances, Hungarian opposition to vienna, and Austrian anxiety about 
Prussia’s imminent, self-interested involvement.367 Under such circumstances, 
there was little opportunity for publications to print accounts of soldiers’ experi-
ences of the fighting.
Much of the press coverage of the war was strategic and technical, tracking the 
advances and retreats of the different armies by telegraph and furnishing detailed 
reports of their tactics, deployments, and use of weaponry. From these points of 
view, it seemed to many correspondents that the campaign was comparable to 
those of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Thus, although it was true—as 
could be seen ‘from the reports on the war in the Crimea (which was only a siege 
war for the most part)’—‘that the art of war has developed to a point at which 
troops trained with the new methods could only be opposed with difficulty or not 
at all—over the long term—through the use of the old methods’, modern warfare 
appeared to require the extension of Napoleonic techniques, in the words of the 
main editorial on the Franco-Austrian War in the Neue Preußische Zeitung: namely, 
‘a speed of movement which is very difficult to achieve without particular exercises 
of this kind’; the ability of infantry, who played ‘a great part in the new method’, 
to manoeuvre quickly and then suddenly to stand their ground and to discharge 
their guns steadily under enemy fire; and the willingness of armies—like Wellington 
in Spain after 1808—to find and defend fixed positions and strongholds.368 French 
forces in Spain, as elsewhere, had had the advantage of speed during the Napoleonic 
Wars, which other armies had had to imitate and counter.369 This imperative 
seemed simply to have increased in the more ‘modern’ campaigns of Napoleon III. 
The battle of Magenta, the ‘first major battle in the new Austrian–French war’, had 
taken place on 4 June, ten days before the fifty-ninth anniversary of the ‘famous 
364 Ibid., 24 June 1859.
365 Ibid., 13 July 1859. The losses in both camps were said to be ‘significant’ and ‘undoubted’.
366 The Kölnische Zeitung’s response to Austria’s defeat and Cavour’s subsequent resignation was 
‘Eine Ueberraschung folgt der andern’, cited in K. Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen Zeitung, 
vol. 4, 104.
367 ‘Frankreich, Oesterreich und der Krieg in Italien’, Preußische Jahrbücher, 1859, vol. 4, 609. See 
also Grenzboten, 1859, vol. 3, 117, for a similar report.
368 ‘Diplomatisch-militärischer Kriegsschauplatz’, Neue Preußische Zeitung, 23 June 1859.
369 Ibid.
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battle of Marengo’, ‘by means of which the first Napoleon commenced his 
 triumphs’, wrote the local, conservative Teltower Kreisblatt on 11 June 1859: ‘The 
battle at Magenta was bloody but it cannot be seen to be as important as the battle 
of Marengo once was. The actual work remains to be done.’370
Although the precise movements and positions differed, with French forces 
advancing from the East at Montebello in 1859 and from the West in 1800 for 
example, the terrain and tactics of the war were similar, with MacMahon concen-
trating ‘all his strength on the right flank of the Austrians’ at Magenta, just as the 
French had once done at Marengo for Napoleon I, in the recollection of the 
Grenzboten.371 In 1796, the French ‘Army of Italy’ had stood opposite its Austrian 
counterpart on the Riviera, making its way under Napoleon I across northern 
Italy in the following months.372 Now, ‘Napoleon III has, in fact, more chance of 
imitating the campaign of 1796 and 1797 than seems at first sight to be the case 
as things stand in Austria and in Germany’, warned the military correspondent of 
the Grenzboten on 25 May 1859.373 The fact—in contrast to the speed and 
decisiveness—of Austria’s defeat at Solferino came as no surprise to the same jour-
nalist, reminding him of the battle of Castiglione in 1796.374 ‘We know that this 
battle was one of the most enormous and bloody of the entire nineteenth cen-
tury’, with each side leading ‘at least 150,000 men into battle’ and leaving ‘about 
20,000 men each, dead and wounded, on the field’, yet such losses were the same 
as those of the Napoleonic Wars.375 They were in keeping with the monarchy’s 
initial mobilization of 650,000 men and an ‘external’ deployment of up to 
450,000 at the start of the campaign, which betrayed ‘a strength such as has only 
been mustered rarely in European wars before’ but which had been exceeded by 
the Coalition’s forces in 1813–15.376 In the Grenzboten and other German publi-
cations, the war of 1859 was compared in its entirety to the campaigns of 1796–7, 
1800, 1813–15, and, even, 1848–9.377 Though sometimes described as ‘new’, it 
appeared to differ in detail alone from earlier military conflicts.
As in previous wars, German and Austrian newspapers presented to their readers 
a contradictory series of reports of events gleaned from official sources, military 
journals, and German-language and foreign publications. One article in the Neue 
Preußische Zeitung talked of ‘collecting’ all available news in order to arrive at a 
clearer view of what was happening at ‘the scene of the war’.378 Because the conflict 
lasted just over two months, there was little opportunity for periodicals to counter 
newspapers’ breathless dissemination of information by means of analysis or 
 eyewitness accounts. Even viennese newspapers with contacts in the Habsburg 
government and army were frequently obliged to reprint and interpret French 
reports on the various battles, expressing relief after the battle of Magenta when the 
370 Teltower Kreisblatt, 11 June 1859.   371 Grenzboten, 1859, vol. 18, no. 2, 485, 495.
372 Ibid., 387.   373 ‘Ausblicke auf den Kriegsschauplatz’, ibid., 390.
374 Ibid., vol. 18, no. 3, 80.   375 Ibid.
376 ‘Die Militärmacht Oestreichs in Italien’, ibid., 1859, vol. 18, no. 1, 513.
377 For references to 1848–9, see ‘Der Krieg in Italien 1848–1849’, ibid., 1859, vol. 18, no. 2, 
518–19; ibid., vol. 18, no. 3, 19.
378 ‘Diplomatisch-militärischer Kriegsschauplatz’, Neue Preußische Zeitung, 26 June 1859.
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Parisian press became ‘moderate’ or when it showed—for instance, on 27 June, via 
the account of an officer in the French General Staff—the doggedness of Austrian 
resistance.379 Sometimes, Die Presse was reduced to ‘guesses about the position of 
the Austrian army’, given the lack of news arriving by telegraph.380 At other times, 
after brief notifications of the battle of Solferino by telegraph had not been corrob-
orated by posted statements from its own correspondents, the newspaper was 
 compelled—for the intervening week—to rely on the Piedmontese, British, and 
French press, the disclosures of which had been relayed by the Kölnische Zeitung 
and other German publications with well-developed networks of correspondents. 
‘Today, too, we have not received further details of the battle of the 24th of this 
month’, admitted the lead article ‘From the Scene of War’ on 28 June: ‘The KZ 
writes of the first impressions [of the battle] in the news in Paris’ that the ‘fight-
ing must have been terrible and pertinacious, as is shown by its duration alone 
(16 hours).’381 When the viennese publication began to receive articles—initially 
in fragmentary form—from its own correspondent from 30 June onwards, it con-
tinued to print pieces from Le Moniteur alongside them.382 Thus, the claims of its 
lead article, from ‘an authentic source’, on 1 July that the French ‘success’ had only 
been achieved ‘with considerable losses’ were juxtaposed on the front page with the 
commentary of the Kölnische Zeitung’s Parisian correspondent on an official French 
report that the Austrians had been ‘chased out of Solferino’.383 The alleged death 
of MacMahon was described in parenthesis by the editor as ‘not accurate’.384 The 
presses of the other German lands, which had less reason to suppress news from 
France and Piedmont-Sardinia, put forward a similarly eclectic range of views, 
convinced, like the Kölnische Zeitung, that the conflict was not one in which 
‘Germany can afford to remain indifferent’ but, in many cases, remaining uncon-
vinced that it was ‘a German war’.385
There was considerable sympathy in the German lands for the Habsburg mon-
archy in its war against Napoleonic France. The resulting ‘national feeling’ in 
Germany, which had been given ‘the most unambiguous expression’ in 1859 
according to the Habsburg ambassador in Paris (whose opinion was published in 
the Heidelberger Journal), was not merely the consequence of what the liberal 
Hermann Baumgarten described as ‘Austrian agitation in the South’; it was also the 
product of political aspirations linked to the struggles of 1848 and an antipathy 
towards Bonapartism or France (see Figure 5.5).386 Even a sceptic such as Engels 
admitted that ‘the German nation’ was ‘fairly roused’.387 In an official dispatch to 
379 Die Presse, 11 and 27 June 1859.   380 Ibid., 12 June 1859.
381 ‘vom Kriegsschauplatze’, ibid., 28 June 1859.
382 Ibid., 30 June 1859. Also, ‘Der Moniteur über die Schlacht von Solferino’, ibid., 2 July 1859.
383 Ibid., 1 July 1859.   384 Ibid.
385 Kölnische Zeitung, 1 May 1859, cited in K. Buchheim, Die Geschichte der Kölnischen Zeitung, 
vol. 4, 96.
386 Heidelberger Journal, 25 Jan. 1859, cited in E. Portner, Die Einigung Italiens im Urteil liberaler 
deutscher Zeitgenossen (Bonn, 1959), 52–3; H. Baumgarten to M. Duncker, 12 Apr. 1859, in J. Schultze 
(ed.), Max Duncker. Politischer Briefwechsel aus seinem Nachlass (Osnabrück, 1967), 96.
387 F. Engels, ‘War Inevitable’, New York Daily Tribune, 30 Apr. 1859, in K. Marx and F. Engels, 
Werke, vol. 13, 302.
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vienna, the Austrian envoy in Baden was confident that ‘the German nation is 
beginning to feel its togetherness and its own power’, at least ‘here in the south-
west’, where the signs were ‘unmistakable’.388 ‘The war, in which one of the 
German Great Powers would have a part of its territory torn away from it, is a war 
of German power and German honour; it is a war against Germany, which all 
Germans have to fight,’ declared the address of the lower chamber of the Badenese 
Landtag on 2 May 1859:
And the more powerful the enemy is, which stands opposite us, the more pressing it 
is that the whole of Germany offers everything in order to meet it with full 
force. . . . These are the attitudes and opinions which are voiced everywhere in the state 
and in all classes of the population.389
Even though there was ‘no enthusiasm for Austria at all’ and the ‘ultramontanes 
and absolutists only play very minor violins’, the ‘rest of the South, the Palatinate 
and our entire land’, except Heidelberg, was ‘agitated’, in Ludwig Häusser’s evalu-
ation on 14 May: ‘from the Grand Duke [of Baden] to the smallest Palatinate 
grower of tobacco, there is only one opinion—hatred against Bonaparte, the desire 
for an Austrian victory, regret concerning Prussia’s fundamental meanness.’390 
In  Bavaria, the ‘bellicosity of the public’ continued, wrote the liberal historian 
Heinrich von Sybel on 8 May, with the peasantry, ‘enthused by the clergy’, wanting 
war ‘today rather than tomorrow’ and with ‘nobles, civil servants and students’ 
streaming to the regiments, ‘here as in Swabia and Baden’.391 In Prussia, Saxony, 
Hanover, Hesse, and the Thuringian states, too, ‘the German question’ had again 
been ‘brought into motion’, in the testimonies of the Hessian liberal Friedrich 
Oetker and the Saxon Karl Biedermann.392 Many liberals and democrats had 
‘warm feelings for Italy and its emancipation from the Austrian yoke, but a con-
cern for Germany lay closer to their hearts’, declared Otto Elben, with everything 
retreating ‘behind the threatening danger from outside’.393 The ‘menace against 
Austria’ was widely considered ‘a menace against Germany’, recalling the earlier 
descent from France’s war against the Habsburg monarchy in 1805 to that against 
Prussia in 1806.394 As the fighting came closer to ‘the German border in the Tyrol’, 
the ‘Swabian people’—or their representatives—delivered a proclamation ‘To Our 
Fellow Citizens’ at the end of June, which constituted ‘the actual beginnings of a 
national party in Württemberg’.395 In these circumstances, the Stuttgart liberal 
rejoiced, ‘we national-minded ones’ were joined by ‘those who were later named 
“Greater German”’ at a ‘moment of danger’, creating ‘the agreement, it can be said, 
of the entire country’.396
388 Fürst v. Schönburg-Hartenstein, 3 May 1859, in E. Portner, Die Einigung Italiens, 90.
389 Address of the second chamber of Baden’s Landtag, 2 May 1859, ibid., 91–2.
390 L. Häusser to H. Baumgarten, 14 May 1859, ibid., 90.
391 H. v. Sybel to M. Duncker, 8 May 1859, in J. Schultze (ed.), Max Duncker, 101.
392 F. Oetker, Lebenserinnerungen, 3 vols (Stuttgart, 1877–85), vol. 3, 116; K. Biedermann, Mein 
Leben und ein Stück Zeitgeschichte, 2 vols (Breslau, 1886–7), vol. 2, 140–61.
393 O. Elben, Lebenserinnerungen 1823–1899 (Stuttgart, 1931), 130.
394 Ibid.   395 Ibid.   396 Ibid., 131.
0002891581.INDD   242 11/4/2016   10:41:35 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/11/16, SPi
 War Reports 243
At the time and later, many contemporaries doubted that such national enthu-
siasm, which had developed above all in the middling strata during the spring of 
1859, betrayed a willingness to go to war or to see the conflict between Austria, 
France, and Piedmont-Sardinia as their own. Looking back, Elben failed to detect 
the ‘unanimity of all’ which had been present in 1848 and 1863, on the eve of the 
war in Schleswig-Holstein.397 Certainly, a large number of Catholic politicians 
and publicists were in favour of a declaration of war by the German Confederation 
on the grounds, resting on a broad interpretation of Article 47 of the viennese 
Final Acts, that Germany—or the territory of the Bund—was ‘threatened’, even if 
not subjected to an ‘attack’.398 Correspondingly, periodicals such as the Historisch-
politische Blätter had championed joint Austrian, Prussian, and confederal action 
throughout the first half of 1859.399 On this reading of events, which was 
expounded by the Rhineland Catholic leaders August and Peter Reichensperger, 
‘the sympathies of millions’ would ‘accompany and promote the unifying feeling 
of a common striving’ and would ‘give the German fatherland the courage and 
power’ to oppose the ‘common enemy in the decisive days ahead’ but also ‘finally 
to place limits on it’, as they had sought to do in 1859.400 The whole of Germany 
had opposed an expansionist Bonapartist dictatorship.401 They had also criticized 
Italian nationalists such as Mazzini and Garibaldi, who had ‘inflicted the deepest 
wounds on the eternal city’, and Italian statesmen like Cavour, who had ‘come 
back from Paris in a very pleased mood’ shortly before the outbreak of the war, ‘as 
the newspapers reported’ at the time.402 Even the Reichensperger brothers, how-
ever, conceded that ‘the confusion of facts corresponds to and serves the confusion 
of ideas’, with ‘nationality, unity, humanity, the localization of war, popular will, 
non-intervention, freedom, civilisation, progress and those sorts of “principles”’ 
clashing with each other and permitting ‘no clarification’.403 Conservatives were 
also troubled by the confusion of these ideas and by conflicting loyalties, dividing 
between supporters of Austria within the camarilla, a handful of opponents of 
Austria such as Bismarck-Schönhausen, and a disquieted majority, including 
Friedrich Julius Stahl and Hermann Wagener, who backed the Prussian govern-
ment’s policy of armed neutrality.404
The majority of other commentators, especially those in the North, had little 
sympathy for the Habsburg monarchy in the Italian war. For radicals such as Arnold 
Ruge, mindful of earlier persecution under Metternich and counter-revolution 
397 Ibid., 136.
398 A. und P. Reichensperger, Deutschlands nächste Aufgaben (Paderborn, 1860), 42.
399 For instance, Historisch-politische Blätter, 1859, vol. 43, 265, 636. They were supported for the 
most part by publications with ‘Greater German’ leanings: ‘Die Grenzen Deutschlands’, Stimmen der 
Zeit, 1859, vol. 1, 1–28; ‘Die nationale Bewegung und ihr Ziel’, Historisch-politische Blätter, 316–20; 
‘Napoléon III et l’Allemagne oder das bevorstehende Attentat auf den europäischen Frieden’, 
Historisch-politische Blätter, 407–41; ‘Studien, Kritiken udn vorschläge in Beziehung auf die gegen-
wärtige Weltlage’, Historisch-politische Blätter, vol. 2, 1–51, which was more critical of the Bund.
400 A. and P. Reichensperger, Deutschlands nächste Aufgaben, 174, 7, 18.
401 Ibid.   402 Ibid.   403 Ibid., 1.
404 H.-C. Kraus, Gerlach, 706–7. Also, M. v. Moltke, Nicht für Österreich, aber gegen Frankreich! 
(Breslau, 1859); ‘Die Politik Preußens. Eine Stimme aus Süddeutschland’, Preußisches Wochenblatt, 
1859, vol. 21, which backed Prussian neutrality and opposed more active support of Austria.
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under Schwarzenberg, Prussia, ‘with its objectionable love affair with the police’, 
was ‘the only salvation for Germany from Jesuits and reactionaries in politics’, who 
were associated with Austria: ‘If Germany is not now capable of using this position 
to free itself from Austrian tyranny, it will be wasting another great opportun-
ity. . . . German freedom means separation from Austria.’405 In Bamberger’s opinion, 
articulated in his anonymously published pamphlet Juchhe nach Italia! (1859), 
405 The article in Das Jahrhundert, 1859, no. 14, is attributed by Hans Rosenberg to Ruge, in Die 
nationalpolitische Publizistik Deutschlands (Munich, 1935), 33. See also H. Simon, Don Quixote; C. vogt, 
Figure 5.5 ‘Die Wiedereroberung einer Fahne in der Schlacht von Magenta’
Source: Gartenlaube, 1859, vol. 28, 405.
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the Habsburg monarchy was ‘a hundred times deadlier’ than France for German 
freedom and unity.406 German support for Austria was not the result of national 
sentiment but an artificially produced, sham patriotism or the ‘inculcated roaring of 
dishonoured subjects’.407 The ‘bulwark of German greatness’ lay not on the Po or 
Mincio Rivers, which had become critical barriers in the military campaign of 
1859, but in ‘the final realization’ of ‘German unity’ at home.408 ‘Germany’ had 
only awoken and acknowledged this fact on the edge of the abyss of military con-
flict, if Bamberger were to be believed. In one of the most famous treatises on the 
war, entitled Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas (1859), the exiled radical Carl 
vogt agreed with Bamberger: the Habsburg monarchy was not a ‘German’ power. 
Rather, it existed at the expense of nationalities in Italy, Germany, and Eastern 
Europe, responsible only for ‘a series of outrages against Germany’s unity, honour, 
reputation, security, freedom, power and greatness’.409 The establishment of an 
independent Italy under Piedmont-Sardinian leadership was to be welcomed by the 
German Confederation, which ought to remain neutral.410 vogt, like many other 
radicals, was prepared to go to war, not least because he believed that military con-
flict would be necessary to establish Italian, Hungarian, and German nation-states 
at the expense of the Habsburg monarchy:
We call for a mobilization against every attack on Germany, on the development of its 
people, its national character; against any contravention of its honour or its inner 
being; but we do not want this to be exploited for self-interested purposes; we want to 
tear the masks from the faces of the hypocrites and show them that we know how to 
distinguish between genuine belief and an outrageous abuse of it.411
For more extreme radicals such as Karl Blind, ‘the moment when Lombardy and 
venice, Hungary and Galicia will demand state independence’ was ‘most keenly’ 
desired: ‘We will welcome any true national struggle (Volkskampf) of these lands 
with enthusiasm’.412 ‘By declaring ourselves against Parisian tyrants, we are not 
preaching sympathy for tyrants in vienna’, declared Blind in a confiscated treatise 
on ‘war risk’, before going on to call for the ‘arming’ of the German people against 
the danger of a European war which, in the case of ‘victory’, would ‘not bring free-
dom’ and, in the event of a defeat, ‘would strike us from the book of nations’.413 
Radicals like Blind were convinced that Austria’s war was dynastic, not national.
Not all radicals and socialists toed the line of the majority of their comrades. 
A few, like Jakob venedey, initially backed vienna against Napoleon III, but then 
changed allegiances, after the peace of villafranca, to Prussia as the only defence 
Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas; H. B. Oppenheim, Deutschlands Noth und Ärzte (Berlin, 1859); 
and H. B. Oppenheim, Deutsche Begeisterung und Habsburgischer Kronbesitz (Berlin, 1859).
406 L. Bamberger, Juchhe nach Italia!, in H. Rosenberg, Die nationalpolitische Publizistik 
Deutschlands, 83.
407 Ibid.   408 Ibid.
409 C. vogt, Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas (Geneva, 1859), 51.
410 Ibid., 54, 56–7.   411 Ibid., 118.
412 K. Blind, Kriegsgefahr! Deutsche National-Vertretung! Männer von Deutschland! (Frankfurt, 
1859), in H. Rosenberg, Die nationalpolitische Publizistik Deutschlands, 42.
413 Ibid., 42.
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against both Austria and France.414 Johann Baptist von Schweitzer, who was widely 
suspected in socialist circles of dilettantism as the scion of a wealthy, Catholic 
 family of Italian origin and as the grandson of the editor of the pro-Austrian 
Oberpostamtszeitung (Frankfurt), was exceptional in the degree of his opposition to 
vogt, declaring in Österreichs Sache ist Deutschlands Sache and Widerlegung von 
Carl Vogt’s Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas—both written at the age of 26 
in 1859—that the Habsburg regime was safeguarding the legal treaties of the inter-
national order, defending German interests against Italy and France, and further-
ing natural ties of kinship:
Where is the cornerstone of a unified national form to be found? Not there, where we 
calmly look on as a common enemy attacks our fraternal tribe, but there, where we 
feel ourselves to be a nation (Nation) and recognise in the injury of our brotherly tribe 
the injury of all.415
Few other socialists were willing to go so far, even though many were sceptical of 
Napoleon III’s intentions. Marx, indeed, had accused vogt on 10 May 1859 of 
being in the pay of the French dictator: ‘the pseudo-democratic party . . . affects to be 
so exasperated by Austrian brutality, as to discern liberalism on the part of the hero 
of December [that is, Napoleon III, who launched his coup on 2 December 1851]’, 
pointing to the fact ‘that some members of the last mentioned party have positively 
been bought by napoléons d’or, and that the great manager of this trade in con-
sciences resides in Switzerland, being himself not only a German, but an  ex-member 
of the German National Assembly of 1848, and an outrageous Radical’.416 At the 
‘the opening of the great and bloody war in which Europe is now involved’, Marx 
and Engels gave their detached backing to Austria as a means of resisting the French 
and the ‘Slavs’ and of protecting Germany, with the latter going on to advocate the 
offensive as ‘the true method for Austria to defend herself ’.417
Like most of their counterparts, Marx and Engels displayed little anxiety about 
the costs of military engagement, with the latter hailing the first battle at 
Montebello, in which he reported 1,500 to 2,000 dead or wounded, as ‘fighting at 
last’.418 Their reports about the battles of Magenta and Solferino betrayed excite-
ment about military technology and strategy, with Engels identifying entrenched 
or fortified positions and steam as ‘two new elements which have significantly 
changed warfare since Napoleon’, and they were apparently indifferent to soldiers’ 
suffering: neither paid much attention to casualty figures other than as a means—
as in Engels’s passing reference on 21 July to ‘losses of approx. 30,000 men since 
the beginning of the campaign’ on the Allied side—of calculating the fighting 
414 J. venedey, Der italienische Krieg und die deutsche Volkspolitik (Hanover, 1859), especially 
34–55.
415 J. B. Schweitzer, Widerlegung von Carl Vogt’s Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas (Frankfurt, 
1859), 42.
416 K. Marx, ‘Austria, Prussia and Germany in the War’, New York Daily Tribune, 27 May 1859, in 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, vol. 13, 326.
417 F. Engels, ‘The Prospects of the War’, New York Daily Tribune, 12 May 1859, ibid., 312.
418 F. Engels, ‘Fighting at Last’, New York Daily Tribune, 6 June 1859, ibid., 344–9.
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strengths of the two armies.419 The ‘sudden and unexpected end’ of the Italian war 
made Marx aware that it had been ‘costly’.420 He accepted that it had ‘in concen-
trated form, brought together in a few weeks not only the heroic acts, invasions and 
counterinvasions, marches, battles, conquests and losses, but also the expenditure of 
people and money of many wars of considerably longer duration’, yet there is little 
indication that the exiled communist was moved to a more fundamental reassess-
ment of modern warfare.421 As it became evident that Austria was losing the war 
(with the ‘noble’ fool Franz Joseph partly responsible), Marx and Engels moved 
from disengaged support to specialized criticism.422 It is doubtful that they ever 
considered the conflict a ‘German’ one (or ‘theirs’), despite their expectation that 
Russia and Prussia—‘unable to master the national feeling’ of the public—would be 
drawn into it.423 Other leading socialists in Germany such as Ferdinand Lassalle 
were more active in calling on the Prussian government to remain neutral, whilst 
maintaining an armed vigilance and the possibility of attacking Denmark and occu-
pying Schleswig-Holstein, in the unlikely event of a French incursion over the 
Rhine or a French attempt to redraw Europe’s borders along national lines.424
Liberals were less worried than radicals about Austrian tyranny and less attracted 
to Italian nationalism, even though the Società Nazionale Italiana served as the 
model for the Nationalverein. Droysen, despite harbouring ‘all imaginable sympa-
thies’ for the ‘unfortunate’ Italians, wanted Austria to ‘have and rule Italy’ so that 
it was not tempted to ‘put even more pressure on Germany’, the interests of which 
were his ‘first concern’.425 ‘That the war which has been started in Italy is directly 
a German affair has not even been claimed by those who have taken it up, notwith-
standing the fact that, where Germans fight, the sympathy of all other Germans 
will always be on their side’, proclaimed the rector of Berlin University Heinrich 
Wilhelm Dove in August 1859.426 Austria’s war, insinuated Constantin Rössler, 
was the corollary of its unnatural, imperial character, contradicting the imperatives 
of nation-building: ‘Austria hinders natural development. But its nemesis stands 
before the door. . . . The Schwarzenberg system has been judged and made forever 
impossible’.427 Prussia should not be misled into joining Habsburg wars in Italy 
and the Near East, but should assume the leadership of Germany, after the 
 withdrawal of Austria, and solve the ‘German’ problem of Schleswig-Holstein, 
419 F. Engels, ‘Der Feldzug in Italien’, Das Volk, vol. 4, 28 May 1859, ibid., 358–60; F. Engels, 
‘Historical Justice’, New York Daily Tribune, 21 July 1859, ibid., 405.
420 K. Marx, ‘What has Italy gained?’, New York Daily Tribune, 27 July 1859, ibid., 417.
421 Ibid.
422 For the reference to the damaging, naïve ‘Ritterlichkeit’ of the Austrian Emperor, see F. Engels, 
‘Die Schlacht bei Solferino’, Das Volk, vol. 9, 2 July 1859, ibid., 402. On Marx and Engels’s disen-
chantment with Austria, see F. Engels, ‘Progress of the War’, ‘Military Events’, ‘The Austrian Events’, 
‘The News from the War’, ‘The Battle of Solferino’, and ‘Der Italienische Krieg. Rückschau’ and K. 
Marx, ‘The Peace’ and ‘The Treaty of villafranca’, ibid., 372–439.
423 F. Engels, ‘The News from the War’, New York Daily Tribune, 8 July 1859, ibid., 402.
424 F. Lassalle, Der italienische Krieg und die Aufgabe Preussens. Eine Stimme aus der Demokratie 
(Berlin, 1859). 69–73.
425 Droysen to Duncker, 8 June 1859, in Fenske (ed.), Reichsgründung, 161.
426 Ibid., 106.   427 C. Rössler, Preussen und die italienische Frage (Berlin, 1859), 36.
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concluded the publicist.428 The liberal historian and military commentator 
Theodor von Bernhardi, writing in the Preussische Jahrbücher, went so far as to 
blame Austria for attacking France as a means of propping up its ailing imperial 
system of rule and re-establishing a conservative order in Europe:
What it was actually about was the entanglement of Germany and especially Prussia 
in a war, the shifting of the war to the Rhine, the invasion of France with a powerful, 
superior military force, the destruction and banishment of the Napoleonists, and 
the  return of Heinrich v and his befriended clerical coterie to the throne of his 
ancestors.429
Austria’s intentions were ‘very easy to see through’, he explained to Usedom in 
April 1859: vienna wanted ‘to transfer the war to Germany at any price’, meaning 
that the decisive battles would be fought on the Rhine and that the ‘main burden 
of the war’ would pass from Austria to Prussia430; 1859 was the last episode in a 
long history of Habsburg exploitation of both Italy and Germany. Such anti-Austrian 
rather than pro-Italian sentiment was what linked Italian and German nationalism, 
in the view of Wilhelm Beseler and many other liberals:
The German nation has no interest at all in seeing the territorial possessions and 
influence of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine maintained or even increased. It must 
be admitted, however difficult this is for many Germans, who have become accus-
tomed—for no reason whatsoever—to looking down on the Italians, that Germany 
and Italy are largely in the same position vis-à-vis Austria, and that we scarcely suffer 
less under Austrian pressure in Germany than do our neighbours on the other side of 
the Alps as a result of the Austrian position in Italy.431
In Beseler’s view, Prussia had to lead Germany, not Austria. Some North German 
old liberals—Waitz, Droysen, and Duncker—were less openly against the Habsburg 
monarchy in 1859, but few were for it. The liberal press displayed a similar 
disinterest.432
The distance of readers from the events of mid-nineteenth-century conflicts was 
barely altered by the gradual, uneven increase of civilians’ sensitivity to violence 
and by the slow transformation of the technology and practices of military wound-
ing and killing. In these respects, the American Civil War (1861–5), despite its 
duration, remained closer to a war of movement or adventure than either the 
Crimean War or the Franco-Austrian War.433 For much of the century, the United 
States had, along with Switzerland, provided German commentators with their 
principal example of a militia (640,000 in the initial Union levy) acting in the 
428 See also Aegidi, Preussen und der Friede von Villafranca.
429 T. v. Bernhardi, ‘Frankreich, Österreich und der Krieg in Italien’, Preussische Jahrbücher, 1859, 
vol. 4, 179–97, 229–52, 457–94, 571–612.
430 T. v. Bernhardi, Leben, vol. 3, 194–5.
431 W. Beseler, Das deutsche Interesse in der italienischen Frage (Leipzig, 1859), 14–15.
432 See articles by Hugo Haelschner, Preußische Jahrbücher, 1859, vol. 3, 300–9; Hermann 
Baumgarten, ibid., vol. 3, 738, and vol. 4, 431; Rudolf Haym, ibid., vol. 3, 493; Karl Neumann, ibid., 
vol. 3, 592 and 734, and vol. 4, 207 and 431.
433 See S. Förster and J. Nagler (eds), On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the 
German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871 (Cambridge, 2002).
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stead of a regular army (20,000).434 Thus, George McLellan, the commander of 
Union forces, was depicted in the Illustrirte Zeitung in 1862 in simple, undecor-
ated military dress, only a drawn sabre indicating that he was an officer.435 In the 
same year, Kladderadatsch imagined ‘pictures of the age from America’, represent-
ing 1822 (when soldiers and taxes were to be found only in Europe), 1842 (when 
a European being robbed was told there was no police, only freedom), and 1862, 
when a brutal-looking American, robbed of half of his clothes and facing the pros-
pect of ‘conscription’ and military drill, was told to go to ‘England’ if he wanted to 
avoid the ‘overburden of taxation, military rule and lawlessness’ which existed in 
the United States.436 As war broke out, even though it was initially referred to as a 
‘civil war’, journalists suggested, in the words of one correspondent of the Allgemeine 
Zeitung in May 1861, ‘that this war cannot last long’, because ‘the American army 
is comprised of people who are dragged away to arms from different occupational 
groups of civilian life and whose time and work are worth ten times as much in 
money as in Europe’.437 The professionalization of Union forces and leadership, 
with ‘Grant and Sherman [coming] from the regular army and [having] completed 
their military studies at the academy of West Point’, took place only in 1864 in the 
opinion of the Grenzboten, replacing the practice of promoting ‘more or less polit-
ical leaders to generals’ and involving more extensive training and longer experi-
ence of warfare on the part of military volunteers.438
Eventually, the mobilization of troops and rates of killing in the American Civil 
War exceeded those of most European conflicts, with the North widely known 
to dispose of an army of over 600,000 men.439 At the beginning of the conflict, 
though, the number of troops engaged in combat seemed small by European stand-
ards, not least because the different battalions of volunteers remained tied to their 
states: ‘200,000 men in virginia, 150,000 on the Mississippi, 100,000 in Tennessee 
and Kentucky, 100,000 in Louisiana and Missouri, in Minnesota against the Indians, 
in Texas, North and South Carolina, Florida and the sea forts’, with ‘the rest in the 
interior and in California, Maryland and New York’, out of a total for the Union 
army of ‘600,000 at the most’ in 1863, in the judgement of one retrospective article 
in the Grenzboten in 1865.440 ‘The spatial extent of the scene of the fighting in North 
America offers an offensive front about like that from Memel to the Pyrenees and 
therefore demands the deployment of forces which are independent of one another 
at the different points of contact,’ reported the same publication in 1862:
These points themselves determine, as a result of general conditions, that the main 
army is deployed in the direction of the capitals, so between Washington and Richmond, 
434 See Chapter 6. The figures come from Grenzboten, 1864, vol. 23, no. 4, 458, with an initial 
Union levy in December 1861 of 682,000.
435 Illustrirte Zeitung, no. 967, 11 Jan. 1862. See also ibid., no. 968, 18 Jan. 1862, which showed 
disembarking Union troops, in the enthusiastic, disordered state of a militia.
436 ‘Sonst und Jetzt’, Kladderadatsch, vol. 15, no. 45, 28 Sept. 1862, 180.
437 Allgemeine Zeitung, Beilage, 9 May 1861.
438 ‘Das Ende des Kriegs in Nordamerika’, Grenzboten, 1865, vol. 24, no. 1, 353.
439 See, for instance, ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika’, ibid., 58.
440 ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika 1863 und 1864’, ibid., no. 1, 229.
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the next most important force on the main transport artery, the Mississippi, and a 
weaker army operates in the enormous space in between these principal points, in 
Kentucky, Tennessee and southwards.441
The largest battle of 1861—Bull Run in virginia on 21 July—pitted 35,000 Union 
soldiers against 34,000 Confederates, resulting in less than 2,000 dead and 
wounded on each side; the battles of 1862 and 1863 were larger, with higher num-
bers of casualties (approximately 18,000 dead and wounded on each side at 
Gettysburg, the costliest of the entire war), but no battle exceeded 200,000 men in 
the field, making them considerably smaller than their Napoleonic equivalents.
Most reports in the German press treated such campaigns strategically, tracking 
the movements of the two armies across the ‘thinly populated landscapes of North 
America’ and weighing up their relative gains and losses: looking back on ‘the over-
all results of the events of the war’ in 1864, one article concluded that ‘the advan-
tages between Washington and Richmond belong to the South rather than the 
North, because the former has, with luck, pushed back the considerably greater 
power of its opponent’, whereas ‘in the West the North under Grant has achieved 
domination over the Mississippi river and over the states of both Kentucky and 
Tennessee’.442 This form of reportage, which was combined with evaluations of the 
political significance and causes of the conflict, overshadowed coverage of ‘the 
internal struggle’ and ‘the bloody wrestling’ which had traditionally been under-
stood to characterize civil wars.443 With the exception of occasional early reports 
on the ‘Bürgerkrieg in America’ or even the ‘Sonderbundskrieg’, which hinted at the 
war between a Swiss federal army and a Catholic Sonderbund in November 1847, 
most German journalists depicted the conflict as a normal ‘war’ or an ‘American 
war’ between two states, rather than a fratricidal conflict which divided families 
and communities.444
The headlines of major articles in the Allgemeine Zeitung were telling, betraying 
the evolution of an unknown ‘civil war’ into a familiar inter-state conflict com-
bined with a separate and predominant sphere of domestic politics. Thus, there 
was a transition from ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Amerika’ (9 May 1861) and ‘Der 
Sonderbundskrieg in den vereinigten Staaten von Amerika’ (11 May 1861), via 
‘Der Wendepunkt in dem amerikanischen Krieg’ (29 July 1862), ‘Die zweite 
Schlacht am Bull Run’ (22 September 1862), and ‘Die Schlacht bei Gettysburg’ 
(20 July 1863), to more explicitly political headlines such as ‘Petersburg, Atlanta 
und die Präsidentenwahl in den vereinigten Staaten’ (25 August 1864), ‘Der Krieg 
und die politischen Parteien in den vereinigten Staaten’ (5 September 1864), and 
441 ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika. Der Kriegsschauplatz’, ibid., 1864, vol. 23, no. 4, 325.
442 Ibid., 1864, vol. 23, no. 4, 326, and ibid., 1865, vol. 24, no. 1, 238.
443 Ibid.: here, the reference was left without further commentary at the end of an article which 
had focused exclusively on the movements of the two armies.
444 See, for instance, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Nordamerika und der Untergang der Union’, Historisch-
politische Blätter, 1862, vol. 49, no. 1, 245–79, ‘Der Wendepunkt im nordamerikanischen Bürgerkrieg’, 
ibid., 1863, vol. 51, no. 1, 211–42, ‘Zeitläufe über Nordamerika’, ibid., 1865, vol. 55, no. 1, 476–98, 
578–604, and ‘Der Feldzug 1862 in Nord-Amerika’, in the Preußische Jahrbücher, 1862, vol. 10, 
470–87, which treated the fighting as a traditional continental ‘campaign’.
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‘Der Präsidentenwahl in den ver. Staaten’ (22 September 1864).445 Even those 
correspondents who—early in the conflict—understood it as a ‘revolution’, which 
would ‘fundamentally reconcile differences of interest and opinion’ after further 
‘sacrifices’, generally avoided reference to a ‘civil war’, with its connotations of 
uncontrolled brutality and internecine killing.446 As a war, ‘we can say . . . that the 
armies still lack a warlike core and nature’, wrote the same correspondent in the 
Preußische Jahrbücher in 1862: ‘The intensity of the fighting has only reached that 
of 1849 in Hungary or 1860 in Italy, at most, but not that of the Crimea or the 
campaign of 1859 in Italy.’447 As the bloodshed increased in 1863 and 1864, there 
were descriptions of what the Allgemeine Zeitung—at the time of the battles of 
Petersburg and Atlanta in August 1864—labelled the ‘atrocious slaughter’ of mod-
ern warfare, yet they remained rare.448 In general, German reports of the American 
war became more and more disparate over the last two years of the conflict, eclipsed 
by the ‘German’ war in Schleswig-Holstein.
Warfare, it seemed from a reading of the press, was changing by the mid-nineteenth 
century, becoming more destructive, but it still appeared to be a distant adventure 
or a strategic game for amateurs and experts. Some journalists passed on their 
 anxieties about the suffering and death which they experienced in more explicit 
reportage of events. The battlefields were a long way away, though, with news 
of Abraham Lincoln’s assassination on 15 April 1865, in one of the final acts of 
the Civil War, working its way to Kladderadatsch ‘from far across the ocean’, for 
example.449 The ‘German’ wars which occurred either affected few combatants—
in Schleswig-Holstein in 1848–51—or they were seen, with some exceptions, to 
be ‘Austrian’ affairs, most notably in Hungary in 1849 and Italy in 1859. Many 
German subjects had served in the military but few had fought in a war, the prin-
cipal ‘memories’ of which—by the early 1860s—were historical, dating back fifty 
years to the Napoleonic campaigns. The public commemorations and histories of 
these military conflicts were romantic, helping to establish an heroic conception 
of warfare which military service and the prominence of the army in daily life 
 normalized. News from exotic wars abroad, imagined in visual form, fed readers’ 
existing fascination and did little, despite premonitions of horrifying violence, to 
deter subjects from going to war. Thus, when conflicts looked likely to escalate 
in 1848–9, 1854–6, and 1859, political leaders, journalists, and ‘public opin-
ion’, as far as can be judged, were willing to countenance the possibility of war. 
445 These political headlines were accompanied in the latter stages of the war by the continuation 
of straightforwardly military headlines: for instance, ‘vom amerikanischen Krieg’ (22 September 
1864), ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika’ (9 April 1865), and ‘Aus den vereinigten Staaten’ (13 April 1865). 
Such articles also appeared in periodicals such as the Preußische Jahrbücher: ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika 
seit der Entscheidung im Westen’, 1865, vol. 15, 258–91; ‘Der Krieg in Nordamerika und die 
Präsidentenwahl im Herbst 1864’, 1865, vol. 16, 324–43.
446 Preußische Jahrbücher, 1862, vol. 10, 487. ‘Der Wendepunkt im nordamerikanischen 
Bürgerkrieg’, ibid., 1863, vol. 51, no. 1, 212, was more critical, terming the conflict ‘a social war’, 
not a political one or a ‘civil war to put down a rebellion’. It nevertheless avoided references of a war 
of all against all, which had typified historical treatments of civil war and the Thirty Years’ War, in 
particular.
447 Ibid., 483.   448 Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 Aug. 1864.
449 ‘Zum 15. April’, Kladderadatsch, vol. 18, no. 20, 30 Apr. 1865, 77.
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Their stance was arguably less the consequence of a hardening of attitudes, visible 
in the liberal Ludwig August von Rochau’s championing of Realpolitik, than of the 
 consolidation of heroic conceptions of combat.450 Between 1864 and 1871, this 
willingness was tested extensively for the first time since 1815.
450 The section on war in L. A. v. Rochau, Grundsätze der Realpolitik (Stuttgart, 1853), vol. 1, 
100–8, is actually concerned to establish legal and other limits to the use of violence.
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